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Abstract
Computer networks face continual attacks from adversaries that devise innovative ways
to achieve their goals. An adversary often conducts careful reconnaissance and scanning
of the target network to amass actionable information before they launch an attack. IP
addresses are one form of information sought by adversaries. A defensive method that
uses a Moving Target Defense (MTD) to change the perceived IP addresses of hosts on a
network attaches an expiration date to information from the intelligence-gathering phases
of an attack. To counter this, an adversary must act fast and introduce a higher chance of
committing an error, or scan more often which increases their visibility.
Technical challenges with MTD pose obstacles for those who wish to use this technique
on their networks. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) provides network engineers with
a flexible way to determine network behavior, which overcomes some of these technical
challenges. One form of a SDN MTD is Random Host Mutation (RHM), which assigns
hosts a Virtual IP address (vIP) to pair with their Real IP address (rIP). At a given
interval, these rIP:vIP mappings “mutate” and link a different vIP to the same rIP.
RHM is an offshoot of a proof-of-concept implementation in a simulation network from
researchers at the University of North Carolina (UNC). While this research did not include
statistical analysis, research by Aust in 2017 at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
confirms the defensive benefits of this technique through experiments on actual hardware
with statistically-significant research. With a proven defensive technique in hand, the im-
pact of RHM on Quality of Service (QoS) for legitimate network users is the next area of
interest for network engineers. This research confirms previous work in the research area
with validation experiments. QoS experiments use a test network similar to the one in past
AFIT research, which supports a simulated adversary and servers for several protocols in
common use. Test scripts generate packet captures of network traffic for later analysis of
legitimate user and adversary actions. Conclusions about the efficacy of RHM on adversary
iv
actions and QoS stem from this data.
Results confirm the defensive benefits of RHM against scanning actions by the com-
parison of total perceived hosts with both quick and intense network scans by a simulated
adversary. T-tests compare scan times and total perceived hosts versus total actual hosts for
quick and intense scans. These tests, done at the 99% confidence level (p <0.01), reveal a
statistically-significant difference in both scan time and number of hosts found. As a result,
Aust’s claims of the defensive benefits of a SDN-based MTD are valid.
Of the seven protocols under test in QoS trials (File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), Post Office Proto-
col (POP), Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP),
and Secure Shell (SSH)), FTP does not function in a RHM-enabled network and HTTP
displays anomalous behavior that creates up to 14.2 times as much network traffic during
mutation connections versus control trials. RTP shows an increase in jitter of 128 ms that,
depending upon the requirements of applications using this protocol, may not be accept-
able. IMAP, POP, SMTP, and SSH display some differences from control studies with an
average overhead latency increase of no more than four milliseconds after accounting for
outliers. While RHM introduces a meaningful impact on QoS, the scale of this impact may
be small enough that the defensive benefit justifies the cost on a case-by-case basis. The
results of this thesis serve as a next-step in application of RHM to real-world networks such
as enterprise settings.
v
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QUALITY OF SERVICE IMPACTS OF A MOVING TARGET DEFENSE WITH
SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING
I. Introduction
This thesis refines a security measure against network scans with a Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) controller and an OpenFlow-capable switch. This chapter gives context
for the research problem of interest and an approach to gather meaningful data. Finally,
this chapter states research goals along with assumptions and limitations for this line of
research.
1.1 Background
Computer networks are a vital part of modern society. Their applications for economic,
personal, and industrial purposes revolutionize several aspects of life. Networked systems
have a similar effect and are a staple of modern life in most nations. Those who wish to inflict
harm on companies, individuals, or nations recognize this new means of attack and develop
exploits to achieve destruction, degradation, or Denial of Service (DoS) of these systems.
The attack surface these systems present results in efforts by security professionals to slow
down or deny adversary actions. Adversaries counter these efforts with new techniques to
get around these defensive measures, which creates a cat-and-mouse game between attacker
and defender.
SDN is an emerging form of network operations for computer networks. In this ar-
chitectural paradigm, the separation of control and data planes allows a central network
intelligence and an abstraction of the underlying infrastructure (e.g., switches or routers) for
applications. The OpenFlow protocol is one instance of SDN that allows for a vast number
of uses on a network. In this configuration, the use of a centralized controller directs the
flow of data across the network in a manner that is difficult or impossible in traditional
1
networking approaches.
Research efforts by the University of North Carolina (UNC), and later on by the Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), examine an implementation of a defensive counter-
measure that uses SDN to thwart adversaries as they conduct the first steps of their attacks.
This technique uses Random Host Mutation (RHM) to shuﬄe the perception of network
asset locations to impede adversary action with a link between a Real IP address (rIP) and
a Virtual IP address (vIP). Results from these research efforts are promising, but do not
consider the Quality of Service (QoS) implications of this defensive technique.
1.2 Problem Statement
There exists proven value of RHMs as a means of Moving Target Defense (MTD) in
SDN. Unfortunately, this evidence does not consider the network performance impact
on legitimate users; it only examines the challenges adversaries experience. This thesis
attempts to confirm results of the defensive benefits of RHM and provide statistically-sound
information that addresses the QoS implications of this MTD on a network. Tests focus
on a stable network that provides an effective means of defense while enabling experiments
that report the QoS legitimate users experience.
1.3 Goals and Hypothesis
This thesis builds upon previous work in the SDN-enabled MTD topic area by confirm-
ing the benefit of mutations as a MTD and their impact on legitimate users with a test
network running services in common use. The framework used to design these tests fo-
cuses on stability, effectiveness, and the measurement of QoS metrics. The severity of these
QoS impacts is unknown and their assessment is one of the primary motivations for this
thesis. The hypothesis for this thesis is that a RHM-network shows statistically-significant
differences in network scan times and scan accuracy at the cost of a decrease in QoS of an
unknown magnitude as experienced by legitimate users.
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1.4 Approach
A test network of thirty hosts, one SDN-enabled switch, one adversary machine, and
one SDN controller provide the basis for experiments. Experiments measure the duration of
adversary and legitimate actions with internal clocks on the hosts. Adversary measurements
focus on the duration of network scans and number of perceived hosts that result from
network scans. Legitimate user actions create traffic with protocols in common use and
report information about the throughput, reliability, and performance of those connections.
Experiments are run with and without RHMs on the network and record packet captures
for later analysis. Comparison of the data from packet captures indicate if the impact on
adversary or legitimate users is statistically significant.
1.5 Assumption and Limitations
Assumptions and limitations enable proper interpretation of the results and keep exper-
imentation focused on the research goals. This thesis applies the following assumptions:
1. To replicate Aust’s study, the adversary scans from inside the network.
2. All target hosts run Windows XP Service Pack 2 to ensure they are vulnerable to the
adversary.
3. The adversary does not attempt to exploit network infrastructure, nor the servers
that host the protocols under test.
4. Legitimate users know the vIP address of the network assets that support the protocols
under test.
5. Due to identical target hosts, the adversary can exploit a random machine from the
list of scan results instead of the same host every time.
6. While dedicated adversaries can identify hosts based upon Media Access Control
(MAC) addresses, the simulated adversary does not. Some exploits launched through
Metasploit require an IP address and do not function without this information [1].
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Since a rescan of the network must occur to supply the exploit with a current vIP
address of the target host, the system still provides a layer of shifting obfuscation.
Research in this thesis has four main limitations:
1. Identification of hosts may occur via characteristics other than IP address (e.g., open
ports, MAC addresses, Operating System (OS) version).
2. RHMs sacrifice the impact on duration of adversary access after a successful attack
from Aust’s work to ensure broader network usability that maintains connections
across mutations. This trade-off allows for lengthier connections, which overcomes a
limitation of previous research and increases usability of the network.
3. The vIP of a given host is known by the client that attempts to open a connection
to it. In experiments, the tester examines the mutation table on the SDN controller
and supplies the correct vIP to the test script which creates connections between the
client and server. A real-world system must automatically update clients with current
rIP:vIP mappings.
4. Wireshark collects QoS with built-in tools. Other tools to measure QoS may exist
that provide better data.
Chapter VI discusses these limitations in greater detail as areas of future work.
1.6 Thesis Overview
This thesis addresses the defined research area in six chapters. Chapter II defines
Software-Defined Networking, network attack, the concept of a moving target defense,
presents a case study where MTD provides a clear benefit, defines random host muta-
tion as a form of MTD, and reviews previous research efforts. Chapter III details the
framework used in tests and provides a detailed description of how each component fits
together. Chapter IV discusses the experimental process, and the results of experiments
are in Chapter V. Chapter VI summarizes the research, and explains the significance of this
research and future work contribution to the SDN body of knowledge.
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II. Background and Related Research
This chapter discusses the information necessary to understand Random Host Mutation
(RHM) in Software-Defined Networking (SDN). Section 2.1 discusses the key characteristics
and developmental history of SDN. Section 2.2 reviews network attack methodology to
provide context for defensive countermeasures. Section 2.3 covers the topic of Moving
Target Defense (MTD) and how RHM provides this capability; this concept is the basis of
the thesis. Section 2.4 provides an example of how MTD reduces the threat posed by the
Mirai botnet. RHMs are described in detail in Section 2.5. Previous research into MTD
through SDN is reviewed in Section 2.6.
2.1 Software-Defined Networking
As shown in Figure 1, traditional network infrastructure combines the processing logic
for network behavior (control plane) and processing of network traffic (data plane) in each
network appliance (e.g., switches). Management of larger, more complex network topologies
in this way, produce complicated administrative challenges. Software-Defined Networking
separates the control and data planes through the use of SDN-capable devices and a cen-
tralized controller which defines network behavior for the SDN devices. SDN controllers
maintain network state information and interact with control applications and switches via
an Application Programming Interface (API). In effect, this becomes a distributed system
the emphasizes performance, scalability, fault-tolerance, and robustness. Centralized con-
trol allows for easier installation and removal of extra hardware as the logic that determines
behavior is located at the controller and not the device that are installed or removed. In
this configuration, the centrally-located controller uses a secure channel (shown as a green
dotted line) to define switch behavior.
5
Figure 1. Separation of Control and Data Planes in Traditional Networks Versus a SDN [2]
2.1.1 SDN Basics.
Four main concepts characterize SDN [2]:
• Plane Separation: The control plane determines data plane actions and establishes
the rules that govern what flow table entries get installed on devices that interact
with the data plane. Data kept in these flow tables define how data plane devices
(e.g., switches) process traffic as it traverses their ingress and egress ports [3]. Data
plane devices forward, drop, consume, or replicate incoming traffic based upon rules
stored in their flow tables. Section 2.1.3 provides examples of these four actions in an
example SDN.
• Simple Devices and Centralized Control : Complex software that determines network
function is stored on the centralized controller, not on switches that handle the data
plane.
• Network Automation and Visualization: SDN simplifies network operations through
abstraction as well as Northbound and Southbound APIs. As shown in Figure 2,
northbound APIs interface with software applications that interact with the controller.
Southbound APIs govern the interface between controllers and network devices. This
concept is similar to how high-level programming languages make programming more
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accessible through layers of abstraction.
• Openness: Software engineering approaches such as agile development have shown
their value in rapid creation of prototypes and a mindset that embraces change. The
flexible nature of SDN enables the development of networks that facilitate research,
experimentation, and vendor interoperability to lower consumer cost and support
rapid innovation. This design goal allows for faster development of and changes to
network behavior.
Figure 2. Northbound and Southbound APIs in a SDN [4]
The SDN controller provides the conduit between the network programmer and the
nuances of network functionality. Controllers manage topologies, flows, discover devices, and
gather locally-stored statistics. The modular nature of the Northbound and Southbound
APIs minimizes differences between SDN devices due to the standardized interface. SDN
devices use the Southbound API to receive updates to their flow tables. The highest priority
match between the packet and a given rule in the flow table dictates how to process network
traffic. The concept of processing network traffic through examination of its characteristics
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is not a novel concept. For example, firewalls have allowed network operators to reject
packets through criteria such as IP addresses and source or destination ports. However, the
generic flow tables and flexible logic in SDN are what make this technology versatile for
packet processing.
2.1.2 SDN versus Traditional networking.
To understand the benefits of SDN, the key differences between SDN and traditional
network management deserve an overview. The Open Networking Foundation notes that
current networking technology without SDN suffers from four main limitations [2]:
• Stasis: Increases in complexity from highly-interconnected control and data plane
hardware present obstacles to ensure stability at scale and inhibit innovation.
• Inconsistent Policies: Uniform adoption of new control plane policies does not always
occur since each control element need individual configuration.
• Poor Scalability : Growing networks require more time from administrators to properly
configure. Automation from SDN due to vendor-independence reduces Operation
Expenses (OPEX).
• Vendor Dependence: Vendor-specific interfaces and configurations create dependencies
on third parties and complicate the role of administrators, especially if hardware from
multiple vendors is in use. Interoperability challenges can lead to vendor lock-in due
to past purchasing decisions.
The separation of control and data plane is not a groundbreaking concept, as mod-
ern switches that do not support SDN still have Application-Specific Integrated Circuits
(ASICs) that communicate with general-purpose Central Processing Units (CPUs) to han-
dle control plane messages or traffic without defined rules [3]. The distinction lies in the
fact that traditional hardware represents these two planes as tightly-woven entities within
the same physical hardware. This in turn led to more complex machines which increase
development costs and contribute to stagnant network technologies.
8
The architecture of SDN adapts to large networks due to the separation of control and
data planes. Separation allows the determination of fast routes without taxing the same
hardware that must forward network traffic. Once new optimal routes are calculated by
the controller’s processing logic, the rules that govern the SDN devices propagate from the
controller to the SDN devices. This process is done through a live update to SDN devices
without service interruptions. The global view of a controller also allows for link state
algorithms such as Dijkstra’s algorithm to compute optimal routes. Since SDN uses well-
defined API calls, the limitation of vendor independence becomes less of a factor as SDN-
capable hardware must perform to a standard specification such as OpenFlow. Changes
in network policy conducted at the controller-level propagate out to infrastructure devices.
This overcomes the traditional network limitation of inconsistent policies.
2.1.3 Example SDN Configuration.
This section provides an example of how all the components in a SDN come together to
process network traffic. Figure 3 illustrates a network consisting of one SDN controller and
three SDN switches along with the basic actions that SDN devices can take. The controller
has a global view of the network in its memory and can interface with the switches using
calls across the southbound API to update the flow information kept on each switch through
a communications protocol such as OpenFlow (Section 2.1.5). As switches receive network
data, they perform one of four actions: Forward, drop, consume, or replicate [2]. Forwarded
packets are processed based upon a matching flow in the flow table. Dropped packets can
result from specific filtering. Packets are consumed when they require additional processing
by the control plane. For example, if a packet did not have a matching filter, the data plane
device uses its isolated channel with the controller to send the packet for further processing
[2]. Replication of packets is a special case of forwarding where packets are sent out across
multiple egress ports.
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Figure 3. Demonstration of SDN Actions
Messages that pass between hosts and SDN devices in Figure 3 demonstrate all actions
that a SDN switch can take and an update from the controller in six steps. As a start
condition, SDN Switch 1 has several flows installed on it to process traffic from Hosts 1,
2, and 3. SDN Switch 2 has only one flow which states that it must replicate any traffic
received to all its egress ports. SDN Switch 3 does not have any active flows and must
consume any packets to receive instruction from the controller before it takes any actions.
The six steps taken contain these actions:
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1. Send - Host 1 sends a message to Host 2. This message is representative of any net-
work traffic that a traditional network would handle, such as a Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) SYN packet or a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) GET request.
2. Forward - As the packet reaches SDN Switch 1, the switch examines its flow table
and finds a match based upon the characteristics of the message from Host 1 (e.g.,
source IP address, destination IP address, TCP or User Datagram Protocol (UDP),
destination and source ports). The rule in the flow table says that it must forward
the message to the egress port associated with SDN Switch 2.
3. Replicate - When Host 1’s message reaches SDN Switch 2, it finds an single flow table
entry which replicates a message of the type that Host 1 sent. A replicate rule is a
special type of forward rule so the switch sends Host 1’s message out on all of its
egress ports (i.e., to SDN switches 1 and 2 as well as Host 2). Host 2 receives Host 1’s
message. When the replicated message reaches SDN Switch 1, it drops the message
according to a rule in the switch’s flow table.
4. Consume - When the replicated message reaches SDN Switch 3, it does not find a
matching entry in the flow table. It now consumes this packet and forwards it to the
controller for instruction on how to handle future packets of this type.
5. Update - The controller examines Host 1’s message and determines that it must be
dropped. A rule to drop further packets of this type is installed in the switch’s flow
table.
6. Drop - The packet consumed by SDN Switch 3 is dropped and does not reach Host 3.
With knowledge of desired network behavior and protocol specifics, these core actions
allow network engineers to define the behavior of a SDN. By using actions broken into
their most basic components, SDN switches can be designed with simplicity in mind. This
separation allows network behavior to become a property of the network as defined in the
controller. As network requirements change, the core actions taken by switches do not
change as they adapt to instructions from the controller through modified flow tables.
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2.1.4 Developmental History.
SDN has its beginnings in the 1990s with four different attempts at network control:
Open Signaling, Active Networking, Decentralized Control of ATM Networks (DCAN), and
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF). In each case, efforts prioritized ways to
make networks more programmable and scalable. Open Signaling produced the idea of pro-
grammable interfaces similar to the North and Southbound APIs discussed in Section 2.1.1
[4]. APIs for computer networks enable customization of network infrastructure with greater
ease. Active Networking used separate channels for data and control planes [5][6]. The abil-
ity of SDN controllers to update flow tables to influence network behavior drew from this
idea. DCAN separated the control and data planes entirely [6]. This separation technique
later became one of the hallmarks of SDNs. In 2006, NETCONF provided a management
protocol that allowed network devices to expose an API to exchange configuration data al-
though it did not separate control and data planes [6]. This feature enabled the ease-of-use
associated with network management through a SDN controller. Along the developmental
timeline of SDN, predecessors such as DCAN, NETCONF, and Ethane provided elements
that influenced SDN in its current form [6][7]. A direct predecessor to OpenFlow, Ethane
focused on the use of a centralized controller to manage policy and security on a network.
Table 1 lists several SDN controllers and provides a brief description for each.
Table 1. Comparison of Different SDN Controllers [6]
Controller Name Controller Description
NOX Multi-threaded C++ on top of Boost library [8]
POX Single-threaded Python for rapid prototyping
Beacon Multi-threaded Java using OSGi and Spring frameworks [9][10]
Floodlight Multi-threaded Java using Netty framework [11]
MUL Multi-threaded C based on top of libevent and glib [12][13]
Maestro Multi-threaded Java
Ryu Python based using gevent wrapper from libevent [14] [12]
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These research efforts culminated in the creation of a communication protocol called
OpenFlow. In 2007, NOX and POX controllers became publicly-available OpenFlow con-
trollers. Since their release, several other controllers have been released to include: Flood-
light, Ryu, Beacon, Mul, and Maestro [7]. These OpenFlow controllers can implement
services such as Domain Name System (DNS), firewalls, and Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (IDSs). SDN controllers act as one logical unit so modifications to the network became
easier to make. By comparison, a traditional network infrastructure needed individual con-
figuration of disparate components to achieve the same effect.
2.1.5 OpenFlow Communications Protocol.
SDN only conceptualizes network behavior. To actually implement these concepts re-
quires a specific communications protocol. A prominent communications protocol in use for
SDN is called OpenFlow [15]. This protocol meets the need of researchers to experiment
with new network protocols without risking campus network outages. For ease of access,
OpenFlow adopts the idea that switches and routers contain flow tables used for activities
such as Network Address Translation (NAT), Quality of Service (QoS), statistics collection,
etc. Three characteristics usually comprise a flow: match fields process incoming traffic,
counters collect statistics, and actions define how to handle a packet caught by the match
fields [6]. A flow handles network traffic with predefined network rules (i.e., match: IP
address x, action: forward to port y). McKeown, Parulkar, et al. highlight the use of Open-
Flow on computer networks through six examples that demonstrate the ability to modify
the individual flow tables on these switches and routers [2][5][15]. Under OpenFlow, these
rules apply on a per-rule basis which allows greater granularity for data prioritization, pro-
cessing, and transmission across a network. The OpenFlow protocol API made this manual
process much faster.
2.1.6 Major Users.
SDN is no longer just a novel technology for use by researchers; several large companies
use SDN for aspects of their network management. Google, Verizon Wireless, and Dell
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all use SDN for tasks ranging from isolated product testing to data relocation across data-
centers [16]. Google and IBM recognize the value of SDN and support the Open Networking
Foundation [16]. IBM and Cisco also produce OpenFlow-enabled switches, indicating that
some of the major players in networking hardware wish to capitalize on the developing mar-
ket [17][18]. Visualization efforts are underway by Nicira to decouple network information
from physical switch hardware in a move similar to how VMware shapes virtual machine
management [16]. Each of these major players remain subject to similar security concerns
that any enterprise network would face. In addition to current defensive techniques com-
mon to computer networks, users of SDN can benefit from the addition of a MTD to their
networks.
2.2 Network Attack
Regardless of if a network is configured through traditional means or via SDN, the ac-
tions of an adversary tend to fall into five sequential steps to achieve their objective. In
the case of the Mirai Botnet discussed in Section 2.4, an adversary used poorly-secured
devices to launch a crippling Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack at an oppor-
tune moment. An understanding of how network attacks are conducted is necessary to see
how the flexibility of SDN can enable new defensive techniques that foil adversaries in these
phases. Adversaries typically launch their attacks by following the process described in Fig-
ure 4: reconnaissance, scanning, gaining access, maintaining access, and covering tracks [19].
Figure 4. Five Stages of Network Attack [19]
Reconnaissance and scanning are distinct activities used to gather intelligence about
a target network. Reconnaissance focuses on the acquisition of target information. Ad-
versaries can detect all sorts of target information from a plethora of sources. With this
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information, targeted attempts to gather intelligence about the target network can occur,
often with a higher chance of success. The pervasive nature of the online world has made
it difficult to reduce the attack surface that organizations and individuals present to adver-
saries. Scanning searches for computers and openings in networks for later exploitation by
an adversary. In combination with proper reconnaissance, selective examination of weak-
points across the network attack surface occurs. Critical network components such as servers
and network infrastructure present high-value targets to adversaries. Poor configuration or
use of default settings offers little guarantee to rebuff even script-kiddie attacks.
Having found a target, gaining access through software exploits or social engineering
allows an adversary to act with greater freedom. Any level of access, not just that of
an administrator, has the potential for great harm. At this point, adversaries establish
footholds to fulfill their broader objectives such as data exfiltration. Now that an adversary
has access, creation of other processes or programs that allow them to maintain access with
less effort if their current form of access fails is common. Throughout this entire process,
adversaries attempt to remain stealthy and cover their tracks. IDSs apply a broad range
of strategies to detect malicious activity within a network. Statistical analysis of network
traffic for sudden high levels of traffic that links to network mapping or connections to
strange external locations may indicate malicious activity. As described in Section 2.3, a
moving target defense forces adversaries to increase certain types of network traffic during
the scanning and maintaining access phases.
The addition of countermeasures after a successful attack offers little solace for the vic-
tims, and no single solution resists all attacks by adversaries. A robust strategy must rely
upon a defense-in-depth to complement the weaknesses posed by other means of counter-
measures. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) advocates for layered
security mechanisms to manage risk in a situation where one control could suffice stating,
“Controls, when used in depth, can make severe vulnerabilities extraordinarily difficult to
exploit and this unlikely to occur” [20]. For example, firewalls must be used in tandem with
endpoint anti-virus, network segmentation, and security awareness training for improved
security.
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The centralized nature of the controller presents a high-value target to adversaries and a
single point-of-failure. Therefore, multiple controllers provide redundancy [21]. The inher-
ent flexibility of SDN opens up a spectrum of new defensive measures to protect networks.
MTD with SDN increases the challenges adversaries face when they try to launch an attack.
2.3 Moving Target Defense (MTD)
From the perspective of an adversary, static network configurations make the task of
gaining and maintaining access more tenable. A compromised system with shifting char-
acteristics is harder to successfully exploit than a compromised system with static char-
acteristics. Much like how a randomly zig-zagging target is harder to shoot with a rifle,
an equivalent approach to network defense presents additional challenges to an adversary.
Even if systems on a network are kept “up-to-date,” public vulnerability disclosures occur
regularly and advanced threats may have access to zero-day exploits on supposedly robust
systems. MTD, by definition, seeks to “create, evaluate, and deploy mechanisms which are
diverse, continually shift and change over time to increase complexity and costs for attack-
ers, limit the exposure of vulnerabilities and opportunities for attack, and increase system
resiliency” [22]. Anything that adds chaos to the adversary’s efforts serves as an effective
defensive countermeasure if deemed worth the cost.
Valuable defensive countermeasures must have costs proportional to the cost of the asset
they defend in addition to the operational impact of the countermeasure [23]. Research
discussed in Section 2.6 concluded that MTD is a useful defensive countermeasure from
broad-spectrum attacks [24]. Opportunistic attacks that adversaries launch to establish
access on a network may not have the benefit of honed phishing attempts as compared
to more targeted attacks. In either case, a defensive measure that constantly morphs the
topology an adversary observes constitutes a valuable defense as long as the QoS the end
user experiences does not suffer. Figure 5 illustrates the network equivalent of zig-zagging
that a MTD provides for a network to impede the scanning efforts of an adversary. Scans
that show a printer at IP address 2 would then resolve to a computer after the network
topology has shifted. Thus, to target the printer after a mutation, the adversary must
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conduct another scan to see the current IP address of its target.
Figure 5. Concept of a Moving Target Defense
With respect to networked computers, standard components include MAC addresses,
open ports, active services, and IP addresses. Each of these characteristics uniquely identi-
fies hosts on a network. IP addresses are a prime candidate for MTD as they are commonly
used to make assets visible on a network. In conjunction with IP addresses, ports (Trans-
port Layer) create a unique 4-tuple between a client and server to establish connections.
Media Access Control (MAC) addresses (Data Link Layer) are also used, but protocols such
as TCP and UDP ride above their layer of abstraction. For a corporate network, a MTD
that changes IP addresses is more practical than changing MAC addresses even though it
may not constitute a perfect defense. In a network dealing with sensitive Industrial Con-
trol Systems (ICSs), a MTD that focuses on multiple aspects, such as IPs and/or MAC
addresses may be justified despite an increase configuration cost. The specifics of a network
influence what constitutes a valuable defensive countermeasure.
2.4 Mirai Botnet Case Study
One example of an attack with far-reaching consequences that could have been impeded
by a MTD was the Mirai botnet attack in October of 2016. Botnets are swarms of networked
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computers which leverage their mass to achieve some goal Denial of Service (DoS)) [25].
Technical specifics have evolved over the years, but the result is that botnets are hard to
detect and defend against once created. The Mirai attacks carried out a DDoS against Dyn,
a major DNS provider, by sending approximately 1.1 terabits of malicious traffic per second.
Several attack variants exist to include Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), TCP, and
HTTP flooding [26]. The service outages resulting from this botnet caused services such as
Twitter, Netflix, and Facebook to go oﬄine for several hours.
Figure 6 outlines the 7-step attack process for this botnet [26]. First, a bot searches
an addresses range for improperly configured IoT devices and attempts to gain access via
brute force. Upon successful discovery of a vulnerable host, the bot reports this information
to a report server that keeps track of vulnerable devices. A Command and Control (C2)
server then checks for potential victims through the information stored on the report server.
Once the C2 server chooses a group of devices to attack, an infection command with the
requisite details (i.e., IP addresses and hardware configurations) is configured on a loader
which delivers the malicious binary. Once this exploit is installed on the new victim, it can
communicate with the C2 server for further instruction. Finally, the C2 server issues attack
commands to the newly-formed botnet. This command then causes the bots to perform
their DoS.
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Figure 6. Mirai Botnet Attack Overview [26]
In a network using RHMs as a MTD, the Mirai botnet may be able to complete steps 1
and 2 in Figure 6, but when the C2 server initiates step 3 the new bot victim could have a
new IP address and would show up as inactive. Next, the C2 server would skip step 4 and
move on to a new target in its list. Alternatively, the Report server may indicate an active
target in step 3 but a mutation could occur between steps 3 and 4. In either scenario, the
reliability of this attack methodology is no longer guaranteed to work due to RHMs which
cause the intelligence gathered in the reconnaissance phase to have a shortened lifespan.
In the case of the Mirai botnet, DoS attacks were made possible by poorly secured
Internet of Things (IoT) devices and demonstrates the massive attack surface posed by a
line of technology so willingly embraced with general disregard toward security implications
[25]. Many users of IoT devices are unaware or apathetic to security implications that may
cause these devices to be repurposed by adversaries [26]. The anticipated existence of over
100 billion IoT devices by 2025 presents serious security concerns for network operators
[25]. Use of a MTD reduces risk posed to this attack surface by disrupting the ability of an
adversary to reliably discover and exploit vulnerable devices.
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2.5 Random Host Mutation
Having defined the value of a MTD, this section addresses the specifics of how a the-
oretical MTD exists on a computer network. Identification of services is one of the main
parts of the scanning phase of the cyberattack methodology. Much like how company-wide
password policies introduce a level of variability in user credentials, the concept of a shift-
ing field of “cyber terrain” through RHM at the network level challenges attackers to act
within a constrained window of opportunity [27]. Researchers at University of North Car-
olina (UNC) provide several proof-of-concept proposals that inspire the general application
of RHMs [28][29][30]. These research efforts produce systems that are unpredictable, fast,
operationally safe, and transparent.
Figure 7 describes a SDN that supports RHM. This network architecture consists of
SDN switches, a SDN controller, and hosts connected to the switch. For connectivity to
the Internet, standard pieces of infrastructure such as routers may exist. Without a certain
level of interoperability, SDN technology does not easily integrate with the well-established
networking techniques of at a cost-effective level. Each SDN switch contains a flow table that
defines how each particular switch processes network traffic. The flow tables are updated
according to information sent by the SDN controller.
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Figure 7. OpenFlow RHM Architecture [31]
A scanning adversary may find a node and see that it is at IP address a.b.c.d running
services x, y, and z. After a RHM, that same IP address may or may not map to an ac-
tual node on the network. If it does, an entirely different set of services could be running
on a.b.c.d which forces an additional scan to account for inaccurate network information.
Further compounding the complexity for adversaries could be the existence of honeypots
that run the same set of services as a legitimate target. Honeypots are targets designed to
attract adversaries so that defenders can better understand or entrap them [32]. Intention-
ally placing weak targets on a RHM network that appear similar to legitimate hosts require
adversaries to acquire more identifying information about targets (e.g., MAC addresses or
Operating System (OS) Versions) to reacquire them after an IP address mutation.
At its core, the controller to leverages the power of SDN to map the Real IP address (rIP)
21
of each host to a Virtual IP address (vIP) in an RHM. If end hosts perform this muta-
tion process, numerous synchronization problems would emerge and inconsistent mutation
calculations done by each host may render themselves isolated from the network. When a
host without a rIP:vIP mapping initiates a connection, the switch examines its flow table
for an existing flow and forwards the packet if one exists. In the event that a flow does not
exist, the controller creates a new flow for the connection and that information propagates
to the switch.
RHM shares similarities with NAT but has a key distinction. While NAT allows multiple
devices to share one Internet-routable address, once an adversary gets beyond a NAT there
is no longer a defensive benefit to a NAT. RHMs allow the use of a similar construct to
add another layer of obfuscation to internal networks which slow down an attacker and
force increased scanning activity. This behavior can make an adversary more visible to an
IDS, especially since SDN flows are designed to facilitate the collection of statistics related
to individual flows. Furthermore, the limited window-of-opportunity constrains adversary
actions and may force careless actions.
Figure 8 provides a sequence diagram of how a host sends network traffic to a host on
a different subnet in a SDN using RHM. First, Host A wants to send a message to the vIP
address of Host B. Additional network management must occur to inform clients of vIPs.
One potential way to share this information with the clients is through DNS cache updates
that occur in sync with mutations (this idea is discussed in Section 6.4). Second, the SDN
switch receives the request and discovers that there is no rule in the flow table to handle
this type of traffic. Third, the switch asks the controller how to handle this request. The
controller determines that traffic coming from Host A’s rIP (10.13.1.5) destined for Host
B’s vIP (10.13.2.42) must have the source/destination headers modified. Host A’s rIP must
be replaced with its vIP (10.13.1.86). The destination of Host B’s vIP then translates to its
rIP (10.13.2.10). After this calculation, the fourth step is to update the flow table entries on
the SDN switch. Fifth, the switch conducts address translation between the rIPs and vIPs
for Hosts A and B. Finally, the switch sends the message to Host B. Note how the SDN
switch sends a request to the SDN controller when predefined behaviors are not present at
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the switch. The network policies set by the network engineers are instantiated as rules at
the controller and transmitted across the Southbound API to the data plane (as described
in Section 2.1.1).
Figure 8. Sequence Diagram for Flow Creation [24]
In the example described in Figure 9, a host attempts to communicate with another host
on a different subnet and the SDN switch already has a defined flow. Now that a flow has
been established between the two hosts, traffic flows freely hosts much like in a traditional
network as long as the flow table is not modified. First, Host A wants to send a message to
the vIP of Host B. Second, the switch checks its flow table for a rule on how to handle this
traffic. There exists a rule on the switch stating that traffic from Host A’s rIP destined for
Host B’s vIP must modify the source/destination headers. Host A’s vIP replaces its rIP
and the switch translates the destination of Host B’s vIP to its rIP much like in Figure 8.
Finally, the Host B receives the message. The difference between this example and the one
in Figure 8 is that a flow already exists on the switch so the controller does not supply the
switch with instructions. If RHMs were used in this example, the rule on the SDN switch
that governs this translation process must update to a different set of translations based
upon source IP addresses.
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Figure 9. Sequence Diagram for an Existing Flow [24]
A variety of specific details may govern RHMs based upon the desires of network engi-
neers. Hosts can mutate in a purely random way, they can be weighted to have mappings
that are not near their current vIP in the address pool, or could mutate based on adversary
actions. The optimal means of calculating the mutation rate is subject to numerous ele-
ments of the network but is beyond the scope of this thesis which measures the performance
impacts of RHMs on legitimate users.
After a certain interval has passed, the mappings between rIPs and vIP change such
that no mapping from the previous mutation table exists in the current mutation table.
If rIP:vIP mappings did not always change with each mutation and the host were already
compromised, an adversary would have even more time to execute attack scripts and create
persistence. Imagine a vIP pool of four with three hosts. In this scenario, host mutations
resemble those illustrated in Figure 10 if a flow table on one of the switches were examined.
Examination of host A in the figure shows it has a vIP of 1 at the start. After the first
mutation, its rIP:vIP mapping becomes A:2. After another mutation host A has a vIP
of 3. This process continues indefinitely with the restriction that each host does not keep
the same vIP across mutations. In this example, it means that host A cannot have a vIP
of 3 after a theoretical third mutation. The specifics of how mutations are handled (i.e.,
frequency, available address ranges) can vary depending upon the level of complexity that
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the network programmers wish to undertake.
Figure 10. rIP:vIP Mutations Example
One possible means of RHM in an OpenFlow network is described in Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1: OpenFlow Random Host Mutation [31]
Data: Unused address ranges, Range-to-Subnet assignments
Result: Mutation of rIP:vIP mappings
1 Unused ranges
2 Range-to-subnet assignments
3 forall packets p from OF-Switches do
4 if p is a Type-A DNS response for host hi then
5 set DNS address to current vIP(hi), TTL ' 0
6 else if p is a TCP-SYN or UDP from hi to hj then
7 if p.src is internal then
8 install in flow in source OF-Switch with action srcIP(p) := vIP(hi)
9 install out flow in source OF-Switch with action dstIP(p) := rIP(hi)
10 if p.dst is rIP then
11 if hi access to hj is authorized then
12 install in and out flows in destination OF-Switch
13 else p.dst is vIP
14 install in flow in destination OF-Switch with action dstIP(p) := rIP(hj)
15 install out flow in destination OF-Switch with action srcIP(p) := vIP(hj)
16 end
17 forall mutation of each host hi do
18 set vIP(hi) to a new vIP
19 end
20 end
Algorithm 1 allows devices on the same subnet to communicate with each other using
only their rIPs and establishes rIP:vIP mappings. Unused address ranges are determined
to define the vIP address pool which are then assigned to subnets in lines 1 and 2. At this
point, each subnet on the network receives a subset of the vIP address pool for its hosts.
Translation/flow creation then happens as required based upon network traffic. Lines 4 and
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5 show the assignment of a vIP for a packet that contains a DNS response for a particular
host on the network. When information reaches the host, the DNS cache now contains a
link between the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) and the vIP of the host in question.
The else block that spans lines 6-16 shows how other network traffic could be handled. The
if block from lines 7-9 conducts address translation between two hosts on the mutation
network by changing the IP addresses in the packet through a new flows on the switch. The
if block that starts on line 10 handles a scenario where hosts are allowed to communicate
with the rIP of a host. In this case, address translation does not necessarily occur. Such an
action may be practical for gateways or DNS servers that new devices must contact when
they join a network. The else block starting on line 13 conducts the translation of a packet
bound for a vIP to the rIP of the intended server. This block also changes the source IP
to the vIP of the client. The forall block that starts on line 17 defines what occurs during
a mutation. In a broad sense, each vIP of a host on the network receives a new vIP. The
specifics of this process are an area that can be custom-tailored to the requirements of the
network.
2.6 Previous Work in RHM Topic Area
Much of the spearheading into the application of SDN for MTD and the concept of RHM
stemmed from work by researchers at UNC starting in 2012 [31]. This research provided
mathematical models with which to define RHMs as well as tests in Mininet, a network
simulator. Preliminary results indicated that adversaries were not able to generate as clear
of a picture of a network topology compared to a static network due to shifting rIP:vIP
mappings. With a proof-of-concept established, this idea was further refined by a previous
research project from Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) [24].
To build upon the work done by the team at UNC, a study to test the concept on
enterprise-quality hardware instead of a simulated environment was conducted by Aust at
AFIT [24]. Aust refers to this work as Proactive Host Mutation (PHM). The study showed
that an adversary in a “PHM network is significantly worse at finding and maintaining
connections to hosts” [24]. T-tests conducted with a 90% confidence level showed differences
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in network scan performance with p-values equal to or less than 0.1. The results supported
Aust’s hypothesis that PHM made scans by an adversary less effective [24]. Aust also
noted the impact that PHM has on legitimate users as an area of future work stating,
“given that servers host critical network functionality and data, they are highly valuable
targets for attackers. The limitation seen in this research is that some network functions
require lengthy connections, such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP). If these connections were
interrupted by the mutation, it would interfere with user connectivity, which is unacceptable
in most enterprise networks. An addition to PHM to allow for extended connections, without
allowing for a new attack vector would significantly improve the functionality of PHM” [24].
The code that calculates PHMs does not update the rIP:vIP mapping for connections after
a mutation occurs. As a result, network assets are no longer at the location in use by a
client in an active connection. This design flaw requires a solution before a SDN-enabled
MTD can see use in real-world networks. This thesis creates a version of Aust’s work, RHM,
that overcomes this critical issue. The limitation of interrupted connections drives the main
focus of this thesis to assess the QoS impact that mutations have for a SDN-enabled MTD.
SDN has also been applied to ICSs by Jason Dearien from Schweitzer Engineering
Laboratories. In a 2017 presentation, he described the use of Operational Technology
SDN (OTSDN) to meet the strict requirements for ICSs. This line of research leveraged the
“unprecedented network diagnostic visibility and ability to visualize packet flow...” [33].
Traditional networking is subject to topology-dependent performance and it is difficult to
achieve 100% test coverage. Completely predefined network behavior is impractical for net-
works that exist in a normal IT environment. In a high-reliability network, performance,
security, and resiliency are critical characteristics. In SDNs, reactive flows are used to
respond and adapt to traffic since loads are variable and devices may join and leave the
network often. The research conducted into OTSDN used static flows to define network
performance with greater certainty and reliance on a known network configuration [33]. The
OTSDN research showcased the flexibility of SDN for specific organizational requirements
and to provide a better network service when compared to traditional networking strategies.
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2.7 Chapter Summary
SDN is an emerging technology that stands poised to redefine large-scale network man-
agement. The decoupling of control and data planes solves many problems faced in current
networks (stasis, inconsistent policies, poor scalability, vendor dependence). Several major
companies (Google, Verizon, IBM, et al.) recognize the power of this paradigm shift for
network operations. If a network is SDN-enabled or not, it remains subject to attack from
adversaries. Adversaries must scan the network to identify targets and potential weaknesses
that can be exploited through the network topology. A defensive countermeasure to this is
MTD, which can take many forms.
One form of MTD is RHM, which creates a mapping between rIP and vIP addresses in
the network and mutates the mappings over time. The specifics of mutation frequency may
vary, but at its core, this defensive strategy increases the challenge for adversaries to scan
a network based upon work by researchers at UNC in simulators and by an AFIT project
on enterprise-quality hardware in a more realistic validation of that work. The remainder
of this thesis analyzes the performance implications of SDN and the effectiveness of RHM
as a MTD in network configurations that are indicative of a small enterprise.
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III. Framework Design
3.1 Overview
Protocols commonly used on computer networks are either elastic and can adapt to
service-interruptions, or inelastic and cannot. Elastic protocols include Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP), Post Office Protocol (POP), Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), and
Secure Shell (SSH). Inelastic protocols include Domain Name System (DNS), Voice over
IP (VoIP), and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). The business case for Random Host
Mutations (RHMs) must also account for any performance impacts on legitimate users. For
example, if RHMs negatively impacts the throughput of a critical service it may not be
appropriate for that network and its specific needs. Conversely, if the candidate network
consists of devices that are difficult to upgrade (i.e., legacy systems) that do not suffer a
performance hit, then RHM may prove a worthwhile addition to the network architecture.
Tests of elastic and inelastic protocols in addition to their impact on an adversary inform
network engineers about how this defensive technique influences normal operations.
3.2 Design Goals
Experiments are conducted using virtual machines to imitate activities of legitimate
users, attackers, and Software-Defined Networking (SDN) controllers. A SDN switch is
considered part of the network design. Three goals drive the development of the test
network:
1. Stability
(a) All hosts are reachable from inside their own subnets.
(b) All hosts maintain network access as indicated by successful ICMP pings and
DNS requests.
(c) The adversary machine can exploit any given machine on the test network.
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2. Effectiveness
(a) RHMs reduce the adversary’s ability to discover hosts.
(b) The adversary cannot reach the Hosts through their Real IP address (rIP), only
through their Virtual IP address (vIP).
3. Quality of Service (QoS)
(a) The framework in Section 3.5 allows for isolated assessment of various protocols
without interference from other confounding factors. For example, test for a
single protocol minimize all other network traffic. This enables conclusions about
performance to focus strictly on the SDN configuration and the protocol under
test. Protocols under test include: File Transfer Protocol (FTP), HTTP, Internet
Message Access Protocol (IMAP), POP, RTP, SMTP, and RTP.
(b) All network assets (i.e., hosts, routers, and switches) have the ability to generate
detailed logs of network traffic. This can be through Wireshark or some other
traffic monitoring software.
(c) The framework provides a controlled, static environment between trials to pro-
duce verifiable conclusions about QoS.
3.3 Network Design
The network under test consists of two subnets. Tests with and without RHMs on the
network provide data for later analysis. The topology is shown in Section 3.3. Five virtual
servers running services that use the protocols under test and 23 virtual Windows XP hosts
are on PlebeNet1. A simulated adversary running Kali Linux is also present. This subnet
allows validation of Aust’s experiments. QoS trials also occur under this configuration. A
single pfsense firewall/router, with a Network Interface Card (NIC) for PlebeNet1 and a
separate NIC for connectivity to the Internet, acts as the gateway for the network. The
network services and XP hosts are all kept on separate port groups. Each port group has a
separate RJ45 port in use on the ESXi hosts. This configuration forces servers and hosts on
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the network to send messages through the Pica8 switch if they wish to communicate with
hosts outside of their port group on the ESXi host. The SDN controller communicates with
the Pica8 switch on a separate channel from the rest of the network traffic (control plane).
The wiring diagram shown in Appendix E details the connections between ESXi hosts and
the Pica8 switch.
Figure 11. Network Diagram for Experiments
3.4 Network Assets
3.4.1 Legitimate Users.
Legitimate users are hosts that generate traffic used to evaluate the protocols under
test. Clients, servers, and a firewall are present on the network. Clients and servers exist
on separate physical NICs, otherwise the ESXi hypervisor would process network traffic
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internally and it would not reach the Pica8 switch running mutations. The adversary
machine can exploit the clients, which are the only network assets targeted in validation
experiments since Aust did not attack other components of the network. The client and
server ends of any given connection measure QoS metrics. Hosts are unaware of whether or
not RHMs are active on a network. In order to access network services, the host knows the
current vIP of the desired service for a given mutation. In real-world applications, the clients
may receive Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) or DNS cache updates in lockstep with
mutation updates to eliminate this assumption. More details about this idea are available
in Section 6.4.
While Aust’s trials have different numbers of active hosts, the validation of those results
as part of this experiment focus on the trials done with 30 active hosts to provide more
time for QoS tests. Aust’s results indicate a consistent difference of at least five hosts in
the discovered amount of hosts and total number of active hosts at this treatment level
[24]. The main focus of this experiment is on the QoS for connections between clients and
servers. A decrease in adversary effectiveness with shorter mutation windows must occur
for successful validation of Aust’s work.
Virtual machines running Windows Server 2012, Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, and Windows XP
represent legitimate users. Additionally, a pfsense firewall is active on the network. Sec-
tion 3.4.3.2 lists system specifications.
3.4.1.1 Windows XP.
Virtual machines running XP represent users of the network. They open connections
with the servers to send messages that use the seven protocols under test. XP is chosen
since reliable exploits (e.g., MS08 067) are readily available in Metasploit. This research
focuses on how RHMs impede the actions of an Adversary, not the resistance of targets.
3.4.1.2 Windows Server 2012.
Win2k12 virtual machines provide a domain controller, web, email, and FTP server each
compartmentalized to separate virtual machines. The domain controller which provides
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DNS services to PlebeNet1 is an instance of Win2k12.
3.4.1.3 Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
The server which receives SSH and RTP communications from the client uses this
Operating System (OS). A client to generate traffic for QoS trials also uses this OS.
3.4.1.4 Pfsense Firewall/Router.
Pfsense is a firewall and router that also features unified threat management, load
balancing, and multi Wide-Area Network (WAN).
3.4.2 Adversary.
The adversary serves to validate the results from Aust’s thesis. This machine scans and
attempts to exploit discovered clients from a separate physical NIC so that its traffic must
traverse the Pica8 switch. As with the hosts, the adversary machine maintains detailed
logs about perceived network traffic. The adversary machine runs Kali Linux (v2017.2)
and uses current network scanning and attack tools such as Wireshark and Metasploit.
Section 3.4.3.2 lists system specifications.
3.4.2.1 Kali Linux.
This operating system is a penetration testing platform in common use [34]. Featuring
several toolkits and frameworks for network attack, it is used to launch scans and exploits
against targets on the testbed network.
3.4.3 SDN Devices.
3.4.3.1 Ryu Controller (version 4.10).
Running on an Ubuntu 14.04 LTS virtual machine, the controller calculates RHMs
and defines switch behavior through updates to the switch’s flow table. Flow table updates
happen on an out-of-band channel imperceptible to the adversary and hosts. If the switch is
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unsure of how to process a packet, the switch sends it to the controller which determines how
to process the packet (i.e., forward, drop, consume, and replicate). Section 2.1.3 contains
more details about flow behavior. As with Aust’s experiments, the controller uses a Ryu
controller. In this experiment, network traffic to test RHMs and exploit hosts occurs on
an isolated bridge defined on the SDN switch. The out of band channel in this experiment
is an Ethernet port kept separate from the test network bridge. The adversary does not
target the out of band channel or the controller. Section 3.4.3.2 lists system specification.
3.4.3.2 Pica8 P-3290 Switch.
The SDN switch directs all traffic generated by adversary and hosts according to flow
table entries that the SDN controller creates. In the event that a flow does not exist for a
received packet, the switch consumes the packet and allows the controller to take further
action. After a time specified by the controller (four minutes, in this experiment), flows
timeout and disappear from the flow table [2]. The four minute expiration exists since QoS
trials are done with a 30 second mutation interval and none of the connections in these trials
last longer than four minutes in an attempt to keep packet captures to a manageable size for
aggregate processing. In this experiment the switch used is a Pica8 P-3290 switch running
PicOS v2.6.32.69 with OpenvSwitch v2.3.0 and has 1 µs latency with 64 byte frames. The
switch fabric capacity is 176 Gigabits per second (Gbps). The adversary does not target
the switch. Section 3.4.3.2 lists system specification.
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Table 2. Overview of System Specification for PlebeNet1
OS Central Processing Unit (CPU) Memory Hard Drive
Windows XP 1 Virtual CPU (vCPU) 1 Gigabyte (GB) 20 GB
Windows Server 2012 2 vCPU 2 GB 90 GB
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 1 vCPU 1 GB 16 GB
Pfsense Firewall/Router 8 vCPU 4 GB 64 GB
Kali Linux 2 vCPU 2 GB 50 GB
Ryu Controller 4 vCPU 4 GB 16 GB
Pica8 P-3290 Switch MPC8541 / Firebolt-3 512 Megabyte (MB) 2 GB
3.5 Test Framework
To validate Aust’s work, the following sequence determines the effectiveness of RHMs at
disrupting adversary scanning and exploitation actions. Each trial starts without influence
from flows that may have been created in a previous trial. The procedures initially described
by Aust influences the steps taken to execute validation trials.
1. Delete any preexisting flows on the SDN switch
2. Establish connection between controller and switch with the specified mutation inter-
val.
3. Assign each rIP a vIP.
4. Initiate a network scan of the PlebeNet1 subnet with Nmap [35].
5. Attempt to exploit a machine discovered during the scan.
6. Send traffic between the adversary and exploited hosts such that a RHM occurs during
transmission.
Given the goals from Section 3.2, the following sequence assesses the QoS impact of
RHM. As with the previous list, each trial is independent from each other. Semi-automated
35
scripts allow the client and server machines to generate and record network traffic for later
analysis.
1. Delete any preexisting flows on the SDN switch
2. Establish connection between controller and switch with a 30 second mutation interval.
A 30-second interval was used by Aust and shown to reduce adversary effectiveness.
This interval also enables faster trials which allow the tester to create more data to
support statistical conclusions.
3. Assign all rIPs a vIP.
4. Begin packet captures on client and server machines.
5. Initiate a connection with one of the protocols under test.
6. Create flow between rIPs and vIPs, then mutate mappings at a given interval.
7. Send network traffic between hosts, such that an RHM occurs during transmission.
In the case of baseline data without RHMs active, the mutator script is inactive during
the control experiments; the network functions as one would expect in a network that does
not use Moving Target Defense (MTD). Network traffic using FTP, HTTP, IMAP, POP,
RTP, SMTP, and SSH is then sent over the network and QoS metrics (latency, Round
Trip Time (RTT), jitter, throughput, and dropped packets) are measured. In the instances
where the mutator script is active, simulated network traffic is exposed to RHMs to see how
the mutator script and protocols under test react to new rIP:vIP mappings. Ideal results
would indicate no change in performance and remain transparent to the hosts. Figure 12
describes this measurement process. Wireshark to assess the performance of protocols under
test from the client and server.
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Figure 12. QoS Measurement Concept
3.6 Design Summary
This chapter describes how a test network is designed to be stable, effective, and facilitate
the analysis of QoS metrics. The RHM framework validates work done by Aust while
also collecting data on how various protocols react to mutations. Section 3.5 describes a
framework for data collection on a network designed to approximate network traffic that
exists in a small enterprise setting.
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IV. Research Methodology
4.1 Problem Statement
Random Host Mutations (RHMs) are a proven-effective means to interfere with scanning
activity of an adversary. This chapter outlines experiments to verify RHMs as a means
of disrupting adversary action in addition to examining the impact this framework has
on legitimate users. The assessment of seven protocols quantifies the impact of RHMs.
Section 4.1 shows the hypotheses under test for the validation experiments. Each hypothesis
expects no statistically-significantly difference between a normal network and one that uses
RHMs. The alternative hypotheses state that a difference does exist, but does not predict
whether or not a RHM network performs better or worse than a standard one.
The hypotheses for scan time and hosts found have a null hypothesis which states
there does not exist a difference between control and mutator experiments. The alternative
hypotheses for these two metrics state that a difference does exist between scan time and
hosts found for control and mutator experiments.
HO1 : ScanC − ScanM = 0, HA1 : ScanC − ScanM 6= 0 (1)
HO2 : HostsC −HostsM = 0, HA2 : HostsC −HostsM 6= 0 (2)
For the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) protocols, latency and Round Trip Time
(RTT) are two unique metrics under test. The null hypotheses for these metrics claim that
there is not a difference in latency or RTT as experienced by the server between control
and mutator experiments. The alternative hypotheses for these two metrics assert that a
difference does exist between latency and RTT in control and mutator experiments.
HO3 : LatencyC − LatencyM = 0, HA3 : LatencyC − LatencyM 6= 0 (3)
HO4 : RTTC −RTTM = 0, HA4 : RTTC −RTTM 6= 0 (4)
For the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) protocol (i.e., Real-time Transport Proto-
col (RTP)), jitter is a unique metric under test. The null hypothesis for this metric asserts
that no difference in jitter exists between control and mutator experiments. The alterna-
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tive hypothesis claims that a difference in jitter does exist between control and mutator
experiments.
HO5 : JitterC − JitterM = 0, HA5 : JitterC − JitterM 6= 0 (5)
For all protocols (TCP and UDP), throughput and packet drop rate are measured.
The null hypotheses for these metrics state that there is not a difference in either metric
between control and mutator experiments. The alternative hypotheses claim that there is
a difference in throughput and packet drop rate.
HO6 : ThroughputC − ThroughputM = 0, HA6 : ThroughputC − ThroughputM 6= 0 (6)
HO7 : PktDropC − PktDropM = 0, HA7 : PktDropC − PktDropM 6= 0 (7)
4.2 Experimental Design
Figure 13 illustrates the design of the system under test. The figure lists factors, pa-
rameters, and metrics involved with the experiment.
Figure 13. System Under Test Diagram for RHM Framework
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4.2.1 Metrics.
This experiment aims to validate the results by Aust and measure the Quality of Ser-
vice (QoS) impact of RHM. Therefore, trials measure the original metrics of scan time
and number of hosts found. Trials do not measure the exploit length metric tested by
Aust. Since RHMs require a means to continue connections across mutations for the sake
of greater usability, that ability was sacrificed in lieu of usability. As a result, a connection
associated with an active exploit cannot be differentiated without additional work to ex-
amine characteristics of that connection. Objective measures of latency, RTT, jitter, and
dropped packets determine the QoS for each protocol. Any measurements of time rely upon
system clocks determined by the operating system. The following list provides a detailed
description of each response variable used as a metric. Table 3 offers a summary of the five
QoS metrics gathered in experiments. Appendix A contains the results for scan time and
found hosts from Aust’s experiments for reference [24].
1. Scan Time: This measures, in seconds, the amount of time it takes for an attacker to
scan the network and find all hosts.
2. Number of Hosts Found : This measures the number of hosts that Nmap is able to
successful find during a scan.
3. Jitter : RFC 4689 defines jitter as “the absolute value of the difference between the
forwarding delay of two consecutive received packets belonging to the same stream”
[36]. Jitter is measured in milliseconds. Generally, the maximum amount of jitter for
acceptable service is 50 ms [37].
4. Latency : Latency refers to the amount of time, in milliseconds, it takes information
to reach its destination [38]. There are four key causes of latency: propagation delay,
serialization, data protocols, and routing and switching overhead [39]. Since the net-
work configuration remains static aside from the presence of RHMs, the only source
of latency that needs to be accounted for is associated with routing and switching.
5. Round-trip Time: RTT is “the elapsed time for transit of a signal over a closed circuit”
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[40]. This metric influences throughput of telephony and ACK-based systems such as
TCP.
6. Throughput : Throughput refers to the amount of data a system can process in a given
amount of time. In the case of network communications, it refers to the amount of
information crossing the channel at a set interval (e.g., Megabits per second (Mbps))
7. Dropped Packets: Dropped packets (or packet loss) refers to information never reach-
ing its destination. Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) pings can diagnose
loss-rates of packets sent and received. This method has limitations in production
environments where the network cannot be fully controlled since loss rates are not
always constant [41]. A controlled environment allows later analysis to ignore this
limitation since experiments are conducted in a controlled environment where the
same network traffic is sent in each trial. For inelastic connections, a drop rate of
0-5% is viewed as acceptable [42].
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Table 3. Metrics
Metric Normal Oper-
ating Level and
Range
Measurement Preci-
sion, Accuracy
Relationship of
Metric to Ob-
jective
Scan Time Depends upon number of
live hosts
1-sec steps, measured on attacker’s
clock
Shows any increase RHMs
add to network scan time
Number
of Hosts
Found
Number of Live Hosts Counted, not measured Shows accuracy of network
scans
Jitter Normal: 0-50 milliseconds,
Range: 0-Infinite millisec-
onds
5-millisecond steps, measured on
Wireshark .pcapng file
Measures service quality of
transmission
Latency 0-4000 milliseconds (de-
fault timeout for ’ping’
command)
10-millisecond steps, measured on
XP host’s system clock
Describes efficiency of net-
work configuration (i.e.,
with or without active mu-
tations)
RTT Normal: 0-50 milliseconds,
Range: 0-Infinite millisec-
onds
5-millisecond steps, measured on
Wireshark .pcapng file
Measures service quality of
transmission
Throughput Normal: Protocol depen-
dent, Range: 0-Infinite bps
0.1 bps steps, measured on Wire-
shark .pcapng file
Measures service quality of
transmission
Dropped
Packets
Normal: 0-5%, Range: 0-
100%
Percentage of packets lost with re-
spect to packets sent, measured on
Wireshark .pcap file
Describes reliability of
transmissions
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4.2.2 Factors, Parameters, and Range.
4.2.2.1 Factors.
A controlled environment that emulates a production environment supports the gather-
ing of test data. Experiments modify three factors for the sake of simplicity. The network
configuration (i.e., number of active hosts) does not change over the course of experiments
which assess the impact of RHM. Table 5 summarizes factors used in experiments.
1. Mutation Time: This is the amount of time in minutes that a specific Real IP
address (rIP):Virtual IP address (vIP) mapping remains active. At the end of this
time period, hosts receive a new rIP:vIP mapping. This categorical variable remains
unchanged across all rounds of testing with four possible values (0.5, 1, 5, 15). This
variable does not require monitoring as it does not change once an experiment begins.
2. Nmap Configuration: This refers to the active options used during an Nmap scan.
Scan types are held constant during a test. Therefore, it is a categorical variable.
Two scans are be used, Intense and Quick. Their options are presented below:
Intense scan:
db nmap -min-hostgroup 96 -T4 -A -v -n 10.13.1.0/24
db nmap = The command to run Namp
-min-hostgroup 96 = Sets the parallel host scan group size to 96
-T4 = Sets timing to 4
-A = Enable OS detection, version detection, script scanning, and traceroute
-v = Tell Nmap to be verbose
-n = Never do Domain Name System (DNS) resolution/Always resolve [default:
sometimes]
10.13.1.0/24 = The IP Address ranges to conduct the scan in
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Quick scan:
db nmap -min-hostgroup 96 -T4 -n -F 10.13.1.0/24
db nmap = The command to run Namp
-min-hostgroup 96 = Sets the parallel host scan group size to 96
-T4 = Sets timing to 4
-n = Never do DNS resolution/Always resolve [default: sometimes]
-F = Fast mode (Scans fewer ports than the default scan)
10.13.1.0/24 = The IP Address ranges to conduct the scan in
3. Metasploit Configuration: Similar to the Nmap configuration, this value repre-
sents the specific Metasploit settings used to compromise a host. In each round of
tests the value is remains constant, making this a categorical variable. Only one factor
of SMB exploit is used as the configuration parameter. This value does not change as
measurements are taken to ensure Metasploit is working correctly before attempted
exploits.
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Table 5. Factor Summary
Factor Normal Operating
Level and Range
Settings Predicted Effects
Mutation
Time
0-15 minutes 0.5, 1, 5, and 15 Lower values reduce the time an at-
tacker has to access an exploited ma-
chine.
Nmap config-
uration
N/A Intense and Quick Difference in time for scan comple-
tion time. Possible decrease in host
discovery.
Metasploit
Configura-
tion
N/A SMB Difference in time to exploit machine
and maintain access.
4.2.2.2 Parameters.
Two items remain constant in the experiment: The Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
switch and servers running virtual machines.
1. SDN Switch: One Pica8 P-3290 switch running OpenFlow 1.3 and controlled by a
SDN controller (Ryu version 4.10).
2. Servers: Two SuperMicro SuperServers 8027R-TRF+ with Xeon E5-4600 v2 pro-
cessors, eight 1000BASE-T Network Interface Cards (NICs), 12 cores, 1000Gigabyte
(GB) of Random Access Memory (RAM), running ESXi hosts the SDN controller and
all hosts.
4.2.3 Determining Sample Size.
Pilot study data from Aust gathered results for quick and intense scanning configurations
of five hosts with and without a 30-second mutation interval. The pilot study consisted of
30 repetitions to enable assumptions of normality. In the control network, all 5 hosts were
enumerated but only an average of 2.6 were found in the network with active mutations
[24]. T-tests conducted by Aust revealed a difference between networks that was not due to
chance with a p-value of 2.028e-12. Based upon those results, Aust calculated a minimum
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sample size for trials with 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 hosts with the formula:
n ≥ ( z · σ
MoE
)2 (8)
The result of Aust’s calculations showed that five samples or more were required to
report the mean within a five-second Margin of Error (MoE) with 95% confidence [24].
Review of Aust’s pilot study data shows a sample size of 9 or larger is required to
achieve results with a margin-of-error of 2.25 seconds. This ensures results that offer a
smaller margin-of-error than Aust’s initial data. A z-value of 1.96 which corresponds to
a 95% confidence level determines the minimum sample size for these experiments. The
largest standard deviation from Aust’s pilot study (3.362 seconds for intense scan time in a
control network) was also used along with a 2.25 second MoE [24]. With this information,
Equation (9) produces a minimum sample size of 8.577.
n ≥ (1.96 · 3.362
2.25
)2 (9)
This rounds up to a minimum sample size of 9. For additional data to support the results,
experiments to support validation analysis shall consist of 10 trials when analyzing the
impact of mutations on adversary actions.
For QoS data, no changes happen to the system under test aside from whether or not
mutations are active. Since the computer hardware is deterministic based upon the set
of instructions given to it, the same inputs yield the same outputs. Variation in the time
required for certain tasks may be accounted for by human involvement with the semi-
automated trials and small differences in how traffic is routed between hosts. This implies
a data distribution that is approximately normal clustered around the mean time taken by
the hardware to perform the same set of actions in each trial. The Central Limit Theorem
guides the determination of sample size for QoS data to be 30 trials [43]. Appendix B
contains the results from each trial and displays histograms for each protocol under test,
which describe the overall distribution of the trial data.
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4.2.4 Experimental Process.
This section details the specific steps taken to collect test data. One of the assumptions
for these trials states that the client knows the vIP address of the host it wishes to open a
connection with. The script files are located in Appendix C for further details. Trials use
bridge br1 on the SDN switch. This bridge consists of physical ports 10-15 on the Pica8
switch. In all cases, two actions are taken at the start and end of each trial. At the start,
the SDN controller initializes in verbose mode with the following command:
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
params.conf defines the subnet ranges for mutation and the mutation interval. Arguments
are stored in the OpenStack Oslo Config format [44].
At the end of each trial, the flows installed on the switch are deleted with the following
command:
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
For further debugging information, installed flows and traffic received by the switch may
be displayed with the following commands, respectively:
ovs-ofctl dump-flows br1
ovs-ofctl snoop br1
4.2.4.1 Validation Study.
The validation study performs the scanning and exploitation activities used in Aust’s
research. Scanning of PlebeNet1 is done with either quick or intense options. Section 4.2.2.1
lists specific options available in trials. This phase occurs before an adversary attempts to
exploit one of the machines revealed in the scan. Once a target is found, an exploit (e.g.,
MS08 067) is launched against it. If a scan persists beyond the amount of time required
for two mutations to occur, it shall be manually terminated and recorded as 0 seconds.
Any results from a scan that took longer than two mutations are out of date and therefore
useless to an adversary.
Validation trials consist of a 9-step process and issue commands to the adversary, con-
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troller, and switch. Target hosts are turned on before the trial begins. The sequence of
events is as follows. Commands 1-5 occur before the mutator starts as they do not generate
network traffic. The only requirement for this sequence of commands is that steps 7 and 8
occur while the mutator is active.
1. From the adversary’s root prompt, start the PostgreSQL database. This is the scan-
ning prompt.
service postgresql start
2. In a separate root prompt on the adversary, start the PostgreSQL database. This is
the exploit prompt.
service postgresql start
3. Initialize the Metasploit framework database in both prompts.
msfdb init
4. Start Metasploit in both prompts.
msfconsole
5. From both prompts on the adversary, ensure connectivity to the Metasploit database
for each prompt.
db status
6. From the controller’s root prompt, initialize the mutator in verbose mode. Wait until
the controller displays the list of rIPvIP mappings. These are the mappings for the
current mutation interval.
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
7. From the scanning prompt, launch the scanning script (Quick or Intense).
resource [quickPN1.rc/intensePN1.rc]
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8. Wait until scan completion. Then, from the exploit prompt, launch the exploit script
against a target found in the scan if one exists. Otherwise, note that the scan did not
find any targets.
resource exploit.rc
9. Wait for the exploit to succeed or fail. From the switch’s root prompt, delete any
flows stored in the flow table.
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
4.2.4.2 HTTP.
A 50 MB file is stored on the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) server for retrieval
by the client. To reduce the size of the packet capture file for later analysis but still have
a connection that persists across multiple mutations, the transfer speed is limited by the
–limit-rate option. Upon completion of the transfer (or a broken connection), the Secure
Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) hash of data transferred to the server is compared to the SHA-1
hash of the file on the HTTP server to verify successful transmission. QoS trials for HTTP
consist of a 6-step process and issue commands to the client, server, controller, and switch.
The sequence of events is as follows.
1. From the controller’s root prompt, initialize the mutator in verbose mode. Wait until
the controller displays the list of rIPvIP mappings. These are the mappings for the
current mutation interval.
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
2. Start Wireshark on HTTP server.
3. Start Wireshark on client.
4. From the client’s command prompt, initiate HTTP from the client traffic with curl
[45].
curl -O 10.13.1.[ip]/Data50.txt --limit-rate 1k
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5. After the transfer, stop calculate SHA-1 sum of transferred data from the server on
the client’s command prompt.
sha1sum Data50.txt > HTTP [M/C] [Trial#]
6. From the switch’s root prompt, delete the flows created during the trial.
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
4.2.4.3 SSH.
To test Secure Shell (SSH) a client opens a connection to a server and periodically sends
commands at an interval that lasts longer than the mutation window to simulate a human
interaction with the command prompt. Output of the SSH session is monitored for broken
connections. QoS trials for SSH consist of a 6-step process and issue commands to the
client, server, controller, and switch. The sequence of events is as follows.
1. From the controller’s root prompt, initialize the mutator in verbose mode. Wait until
the controller displays the list of rIPvIP mappings. These are the mappings for the
current mutation interval.
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
2. Start Wireshark on SSH server.
3. Start Wireshark on client.
4. Open a SSH connection to server from client. Supply password when prompted.
ssh root@10.13.1.[ip]
5. Activate SSH script stored on the server from the client.
~/Send ssh.sh
6. Wait for the script to terminate. From the switch’s root prompt, delete the flows
created during the trial.
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
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4.2.4.4 RTP.
RTP is tested through the client opening a connection to the server and sending a
message at 1-second intervals for a duration that lasts longer than the mutation window
with rtpgen [46]. Output of the RTP session is monitored via Wireshark and the rtpdump
utility to measure QoS information [47]. QoS trials for RTP consist of a 7-step process and
issue commands to the client, server, controller, and switch. The sequence of events is as
follows.
1. From the controller’s root prompt, initialize the mutator in verbose mode. Wait until
the controller displays the list of rIPvIP mappings. These are the mappings for the
current mutation interval.
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
2. Start Wireshark on server.
3. Start Wireshark on client.
4. Start a RTP listener on server [47].
./rtpdump 10.13.1.6/9000
5. Send RTP traffic from the client with rtpgen [46].
./rtpgen -a 10.13.1.6 -p 9000 -c message.txt
6. After the client transmits for more than at least two mutations, stop the transmission
by the client.
Ctrl + C
7. From the switch’s root prompt, delete the flows created during the trial.
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
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4.2.4.5 POP.
A Powershell script executed through PowerCLI automatically starts Wireshark captures
and sends Post Office Protocol (POP) data. Two scripts are activated in sequence to
generate POP traffic. QoS trials for POP consist of a 7-step process and issue commands
to the client, server, controller, and switch. The sequence of events is as follows.
1. From PowerCLI, log on to the vCenter server. Supply credentials when prompted.
Connect-VIServer 10.1.0.85
2. Navigate to the directory holding powershell scripts (for example, C:\Users\smayer.
CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer_Thesis\Powershell_Scripts)
3. From the controller’s root prompt, initialize the mutator in verbose mode. Wait until
the controller displays the list of rIPvIP mappings. These are the mappings for the
current mutation interval.
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
4. From PowerCLI, start transmission script on client.
.\Capture Mutation Kali.ps1 -Duration 120 -Trials 10 -Interface "eth0" -SVC Name
"Aust Kali" -Protocol "POP" -C:[$True/$False]
5. When prompted, enter the vIP of the POP server and press enter.
6. Start transmission script on email server.
.\Capture Mutation Svcs.ps1 -Duration 120 -Trials 10 -Interface "eth0" -SVC Name
"Clio" -Protocol "POP" -C:[$True/$False]
7. From the switch’s root prompt, delete the flows created during the trial.
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
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4.2.4.6 IMAP.
A Powershell script executed through PowerCLI automatically starts Wireshark captures
and sends Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) data. Two scripts are activated in
sequence to generate IMAP traffic. QoS trials for IMAP consist of a 7-step process and
issue commands to the client, server, controller, and switch. The sequence of events is as
follows.
1. From PowerCLI, log on to the vCenter server. Supply credentials when prompted.
Connect-VIServer 10.1.0.85
2. Navigate to directory holding powershell scripts (for example, C:\Users\smayer.CDN\
Documents\GitHub\Mayer_Thesis\Powershell_Scripts)
3. From the controller’s root prompt, initialize the mutator in verbose mode. Wait until
the controller displays the list of rIPvIP mappings. These are the mappings for the
current mutation interval.
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
4. From PowerCLI, Start transmission script on the client
\Capture Mutation Kali.ps1 -Duration 120 -Trials 10 -Interface "eth0" -SVC Name
"Aust Kali" -Protocol "IMAP" -C:[$True/$False]
5. When prompted, enter the vIP of the IMAP server and press enter.
6. Start transmission script on email server.
.\Capture Mutation Svcs.ps1 -Duration 120 -Trials 10 -Interface "eth0" -SVC Name
"Clio" -Protocol "IMAP" -C:[$True/$False]
7. From the switch’s root prompt, delete the flows created during the trial.
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
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4.2.4.7 SMTP.
A Powershell script executed through PowerCLI automatically starts Wireshark cap-
tures and sends Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) data. Two scripts are activated in
sequence to generate SMTP traffic. QoS trials for SMTP consist of a 7-step process and
issue commands to the client, server, controller, and switch. The sequence of events is as
follows.
1. From PowerCLI, log on to the vCenter server. Supply credentials when prompted.
Connect-VIServer 10.1.0.85
2. Navigate to the directory holding powershell scripts (For example, C:\Users\smayer.
CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer_Thesis\Powershell_Scripts)
3. From the controller’s root prompt, initialize the mutator in verbose mode. Wait until
the controller displays the list of rIPvIP mappings. These are the mappings for the
current mutation interval.
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
4. Start transmission script on the client.
.\Capture Mutation Kali.ps1 -Duration 120 -Trials 10 -Interface "eth0" -SVC Name
"Aust Kali" -Protocol "SMTP" -C:[$True/$False]
5. When prompted, enter the vIP of the SMTP server and press enter.
6. Start transmission script on the SMTP server.
.\Capture Mutation Svcs.ps1 -Duration 120 -Trials 10 -Interface "eth0" -SVC Name
"Clio" -Protocol "SMTP" -C:[$True/$False]
7. From the switch’s root prompt, delete the flows created during the trial.
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
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4.2.4.8 FTP.
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) trials retrieve a 50 MB file from the FTP server. The
transmission rate is limited to 500 Kbps to ensure a connection that lasts across several
mutations. A passive FTP connection is used [48]. One use case for a passive FTP con-
nection is a situation where the FTP server is unable to establish a data channel, such as
a restrictive firewall rule on the client side [49]. Packet captures are initialized before the
FTP connection is attempted. QoS trials for FTP consist of a 9-step process and issue
commands to the client, server, controller, and switch. The sequence of events is as follows.
1. Start Wireshark on client and server.
2. From the controller’s root prompt, initialize the mutator in verbose mode. Wait until
the controller displays the list of rIPvIP mappings. These are the mappings for the
current mutation interval.
ryu-manager Mutator PlebeNet.py --config-file params.conf --verbose
3. From the client, open a FTP connection via the lftp tool [50].
lftp 10.13.1.[ip]
4. Set transmission rate to 500 Kbps.
set net:limit-rate 500000:500000
5. Initiate download.
get Data50.txt
6. Once the transfer completes, close the FTP connection.
bye
7. Stop Wireshark on the client and server.
8. Calculate SHA-1 hash of transferred data.
sha1sum Data50.txt > FTP [M/C] [Trial#]
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9. From the switch’s root prompt, delete the flows created during the trial.
ovs-ofctl del-flows br1
4.3 Methodology Summary
This chapter describes the methodology used to measure the stability and effectiveness
of the RHM framework in addition to gathering QoS data for analysis. The validation
experiments use the same levels of hosts and mutation times as Aust did in the 30-host
experiments with and without active mutations. This information validates previous work
and indicates that the test network is properly configured for QoS analysis. Furthermore,
trials examine seven protocols under test for QoS performance. Controllable factors such
as hardware and software configurations remain constant to reduce variability in the data
and isolate the affect of RHM. The ability of the adversary to conduct a quick scan and
detect all hosts with and without active mutations determines network stability in addition
to ICMP pings and DNS requests.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Summary of Results
Experiments have two goals. First, gather more data for efficacy of Random Host
Mutations (RHMs) as a way to impede adversary actions. Second, quantify the impact (if
any) on the Quality of Service (QoS) of common protocols of an RHM implementation.
Validation data on a network with 30 hosts confirms that scanning actions by an adversary
are less effective than a network without RHMs. Of the seven protocols under test, one
protocol (File Transfer Protocol (FTP)) fails and another (Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP)) presents anomalous behavior. This chapter provides an overview of the results;
test data can be found in Appendix B.
Experimental data gathered by Aust showed an increase in scan times and a decrease in
the number of hosts discovered by an adversary in a RHM network. The validation study
produced differences in the length of scan times when compared to Aust but supported the
conclusion that RHMs impede the ability of an adversary to successfully gather intelligence
about a target network.
T-tests at the 99% confidence level on QoS data found statistically-significant differences
in varying aspects of the seven protocols under test (p = 0.01). Table 7 describes which
protocols exhibited statistically-significant differences from control data for each metric.
FTP connections initiated by IP address do not function when mutations are active. Con-
nections through Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) may still be possible, but require
extra modification to the mutator script (see Section 6.4). HTTP connections successfully
transfer data, but sent as much as 14.2 times the amount of packets when compared to con-
trol experiments. Such a dramatic increase in network traffic is unacceptable for large-scale
applications as the network would be overwhelmed with extraneous traffic and degrade
throughput. RTP exhibits an increase in jitter that may or may not be acceptable, de-
pending upon the performance requirements of the application using the protocol. Internet
Message Access Protocol (IMAP), Post Office Protocol (POP), Simple Mail Transfer Pro-
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tocol (SMTP), and Secure Shell (SSH) connections function with minimal differences when
compared to control experiments. In Table 7, cells colors correspond to level of difference
between means for control and mutator trials, which are detailed in the legend. The table is
colored in terms of the difference of the order of magnitude for the sample means since some
control samples had extremely small standard deviations. Coloring the table according to
the difference in standard deviation creates a misleading table where a reported difference
of hundreds of standard deviations masks the fact that the true performance difference is
only 1-4 milliseconds in most cases.
Table 7. Overview of Protocol Performance
Latency RTT Throughput Dropped Packets Jitter
FTP
HTTP
IMAP
POP
RTP N/A
SMTP
SSH
Legend Description
No difference
Difference within one order of magnitude
Difference of one order of magnitude
Difference of two orders of magnitude, or application-specific judgment required
Difference of at least three orders of magnitude, or broken protocol
Not Applicable
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5.2 Validation Data
5.2.1 Quick Scan.
5.2.1.1 Scan Time.
Time to complete a quick scan for Aust’s study and the validation study are shown in
Figure 14 along the y-axis in seconds. Of particular note is the large difference in scan
times despite the use of the same Nmap command in Aust’s experiments and the validation
experiments. It is possible that several options were omitted in the original trial or that
a smaller IP address range was scanned as this could account for some of the difference in
scan time.
While Aust’s data suggests that mutations increase scan time, the results from validation
experiments show a decrease in scan time compared to control. Regardless of the difference
in scan time, both experiments show a decrease in the number of hosts discovered by the
adversary as shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 14. Quick Scan Results
5.2.1.2 Hosts found.
Figure 15 reports the amount of hosts found by quick network scans in control and RHM
trials. In both the original data and the validation trial, RHM scans consistently reported
a number of detected hosts that was less than 74% of active hosts on the network at the
time of scan. Aust’s control data is not visible on the figure because it has the exact same
values as the validation control data. Control experiments validate Aust’s data. However,
mutator scans took between 40 and 60 seconds to complete so the amount of discovered
hosts plateaus at the maximum level of 22 hosts as mutation interval grew beyond the
required scan time. This data suggests that mutation intervals are most effective when
shorter than scanning activity by an adversary.
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Figure 15. Quick Scan Hosts Found
5.2.2 Intense Scan.
5.2.2.1 Scan Time.
Time to complete an intense scan for Aust’s study and the validation study are shown in
Figure 16 along the y-axis in seconds. As with the results in Section 5.2.1.1, there is a large
difference in scan times despite the use of the same Nmap command in Aust’s experiments
and the validation experiments. It is possible that several options were omitted in the
original trial or that a smaller IP address range was scanned as this could account for some
of the difference in scan time. Regardless of the difference in scan time, both experiments
showed a decrease in the number of hosts discovered by the adversary as shown in Figure 17.
Unlike Aust’s results, scans were manually terminated if they persisted beyond the amount
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of time required for two mutations to occur. Any results from such a scan would be out
of date and therefore useless to an adversary. This accounts for the mutator results of the
30-second, one-, and five-minute mutation windows. As with the results in Section 5.2.1.1,
the mutator caused adversary scans to terminate faster than control experiments which
provides inaccurate information.
Figure 16. Intense Scan Results
5.2.2.2 Hosts found.
Figure 17 reports the number of hosts found by intense network scans in control and
RHM trials. In both the original data and the validation trial, RHM scans consistently
report a number of hosts that was less than 74% of active hosts on the network at the time
of scan. Aust’s control data is not visible on the figure because it has the exact same values
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as the validation control data. Unlike Aust’s results, scans were manually terminated if
they persist beyond the amount of time required for two mutations to occur. Any results
from such a scan are out of date and therefore useless to an adversary. This accounts for the
results of the 30-second, one-, and five-minute mutation windows where no hosts were found.
The reason for results from intense scans in Aust’s study at smaller mutation intervals is
likely due to logging intermediate output of the Nmap scan in combination with the fact
that intense scans by Aust finished in a shorter amount of time (Figure 16). Since this
was not specified in the experimental procedure, intermediate output was not logged and
therefore lost when scans were terminated after exceeding the two-mutation limit [24]. For
scans at the 15 minute interval, a similar amount of hosts were discovered when compared
to Aust’s data. This data suggests that mutation intervals are most effective when shorter
than scanning activity by an adversary.
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Figure 17. Intense Scan Hosts Found
5.3 Quality of Service Data
This section reports the QoS data for the protocols under test. Each applicable cell in
Table 7 has a corresponding section for each protocol. The output of T-tests support claims
of statistical significance. T-tests are reported using a standardized format of:
t([degrees of freedom])=[t-statistic], p = [p-value]
5.3.1 FTP.
FTP failed to function under a RHM network. A connection could not be established
since server transmits its Real IP address (rIP) in payload of the FTP data to establish
a passive connection. While it is possible to open a connection by supplying a FQDN
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instead of an IP address, this would require modification to the mutator script to update
the Domain Name System (DNS) cache on the client. This process must occur in sync with
the frequency of mutations. Section 6.4 examines this concept in greater detail. Trials used
the Virtual IP address (vIP) of the FTP server to initiate connections. As a result, no
useful test data was collected to compare with control data as the client could not establish
a data channel to to the rIP of the server. Since the entire point of the mutator framework
is a focus on masking the rIP with a shifting vIP, the rIP was not accessible by the client.
Figure 18 contains the important packet exchanges of the mutator FTP connection. The
“No.” column indicates the frame number. “Source” and “Destination” show the source
IP address of the client and server. “Protocol” indicates the protocol associated with a
given frame. “Length” states the length of a frame in bytes. “Info” provides an overview
of the data transmitted in a frame. This packet capture occurred on the client (rIP of
10.13.1.8) when it communicated with the FTP server (vIP of 10.13.1.44). Frames 9-11
contain the three-way handshake for initialization of the Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) connection. Frames 12-16 show that FTP control channel data can travel between
the client and server. Frames 17-39 contain similar information and are omitted for brevity.
The entire conversation, including frames 17-39, is available in Appendix B.1.
The client requests a passive FTP connection in frame 40. The server responds with
frame 41 and states that the IP address to use for the connection is its rIP of 10.13.1.4.
The payload of this packet contains the rIP of the server in the payload, shown in Figure 19
and boxed in red. The client does not know how to contact 10.13.1.4, so it creates Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests such as those shown in frames 42 and 44-46. Since the
rIP:vIP table only resolves vIPs, the passive IP address in the payload is inaccessible. Fig-
ure 20 displays the contents of an ARP request (boxed in red) created in this transmission.
10.13.1.4 is not in the mutations table so no ARP responses appear and the file transfer
cannot happen. Frames 47-54 show the termination of the connection between client and
server.
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Figure 18. Filtered FTP Stream
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Figure 19. FTP Server Initiation of Passive Mode in Frame 41
Figure 20. ARP Request for rIP of FTP Server in Frame 42
This data demonstrates the usability issue that RHM-enabled networks present for FTP
connections. As long at FTP transmits the client or server rIP as in Figure 19, then this
protocol will not function with RHM. Alternative means of file transfer should be examined
if possible to use RHM on a network.
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5.3.2 HTTP.
HTTP is a stateless application-level protocol designed for flexible interaction with
network-based hypertext information systems [51]. This protocol presents a uniform in-
terface to clients and has seen widespread adoption since its inception in 1989. TCP is a
common choice of transport layer protocol for HTTP as HTTP assumes a reliable transport
layer protocol. Four metrics were assessed: latency, Round Trip Time (RTT), throughput,
and dropped packets. Of these four metrics, three indicated a statistically-significant differ-
ence between the control and mutator trials. The following sections provide box & whisker
plots for tested metrics and an overview of t-test results. Unabridged output from t-tests
and the R script used to generate them are available in Appendix B.2 and Appendix D,
respectively. Due to anomalous behavior discussed in Section 5.3.2.4, HTTP should be
approached with caution when used with RHM as described in this thesis.
5.3.2.1 Latency.
Figure 21 depicts the latency perceived by the server that hosts the HTTP service used
by a client. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials with RHM
or control trials without RHM. Average mutation latency (1.875e-03 seconds) is greater
than average latency in control experiments (3.249e-05 seconds). There was a statistically-
significant difference in the latency for HTTP communications under a network using RHM;
t(58)=57.229, p <2.2e-16. While this difference was statistically significant, a difference of
2 milliseconds may still be an acceptable increase in latency for some networks.
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Figure 21. Box & Whisker Plot of Latency Between Control and Mutator Trials for HTTP
5.3.2.2 RTT.
Figure 22 portrays the RTT for data sent by the client and subsequent server responses
from the HTTP server. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials
with RHM or control trials without RHM. Average mutation RTT (0.020 seconds) is
greater than average RTT in control experiments (0.004 seconds). There was a statistically-
significant difference in the RTT for IMAP communications under a network using RHM;
t(58)=69.219, p <2.2e-16. The increase in RTT is due to the performance of HTTP under
mutations, which sent massive amounts of traffic to convey the same amount of data when
compared to the control, which was set to transmit at a limited rate. This restricted rate of
transmission was chosen to decrease the size of packet capture files needed for analysis but
still have an active connection across mutations. In other words, the mutator connection
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needed to work “harder” (i.e., send more data at a faster rate) to transfer the same data as
control trials.
Figure 22. Box & Whisker Plot of RTT Between Control and Mutator Trials for HTTP
5.3.2.3 Throughput.
Figure 23 details the throughput for data received by the server in terms of bits-per-
second (bps). The y-axis represents bps. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control
trials without RHM. Average mutation throughput (7396.133 bps) is greater than average
throughput in control experiments (6474.200 bps). There was a statistically-significant
difference in the throughput for HTTP communications under a network using RHM;
t(58)=12.483, p <2.2e-16. HTTP mutation trials exhibited anomalous behavior that caused
a large amount of retransmission packets to be sent during a trial. This accounts for the
increased throughput even though the same file was transferred between hosts. As stated
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in Section 5.3.2.2, the mutator connection needed to work “harder” (i.e., send more data
at a faster rate) to transfer the same data as control trials.
Figure 23. Box & Whisker Plot of Throughput Between Control and Mutator Trials for HTTP
5.3.2.4 Dropped Packets.
HTTP traffic presented anomalous behavior when compared to control trials. While
a standard control trial generated somewhere in the area of 5000 packets on the server
side, mutator trials generated anywhere between 69,000 and 71,000 packets. Due to the
underlying structure of TCP, all the HTTP data successfully transferred across. However,
this comes at the cost of nearly 14.2 times as much traffic when compared to control trials.
The balance of packet types seen across control and mutation trials is shown in Figure 24.
It is hard to imagine a scenario where so much extraneous HTTP traffic is acceptable on
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a real-world network. The root cause of this issue is puzzling since other TCP protocols
did not exhibit similar behavior. Further research is required to determine the root cause,
though there is a high chance the answer lies within the mutator script since no other aspect
of the network or connection used was changed between trials. For this reason, RHM as
presented in this thesis is unsuitable for HTTP traffic without further research.
Figure 24. Distribution of Packet Types Across All Control and Mutator Trials for HTTP.
Several types of traffic are shown in Figure 24. They are defined in the following list:
• Window Update: Window Updates occur when the receiving application has created
enough space in its TCP buffer that in can handle more data from the sender [52].
• Window Full : These packets indicate that the TCP window is full and cannot receive
more data until the TCP buffer has emptied [52].
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• Spurious Retransmission: These are the retransmissions in which the receiver acknowl-
edged the packet after the Sender retransmits the packet due to a retransmission time
out [53].
• Retransmission: Occurs when the sender retransmits a packet after the expiration of
the acknowledgment [52].
• Out of Order : Occurs when a packet is seen with a sequence number lower than the
previously received packet on that connection [52].
• Lost ACK : These are ACKs that Wireshark cannot match with a sent segment [52].
• Fast Retransmission: Occurs when the sender retransmits a packet before the expira-
tion of the acknowledgment timer [52]. Senders should perform this action upon the
receipt of three duplicate ACKs [52].
• Duplicate ACK : Occurs when the same ACK number is seen and it is lower than the
last byte of data sent by the sender [52].
• Data: These packets contain the actual data requested by the client in a transmission.
5.3.3 IMAP.
IMAP is a standard email protocol defined by RFC 3501 that enables a client to store
and manipulate messages on a server in a way that is similar to local folders [54]. IMAP uses
a Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) connection to transfer data.
Four metrics were assessed: latency, RTT, throughput, and dropped packets. Of these four
metrics, only latency indicated a statistically-significant difference between the control and
mutator trials. The following sections provide box & whisker plots for tested metrics and an
overview of t-test results. Unabridged output from t-tests and the R script used to generate
them are available in Appendix B.3 and Appendix D, respectively. Overall, IMAP did not
exhibit behavior that suggested it is unsuitable for use a RHM-enabled network.
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5.3.3.1 Latency.
Figure 25 depicts the latency perceived by the server that hosts the IMAP service
used by a client. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials with
RHM or control trials without RHM. Average mutation latency (0.004 seconds) is greater
than average latency in control experiments (0.001 seconds). There was a statistically-
significant difference in the latency for IMAP communications under a network using RHM;
t(58)=4.4067, p= 4.593e-05. An extra 3 milliseconds of latency on average for IMAP
connections is unlikely to have an adverse impact for users of a network.
Figure 25. Box & Whisker Plot of Latency Between Control and Mutator Trials for IMAP
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5.3.3.2 RTT.
Figure 26 portrays the RTT for data sent by the client and subsequent server responses
from the IMAP server. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials
with RHM or control trials without RHM. Average mutation RTT (0.035 seconds) is greater
than average RTT in control experiments (0.001 seconds). This difference across several
orders of magnitude is due to outliers in the mutation trials. Without outliers, the average
is 0.002 seconds. There was not a statistically-significant difference in the RTT for IMAP
communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=1.4843, p= 0.1431. An additional
millisecond added to RTT is a small price to pay for the benefits of RHM.
Figure 26. Box & Whisker Plot of RTT Between Control and Mutator Trials for IMAP
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5.3.3.3 Throughput.
Figure 27 details the throughput for data received by the server in terms of Bits per
second (bps). The y-axis represents bps. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control
trials without RHM. Average mutation throughput (382.133 bps) is greater than average
throughput in control experiments (380.000 bps). The slight increase in average throughput
can be explained by the additional packets required to make up for dropped packets recored
in Section 5.3.3.4. There was not a statistically-significant difference in the throughput
for IMAP communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=1.3442, p= 0.1841. With
respect to throughput, there is no meaningful difference and therefore no adverse impact to
QoS.
Figure 27. Box & Whisker Plot of Throughput Between Control and Mutator Trials for IMAP
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5.3.3.4 Dropped Packets.
Figure 28 illustrates the average amount of dropped packets for control and mutation
trials. The y-axis represents the number of dropped packets, which is an integer value
since packets cannot be partially dropped. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control
trials without RHM. The mutation drop rate of 0.300 packets is the calculated average
across all trials and is greater than the average drop rate in control experiments (0.000
packets). The IMAP connection did not omit any data as TCP has built-in safeguards to
handle dropped packets. There was not a statistically-significant difference in the amount
of dropped packets for IMAP communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=1.6075,
p= 0.1134.
Figure 28. Box & Whisker Plot for Number of Dropped Packets Between Control and Mutator
Trials for IMAP
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5.3.4 POP.
POP is a protocol used by local a e-mail client to access mail stored on a server. Per
RFC 1939, POP normally downloads and then deletes mail from the server [55]. Extensive
manipulations of mail are handled by more complex protocols, such as IMAP or webmail
[55]. POP uses a TCP/IP connection to transfer data. Four metrics were assessed: latency,
RTT, throughput, and dropped packets. Of these four metrics, two indicated a statistically-
significant difference between the control and mutator trials. The following sections provide
box & whisker plots for tested metrics and an overview of t-test results. Unabridged output
from t-tests and the R script used to generate them are available in Appendix B.4 and
Appendix D, respectively.
5.3.4.1 Latency.
Figure 29 depicts the latency perceived by the server that hosts the POP service used by
a client. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or con-
trol trials without RHM. Average mutation latency (0.028 seconds) is greater than average
latency in control experiments (0.001 seconds). There was a statistically-significant differ-
ence in the latency for POP communications under a network using RHM; t(57)=184.96,
p <2.2e-16. Since users retrieve email in sporadic bursts rather than sustained queries to
the mail server, an increase of 27 milliseconds when compared to control data is unlikely to
have critical impacts to QoS. In the event that such an increase in latency in unacceptable,
IMAP and webmail have established themselves as other means to handle email traffic.
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Figure 29. Box & Whisker Plot of Latency Between Control and Mutator Trials for POP
5.3.4.2 RTT.
Figure 30 portrays the RTT for data sent by the client and subsequent server responses
from the POP server. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials
with RHM or control trials without RHM. Average mutation RTT (0.122 seconds) is greater
than average RTT in control experiments (0.001 seconds). This difference across several
orders of magnitude is due to two outliers that skews the data. Without these outliers, the
average is 0.002 seconds. There was not a statistically-significant difference in the RTT for
POP communications under a network using RHM; t(57)=2.18, p= 0.0334. When outliers
are accounted for, an additional millisecond added to average RTT does not pose an adverse
impact to QoS.
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Figure 30. Box & Whisker Plot of RTT Between Control and Mutator Trials for POP
5.3.4.3 Throughput.
Figure 31 details the throughput for data received by the server in terms of bits-per-
second (bps). The y-axis represents bps. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control
trials without RHM. Average mutation throughput (318.667 bps) is greater than average
throughput in control experiments (291.733 bps). The slight increase in average throughput
can be explained by the additional packets required to make up for dropped packets recored
in Section 5.3.4.4. There was a statistically-significant difference in the throughput for
IMAP communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=10.189, p= 1.541e-14. With
respect to throughput, the difference between control and mutator trials does not introduce
enough extra traffic to the network to pose concerns about the impact on QoS.
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Figure 31. Box & Whisker Plot of Throughput Between Control and Mutator Trials for POP
5.3.4.4 Dropped Packets.
Figure 32 illustrates the average amount of dropped packets for control and mutation
trials. The y-axis represents the number of dropped packets, which is an integer value
since packets cannot be partially dropped. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control
trials without RHM. The average mutation drop rate of 0.600 packets is the calculated
average across all trials and is less than the average drop rate in control experiments (1.000
packets). Dropped packets are determined by the calculation of total packets perceived by
the client minus total packets perceived by the server. In the case of POP, a reply to the
LIST command from the client send messages that were longer than the standard Ethernet
frame size of 1518 Bytes. Therefore, the server response was fragmented and perceived
as two packets by the client. This means that no packets were dropped for the majority
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of control experiments and the calculated average is misleading. The POP connection
did not omit any data as TCP has built-in safeguards to handle dropped packets. There
was not a statistically-significant difference in the amount of dropped packets for POP
communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=1.4841, p= 0.1432.
Figure 32. Box & Whisker Plot of Dropped Packets Between Control and Mutator Trials for
POP
5.3.5 RTP.
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) delivers audio and video over IP networks. As
such, it is prevalent in telephony, video teleconference, and television services. This protocol
usually runs over User Datagram Protocol (UDP) to carry media streams. This protocol
is one of the underpinnings of Voice over IP (VoIP). RFC 3550 provides the most current
definition of the protocol [56]. Three metrics were assessed: jitter, throughput, and dropped
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packets. Of these three metrics, only jitter indicated a difference between the control and
mutator trials. The following sections provide box & whisker plots for tested metrics and an
overview of t-test results. Unabridged output from t-tests and the R script used to generate
them are available in Appendix B.5 and Appendix D, respectively.
5.3.5.1 Jitter.
Figure 33 depicts the jitter perceived by the server that receives the RTP stream sent
by the source. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials with RHM
or control trials without RHM. Average mutation jitter (0.355 seconds) is greater than
average jitter in control experiments (0.227 seconds). R was unable to conduct a t-test with
the data supplied due to minimal variation in the data, which did not produce a meaningful
t-statistic. Despite this, the difference in mean jitter is evidenced in Figure 33. Section 4.2.1
notes that maximum acceptable jitter is 50 milliseconds. However, part of the jitter data
can be accounted for by the fact that packets were sent once per second. Examination of
the increase in jitter from control to mutator, the average increase is 128 milliseconds. This
is greater than the 50 millisecond maximum. This may present an adverse impact to QoS,
but that determination should be made on a case by case basis dependent upon the network
and application(s) in use.
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Figure 33. Box & Whisker Plot of Jitter Experienced by Receiver Between Control and
Mutator Trials for RTP
5.3.5.2 Throughput.
Figure 34 details the throughput for data received by the server in terms of bits-per-
second (bps). The y-axis represents bps. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or con-
trol trials without RHM. Average mutation throughput (1551.800 bps) is greater than
average throughput in control experiments (1427.733 bps). There was a statistically-
significant difference in the throughput for RTP communications under a network using
RHM; t(58)=6.1149, p= 8.804e-08. Much of the variety in throughput can be accounted
for by the semi-automated testing procedure for RTP. Some of the variability is due to
human imprecision since the packet capture and traffic generator were terminated by hand.
The remaining outliers in Section 5.3.5.3 are primarily caused by dropped packets. A better
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experimental design would have fully automated the capture and transmission of RTP data.
Figure 34. Box & Whisker Plot of Throughput Between Control and Mutator Trials for RTP
5.3.5.3 Dropped Packets.
Figure 35 illustrates the average amount of dropped packets for control and mutation
trials. The y-axis represents the number of dropped packets, which is an integer value since
packets cannot be partially dropped. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control trials
without RHM. The mutation drop rate of 12.500 packets is the calculated average from
all trials and is greater than the average drop rate in control experiments (-8.400 packets).
Since RTP uses UDP at the transport layer, those dropped packets did not reach the server.
There was a statistically-significant difference in the amount of dropped packets for RTP
communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=9.1971, p= 6.28e-13. Negative results
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in the dropped amount of packets are accounted for by the method in which dropped packets
for RTP were calculated (i.e., TotalSent−TotalReceived). For RTP, the individual streams
were isolated in Wireshark and the total amount of RTP packets sent by the client an server
were computed. The client total subtracted from the server total indicated the amount of
packets dropped. Timing issues in the semi-automated format of experiments likely caused
negative results in situations where the packet capture began after transmission started. A
better experimental design would have fully automated the capture and transmission of RTP
data. Despite these issues, RTP packets still seem to successfully arrive in a RHM-enabled
network.
Figure 35. Box & Whisker Plot of Dropped Packets Between Control and Mutator Trials for
RTP
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5.3.6 SMTP.
SMTP is standardized form of email transmission defined in RFC 821 and updated
in RFC 5321. Mail servers and other mail agents use SMTP to send or receive messages
whereas clients may use IMAP, POP, or webmail. SMTP requires a reliable ordered data
stream channel, so TCP is a common choice but other modes are possible [57]. Four metrics
were assessed: latency, RTT, throughput, and dropped packets. Of these four metrics, only
latency indicated a statistically-significant difference between the control and mutator trials.
The following sections provide box & whisker plots for tested metrics and an overview of
t-test results. Unabridged output from t-tests and the R script used to generate them are
available in Appendix B.6 and Appendix D, respectively.
5.3.6.1 Latency.
Figure 36 depicts the latency perceived by the server that hosts the SMTP service in use.
The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control trials
without RHM. Average mutation latency (0.065 seconds) is greater than average latency in
control experiments (0.061 seconds). There was a statistically-significant difference in the
latency for SMTP communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=5.6527, p=5.056e-
07. However, an increase in average latency of four milliseconds is unlikely to have a
noticeable impact on applications that require SMTP.
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Figure 36. Box & Whisker Plot of Latency Between Control and Mutator Trials for SMTP
5.3.6.2 RTT.
Figure 37 portrays the RTT for data sent by the client and subsequent server responses
from the SMTP server. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials
with RHM or control trials without RHM. Average mutation RTT (0.133 seconds) is greater
than average RTT in control experiments (0.013 seconds). Four outliers skewed the mutator
averages. Without the outliers, the mutation average is 0.014 seconds. Despite outliers,
there was not a statistically-significant difference in the RTT for IMAP communications
under a network using RHM; t(58)=2.1415, p= 0.03645. Without outliers, an average
increase in RTT of 1 millisecond is unlikely to have an noticeable impact and rare cases
where RTT is greater pose little threat to reliable QoS.
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Figure 37. Box & Whisker Plot of RTT Between Control and Mutator Trials for SMTP
5.3.6.3 Throughput.
Figure 38 details the throughput for data received by the server in terms of bps. The
y-axis represents bps. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control trials without RHM.
Average mutation throughput (226.400 bps) is less than average throughput in control ex-
periments (228.000 bps). There was not a statistically-significant difference in the through-
put for IMAP communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=2.1122, p= 0.03898.
Some of the outliers in throughput for mutator trials can be accounted for by trials that
terminated packet captures before the SMTP connection was closed. Increased automation
of the testing procedure would eliminate this discrepancy.
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Figure 38. Box & Whisker Plot of Throughput Between Control and Mutator Trials for SMTP
5.3.6.4 Dropped Packets.
Figure 39 illustrates the average amount of dropped packets for control and mutation
trials. The y-axis represents the number of dropped packets, which is an integer value since
packets cannot be partially dropped. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control trials
without RHM. The average mutation drop rate of 0.533 packets is the calculated average
based upon all trials and is greater than the average drop rate in control experiments (0.000
packets). The SMTP connection did not omit any data as TCP has built-in safeguards to
handle dropped packets. There was not a statistically-significant difference in the amount
of dropped packets for SMTP communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=2.1122,
p= 0.03898.
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Figure 39. Box & Whisker Plot of Dropped Packets Between Control and Mutator Trials for
SMTP
5.3.7 SSH.
SSH is a protocol for secure remote login over an insecure network. Designed as a
replacement for telnet and other insecure remote shell protocols, SSH is used to provide
confidentiality and integrity of data. Transport later aspects of SSH are defined in RFC
4253 [58]. Four metrics were assessed: latency, RTT, throughput, and dropped packets. Of
these four metrics, two indicated a statistically-significant difference between the control
and mutator trials. The following sections provide box & whisker plots for tested metrics
and an overview of t-test results. Unabridged output from t-tests and the R script used to
generate them are available in Appendix B.7 and Appendix D, respectively.
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5.3.7.1 Latency.
Figure 40 depicts the latency perceived by the server that hosts the SSH service used by a
client. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or con-
trol trials without RHM. Average mutation latency (0.003 seconds) is equal to the average
latency in control experiments (0.003 seconds). There was not a statistically-significant dif-
ference in the latency for SSH communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=0.27478,
p= 0.7845. The data does not suggest an adverse QoS impact to latency.
Figure 40. Box & Whisker Plot of Latency Between Control and Mutator Trials for SSH
5.3.7.2 RTT.
Figure 41 portrays the RTT for data sent by the client and subsequent server responses
from the SSH server. The y-axis represents time in seconds. The x-axis separates trials
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with RHM or control trials without RHM. Average mutation RTT (0.0011 seconds) is
greater than average RTT in control experiments (0.0008 seconds). There was a statistically-
significant difference in the RTT for SSH communications under a network using RHM;
t(58)=6.9831, p= 3.129e-09. Despite this difference, an increase in RTT of 0.3 milliseconds
would not have a negative impact on QoS.
Figure 41. Box & Whisker Plot of RTT Between Control and Mutator Trials for SSH
5.3.7.3 Throughput.
Figure 42 details the throughput for data received by the server in terms of bps. The
y-axis represents bps. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control trials without RHM.
Average mutation throughput (3203.533 bps) is less than average throughput in control
experiments (3339.267 bps). There was a statistically-significant difference in the through-
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put for SSH communications under a network using RHM; t(58)=8.6838, p= 4.424e-12.
However, a difference of 133.734 bps does not indicate a large enough change in network
traffic to concern network infrastructure with a switch fabric capacity of 176 Gigabits per
second (Gbps).
Figure 42. Box & Whisker Plot of Throughput Between Control and Mutator Trials for SSH
5.3.7.4 Dropped Packets.
Figure 43 illustrates the average amount of dropped packets for control and mutation
trials. The y-axis represents the number of dropped packets, which is an integer value since
packets cannot be partially dropped. The x-axis separates trials with RHM or control trials
without RHM. The average mutation drop rate of 0.033 packets is the calculated average
from all trials and is less than the average drop rate in control experiments (1.000 packet).
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As with POP, some of the messages sent were larger than the standard Ethernet frame size
of 1518 Bytes. Specifically, the server key exchange initialization was 1714 Bytes. From the
server perspective, this packet was not broken up into multiple packets but on the client
packet captures, it appeared as two packets. This means that no packets were dropped
by the control trials and the calculated average is misleading. The SSH connection did
not omit any data as TCP has built-in safeguards to handle dropped packets. Therefore,
despite a calculated statistically-significant difference in the amount of dropped packets of
t(58)=12.794, p <2.2e-16, the true difference in means is closer to 0.033 packets for mutator
and 0 packets for the control. As a result, no adverse QoS impact should be expected when
using an established SSH connection.
Figure 43. Box & Whisker Plot of Dropped Packets Between Control and Mutator Trials for
SSH
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Overview
This chapter provides a summary of the research conducted. Section 6.2 states the
conclusions of the research. Section 6.3 explains how this research contributes to the field
of study related to Software-Defined Networking (SDN). Section 6.4 presents new research
paths for future exploration.
6.2 Research Conclusions
This research met the three goals of stability, efficacy, and Quality of Service (QoS)
assessment identified in the design phase. Experimental data demonstrated the stability and
efficacy of a Random Host Mutation (RHM)-enabled network and provided results on the
QoS impact of this technique. The stable design of RHM ensured that all designated targets
were reachable from inside their own subnets, could send successful Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) pings and Domain Name System (DNS) requests, and were exploitable by
the adversary. RHM also reduced the ability of an adversary to discover hosts and ensured
they were only accessible through their Virtual IP address (vIP). This line of research
confirms the defensive efficacy of RHMs against scans as first determined by Aust.
QoS analysis reveals the impact that RHMs have on seven application layer protocols
that use Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) at the
transport layer. The experimental design successfully enabled the isolated assessment of
various protocols without interference from other confounding factors. All network assets
produced detailed logs of network traffic with Wireshark. This resulted in a controlled,
static environment to produce verifiable conclusions about QoS. Three protocols exhibit a
decrease in QoS that may not be acceptable, based upon network requirements. The other
four do not show a difference in QoS large enough to create concern, if at all. Based upon
the design goals of stability, efficacy, and QoS assessment, the experiments have met all
three goals.
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However, RHMs do not impede an adversary’s ability to maintain persistence on com-
promised hosts. Aust’s initial research into Proactive Host Mutation (PHM) produced code
that does not maintain active connections after a mutation occurs. As a result, active
connections were terminated after each mutation. This rendered the network unusable if a
connection lasted longer than one mutation interval. This design flaw required a solution
for SDN-enabled MTD to have a chance at use in real-world networks. The RHM technique
described in this thesis created a version of Aust’s work that overcame this critical issue and
ensured greater usability. In combination with IDS-integration, which is presented as future
work in Section 6.4, the disruption to adversary scanning attempts make the adversary less
stealthy and make targets harder to reliably exploit. The compressed decision making cycle
produced by frequent mutation intervals amplifies this effect, especially at shorter mutation
intervals.
6.2.1 Stability.
Design of the testbed network showed all target hosts and network services remain ac-
cessible from inside the network and maintain connectivity as indicated by ICMP ping tests.
DNS also resolved the Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) for network services. The
adversary always exploited target machines given that it discovered the current vIP associ-
ated with the target and launched an attack before a mutation occurred. The occurrence of
a mutation before completion of an attack accounts for the instances where the adversary
failed to exploit a target. This is the expected behavior from a RHM-enabled network and
not a stability issue.
6.2.2 Effectiveness.
A validation study of Aust’s trials with 30 hosts confirms the efficacy of RHMs as a
defensive technique against scans. While there is a discrepancy in the time required to
conduct network scans, scans from validation trials report a smaller number of perceived
hosts when compared to the number of total hosts. As with the PHM mutator created by
Aust, the RHM mutator does not allow traffic to reach the Real IP address (rIP) of a target;
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it only accepts traffic directed to the vIP associated with a host for the current mutation
interval.
A key distinction between PHM implemented by Aust and RHM is the ability of RHM
networks to allow connections that persist beyond one mutation. Initial experiments reveal
that the original mutator code deletes all rIP:vIP mappings with each mutation and provides
no means to maintain a connection that spanned multiple mutations. Without this ability,
PHM does not have value as a MTD in realistic network scenarios. A key contribution of this
thesis was the modification of mutator code to enable connections across multiple mutations.
However, this ability does not distinguish between legitimate and malicious traffic which
does not impede the adversary’s ability to maintain persistence on a compromised host.
Given the need to balance security and usability, this tradeoff is acceptable.
Based upon previous results and limitations in design of the RHM framework, one con-
cludes that RHMs provide a means of defense against the reconnaissance and scanning
phases of adversary action. RHMs do not reduce the ability of an adversary to maintain
persistence through a host, as that requires the ability to reliably distinguish legitimate
traffic from malicious traffic. This may be possible for well-known exploits, but becomes
impractical given the wide array of malicious traffic which may be obfuscated by the adver-
sary.
6.2.3 Quality of Service.
There is a statistically-significant difference in either latency or jitter for three of the
seven protocols under test. After removal of outliers, no protocols indicate a difference in
Round Trip Time (RTT). One protocol, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), shows a
difference in throughput and packet drop rate. The quantification of these metrics informs
network engineers about the performance cost of RHMs. In some cases, the differences
between RHM and control performance, while statistically significant, are minimal and
may be an acceptable overhead cost for some applications. This information provides a
foundation for further research into QoS with RHM and allows network engineers to make
decisions based upon proven data to balance security and usability.
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6.3 Significance of Research
6.3.1 Contributions.
This research focuses on validation of the studies conducted by Aust and the QoS impli-
cations of RHM on a network. The concept of RHM stems from researchers at University of
North Carolina (UNC) where preliminary efforts were done in mininet, a network emulator
[31]. Mininet serves as an excellent prototype platform, but does not indicate performance
when applied to actual hardware and software. Based upon Aust’s efforts, the research
herein confirms the ability of RHMs to impede the scanning activity of an adversary. While
Aust’s research notes the effect that PHM has on attacks launched by adversaries, it does
not describe how legitimate traffic may be affected. PHM also presents serious problems to-
ward network usability by legitimate users. RHMs do not provide additional defense against
exploits launched by an adversary, but they do create a limited window of opportunity for
adversaries to launch attacks. Analysis of RHM also informs potential users how their net-
works may be affected by the examination of seven protocols in common use. File Transfer
Protocol (FTP), HTTP, and Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) show decreases in per-
formance, whereas Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), Post Office Protocol (POP),
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), and Secure Shell (SSH) do not.
6.3.2 Applications.
The value of a MTD provides the primary impetus for RHMs as a defensive counter-
measure. Frustration of an attacker and the creation of incomplete intelligence provides
an edge skewed toward defensive efforts. Adversaries are left with two choices to launch
successful attacks: increase the scan rate at the risk of detection by an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) and less precise intelligence, or stop scans entirely. The former presents a
noisier adversary that an IDS could detect whereas the latter leaves an adversary with in-
complete or incorrect data. The RHM framework also leverages the flexibility of SDN to
enable modification for whatever specific implementation details may best suit a potential
user (e.g., Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) applications, traditional
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IT).
6.4 Future Work
The work by previous researchers and this thesis present several opportunities for future
work in the MTD research area.
1. Media Access Control (MAC) Address and Port mutation: As noted in Section 1.5, a
determined adversary could identify targets on the network via other defining char-
acteristics. SDN allows modification of MAC address and port fields in packets. A
similar approach as described in this thesis could add another layer of difficulty to
adversary actions for a network that uses RHM.
2. Multiple controller configurations: The use of a single controller in the test network
presents a centralized point of failure. A real-world implementation of SDN would
benefit from multiple controller for load balancing and failure redundancy. In the
case of time-sensitive mutations, synchronization of the mutation table must be im-
plemented.
3. Optimal mutation rate and address range determination: As first indicated by Jafarian
in 2012, allocation of virtual IP addresses is an instance of the knapsack problem [31].
While experiments in this thesis were on a small enough scale that na`ıve allocation
techniques suffice, other RHM implementations would benefit from address allocation
schemes custom-tailored to the specifics of the networks in which they are used. For
example, a shifting mutation rate instead of the constant rates in experiments could
further confound adversaries as they launch scans and attacks on the network. Address
ranges also require one vIP for each rIP. In a standard /24 subnet, this means that up
to half the address space is wasted on IP addresses that do not resolve to actual hosts.
A comparative analysis of ways to determine the frequency at which mutations should
occur, as well as ways to allocate vIPs , would prove useful to support real-world use
of RHM as a MTD.
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4. IDS integration: The ability of RHM to prompt noisier adversary actions on a net-
work is mentioned several times. To capitalize on this change in adversary behavior,
integration of statistics gathered by the SDN infrastructure with an IDS allows for
better active defense. The specifics of how an SDN controller or switch could integrate
with an IDS depends upon further research.
5. Honeypot integration: Mutations provide a layer of obfuscation to the true char-
acteristics of a network. Honeypots create false targets to tempt exploitation. A
combination of these two concepts may provide a way to further confuse and impede
adversary actions. One potential application of honeypots with RHM could be a “fol-
lower” strategy. In this instance, honeypots would be assigned vIPs that belonged
to legitimate hosts in the previous mutation. This can result in an adversary that
launches an attack on a honeypot running the same set of services as legitimate users
due to stale network intelligence.
6. Graceful flow management: Flows stored on the SDN switches are created by network
traffic previously encountered by the controller. In this implementation of RHM, they
are removed from the SDN devices after a timeout period that starts once no received
traffic matches the flow. A more precise version of RHM examines characteristics
such as header flags in the transport layer and then removes flows once a terminated
connection is detected. Some SDN hardware may require specific versions of the
Operating System (OS) in order to detect information with this degree of detail. This
form of flow management can suffer from spoofed traffic, unless precautions are taken
by the controller to be aware of such attempts.
7. DNS and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) updates: As discussed in Section 5.3.1,
some protocols (e.g., FTP) do not function when IP address resolution is in use.
If the IP address exists in the payload of the packet, then RHM presents usability
challenges. Use of FQDNs also presents an issue due to DNS caches on hosts in
the network. One possible solution to this problem is the creation of DNS updates
from the controller that update the mapping between FQDN and the IP address of
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critical network services. As the controller calculates new rIP:vIP mappings, it would
also update a separate list of IP addresses and DNS records. The mappings in this
additional table then propagate to the hosts and keep their DNS cache in sync with
the current network state. For applications reliant upon MAC addresses, a similar
technique can update the ARP caches of hosts in the network. As with graceful flow
management, this method of updating DNS and ARP caches may be vulnerable to
spoofing efforts by an adversary.
6.5 Chapter Summary
RHM as a MTD is a cutting-edge technique that disrupts scanning activity of adversaries
before they can launch attacks on network assets. If an adversary has a constrained window
of opportunity to launch a successful attack, then there is a higher likelihood that the
attacker commits an error in one of the steps of the cyberattack methodology (Figure 4).
The conclusions made in this chapter stem from extensive tests conducted in a network that
mimics what could be expected in a small enterprise network. This chapter also examines
applications for RHMs and directions for future work.
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Appendix A. Validation Study Results
A.1 Original Results
This section contains the data from all of Aust’s experiments [24]. For the sake of
brevity, all column headers in this section are described here. Trial indicates the mutation
interval in use for the corresponding data in Appendix A.1.1 and the index of the associated
data for all other tables. Mutator indicates if the data was gathered with PHMs active on
the network. A 1 indicates that PHM was active, a 0 indicates that it was not. Scan - I
refers to the number of seconds required to complete an intense scan. Scan - Q refers to
the number of seconds required to complete a quick scan. Hosts - I refers to the number of
perceived hosts based upon intense scan results. Hosts - Q refers to the number of perceived
hosts based upon quick scan results. Pen Time - I displays the amount of time that an
adversary maintained access on a target host following the results of an intense scan. Pen
Time - Q indicates the amount of time that an adversary maintained access on a target
host following the results of a quick scan. Cells that contain a “-” indicate that no data
was collected for reasons explained in the section that contains the graph.
A.1.1 Averages.
Table 8. Averages from Aust’s Experiments
Trial Mutator Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q Pen Time - I Pen Time - Q
30S 0 84.092 5.44 30 30 3600 3600
30S 1 0 9.706 0 21 0 139.56
1M 0 84.092 5.44 30 30 3600 3600
1M 1 224.826 10.806 16.6 13.2 0 188.04
5M 0 84.092 5.44 30 30 3600 3600
5M 1 99.7 11.44 15.4 17.6 333 417.72
15M 0 84.092 5.44 30 30 3600 3600
15M 1 138.398 9.81 20.8 15.6 923.28 876
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A.1.2 Control.
Table 9. Data from Aust’s Control Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q Pen Time - I Pen Time - Q
1 93.840 4.680 30 30 3600.000 3600.000
2 85.600 5.830 30 30 3600.000 3600.000
3 89.880 5.860 30 30 3600.000 3600.000
4 81.380 4.980 30 30 3600.000 3600.000
5 69.760 5.850 30 30 3600.000 3600.000
A.1.3 30 Second.
Cells that contain a “-” indicate that no data was collected due to failure of either the
scan or exploit.
Table 10. Data from Aust’s 30 Second Interval Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q Pen Time - I Pen Time - Q
1 - 9.74 - 20 - 3.16
2 - 15.04 - 23 - -
3 - 6.46 - 21 - 3.15
4 - 8.8 - 15 - 2.15
5 - 8.49 - 26 - 3.17
A.1.4 1 Minute.
Cells that contain a “-” indicate that no data was collected due to failure of the exploit.
Table 11. Data from Aust’s 1 Minute Interval Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q Pen Time - I Pen Time - Q
1 449.31 8.49 30 28 - 3.06
2 68.76 10.61 10 17 - 3.15
3 160.78 11.83 13 6 - 3.17
4 155.62 11.56 11 6 - 3.15
5 289.66 11.54 19 9 - 3.14
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A.1.5 5 Minutes.
Table 12. Data from Aust’s 5 Minute Interval Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q Pen Time - I Pen Time - Q
1 154.050 8.670 23 27 5.150 6.160
2 89.600 11.250 15 13 6.160 7.170
3 89.150 8.190 15 28 6.140 7.160
4 74.900 19.110 10 11 5.160 7.150
5 90.800 9.980 14 9 5.140 7.170
A.1.6 15 Minutes.
Table 13. Data from Aust’s 15 Minute Interval Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q Pen Time - I Pen Time - Q
1 111.770 11.600 15 9 16.290 6.160
2 155.550 9.700 28 21 15.180 16.290
3 78.130 8.210 9 24 16.170 16.160
4 192.470 9.380 26 16 14.140 17.170
5 154.070 10.160 26 8 15.160 17.220
A.2 Validation Results
This section contains the data from all of the validation experiments. For the sake of
brevity, all column headers in this section are described here. Trial indicates the mutation
interval in use for the corresponding data in Appendix A.2.1 and the index of the associated
data for all other tables. Mutator indicates if the data was gathered with RHMs active on
the network. A 1 indicates that RHM was active, a 0 indicates that it was not. Scan - I
refers to the number of seconds required to complete an intense scan. Scan - Q refers to
the number of seconds required to complete a quick scan. Hosts - I refers to the number of
perceived hosts based upon intense scan results. Hosts - Q refers to the number of perceived
hosts based upon quick scan results. As discussed in Section 2.6, a primary limitation of
PHM was that it did not allow connections to persist beyond one mutation. RHM added
this capability, which still provides a defensive benefit against scans but does not terminate
connections after each mutation. This tradeoff means that the “Pen Time” data collected
105
by Aust has no counterpart in validation trials since adversary connections were never
terminated.
A.2.1 Averages.
Table 14. Averages from Validation Experiments
Trial Mutator Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q
30S 0 901.2 71.1 30 30
30S 1 0 39.5 0 18.5
1M 0 901.2 71.1 30 30
1M 1 0 44 0 20.4
5M 0 901.2 71.1 30 30
5M 1 0 50.9 0 22
15M 0 901.2 71.1 30 30
15M 1 724.3 56.6 22 22
A.2.2 Control.
Table 15. Data from Control Validation Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q
1 868 71 30 30
2 861 73 30 30
3 933 72 30 30
4 858 69 30 30
5 876 70 30 30
6 954 73 30 30
7 954 73 30 30
8 933 72 30 30
9 902 70 30 30
10 873 68 30 30
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A.2.3 30 Second.
Table 16. Data from 30 Second Interval Validation Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q
1 120 120 0 0
2 120 120 0 0
3 120 31 0 19
4 120 120 0 0
5 120 120 0 0
6 120 120 0 0
7 120 120 0 0
8 120 120 0 0
9 120 120 0 0
10 120 48 0 18
A.2.4 1 Minute.
Table 17. Data from 1 Minute Interval Validation Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q
1 240 55 0 21
2 240 34 0 17
3 240 64 0 27
4 240 56 0 24
5 240 41 0 18
6 240 33 0 22
7 240 28 0 16
8 240 46 0 21
9 240 43 0 21
10 240 40 0 17
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A.2.5 5 Minutes.
Table 18. Data from 5 Minute Interval Validation Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q
1 1200 51 0 21
2 1200 50 0 23
3 1200 50 0 23
4 1200 47 0 23
5 1200 35 0 19
6 1200 37 0 17
7 1200 75 0 27
8 1200 53 0 23
9 1200 42 0 18
10 1200 69 0 26
A.2.6 15 Minutes.
Table 19. Data from 15 Minute Interval Validation Experiments
Trial Scan - I Scan - Q Hosts - I Hosts - Q
1 781 45 21 19
2 771 51 24 21
3 751 49 21 20
4 915 53 22 22
5 796 73 23 27
6 892 95 25 23
7 662 44 23 25
8 308 53 17 23
9 883 63 26 23
10 484 40 18 17
108
Appendix B. QoS Study Results
B.1 FTP
Due to the inability of FTP to establish a connection based upon IP address, no mean-
ingful test data was gathered. The entire FTP exchange conducted in mutator trials is
included in this section. The “No.” column indicates the frame number. “Source” and
“Destination” show the source IP address of the client and server. “Protocol” indicates the
protocol associated with a given frame. “Length” states the length of a frame in bytes.
“Info” provides an overview of the data transmitted in a frame.
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Figure 44. Full FTP Stream
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B.2 HTTP
This section contains the data from all QoS experiments for HTTP. For the sake of
brevity, all column headers in this section are described here. Trial indicates the index
associated with the data in a row. Latency shows the average time in milliseconds that
it took information from the client to reach the server for the trial. RTT indicates the
amount of time in seconds from when a packet was sent by the server to the client and the
receipt of the ACK from the client. Duration shows the length of the connection in seconds.
BPSS represents the throughput of the client in Bits per second (bps). BPSR indicates the
throughput of the server in bps. PacketsS displays the number of packets sent by the client
during the transmission. PacketsR reports the number of packets sent by the server during
the transmission.
ACKlostR displays the number of packets lost by the server during a trial. DupACKR
shows the count of duplicate ACKS received during a trial. RetransR, FRetransR, and
SRetransR indicate the amount of retransmissions, fast retransmissions, and spurious re-
transmissions by the server in a trial, respectively. OutOfOrderR indicates the number of
packets received out of order in a single trial. WinUpdateR reports the number of window
updates sent in a transmission. WinFullR shows how many times a notification that the
TCP receive window was at capacity were send in a single trial.
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B.2.1 Control.
Figure 45. Histograms of HTTP QoS Control Data
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Table 20. HTTP Control QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR
1 5.00E-05 0.0189 62.198 6750 6474 37 5054
2 4.00E-05 0.01902 62.188 6751 6474 37 5028
3 5.00E-05 0.02069 62.187 6751 6475 37 5052
4 4.00E-05 0.01912 62.177 6752 6475 37 5012
5 4.00E-05 0.01907 62.175 6753 6476 37 5042
6 4.00E-05 0.01765 62.178 6753 6476 37 5156
7 4.00E-05 0.01908 62.201 6750 6473 37 5025
8 5.00E-05 0.01909 62.194 6750 6474 37 5027
9 5.00E-05 0.01895 62.178 6752 6475 37 5038
10 4.00E-05 0.01903 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
11 5.00E-05 0.01891 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
12 4.00E-05 0.02046 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
13 3.00E-05 0.0193 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
14 5.00E-05 0.01892 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
15 5.00E-05 0.01889 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
16 5.00E-05 0.0191 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
17 5.00E-05 0.0189 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
18 5.00E-05 0.01878 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
19 5.00E-05 0.01891 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
20 5.00E-05 0.01896 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
21 4.00E-05 0.01907 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
22 4.00E-05 0.02093 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
23 4.00E-05 0.01894 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
24 3.00E-05 0.01752 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
25 4.00E-05 0.01919 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
26 5.00E-05 0.01895 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
27 4.00E-05 0.01892 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
28 4.00E-05 0.01907 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
29 5.00E-05 0.01891 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
30 5.00E-05 0.01897 62.194 6751 6474 37 5042
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Table 21. HTTP Control Lost, Duplicate, Retransmitted, and Out of Order Packets
Trial ACKlostR DupACKR RetransR FRetransR SRetransR OutOfOrderR
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 22. HTTP Control Window Update Data
Trial WinUpdateR WinFullR
1 1108 15
2 1126 0
3 1108 15
4 1119 0
5 1111 15
6 1118 0
7 1128 0
8 1103 15
9 1101 20
10 1109 14
11 1116 3
12 1086 1
13 1102 17
14 1112 7
15 1109 14
16 1109 12
17 1111 4
18 1085 106
19 1116 3
20 1108 13
21 1124 0
22 1112 4
23 1109 15
24 985 4
25 1107 15
26 1119 2
27 1114 4
28 1105 14
29 1119 0
30 1110 15
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B.2.2 Mutator.
Figure 46. Histograms of HTTP QoS Mutator Data
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Table 23. HTTP Mutator QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR
1 0.00187 0.00315 66.409 6606 7304 69 71
2 0.00183 0.00335 64.666 6786 7515 69 71
3 0.00239 0.00686 83.13 5282 5848 69 71
4 0.00239 0.00686 67.23 5282 7254 69 72
5 0.00171 0.00259 59.452 7378 8162 69 71
6 0.00198 0.00397 69.08 6353 7043 69 71
7 0.00208 0.00511 72.571 6050 6687 69 71
8 0.00171 0.00257 59.647 7354 8133 69 71
9 0.00206 0.00413 71.713 6121 6774 69 71
10 0.00186 0.00353 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
11 0.00178 0.00265 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
12 0.00178 0.00306 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
13 0.00187 0.00373 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
14 0.0018 0.00349 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
15 0.0018 0.00304 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
16 0.00183 0.0037 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
17 0.0018 0.00327 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
18 0.00179 0.00353 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
19 0.00179 0.003 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
20 0.00179 0.00301 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
21 0.00176 0.00291 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
22 0.00179 0.00311 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
23 0.00213 0.00405 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
24 0.00177 0.00401 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
25 0.00181 0.00338 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
26 0.00178 0.00316 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
27 0.00189 0.00385 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
28 0.0018 0.00315 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
29 0.00181 0.00366 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
30 0.00178 0.00382 65.034 6747 7484 69 71
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Table 24. HTTP Mutator Lost, Duplicate, Retransmitted, and Out of Order Packets
Trial ACKlostR DupACKR RetransR FRetransR SRetransR OutOfOrderR
1 0 22073 3568 3435 0 324
2 1 22987 3613 3485 0 343
3 0 26067 3491 3288 0 441
4 0 25003 3734 3592 0 328
5 1 21671 3619 3510 0 293
6 0 23740 3624 3474 0 369
7 1 25110 3446 3273 0 425
8 0 21778 3590 3481 0 306
9 0 23824 3539 3379 0 391
10 0 23108 3678 3543 0 333
11 0 20797 3597 3483 0 295
12 1 22130 3766 3641 0 315
13 0 23525 3599 3463 0 350
14 0 23620 3669 3537 0 303
15 0 22259 3663 3538 0 325
16 0 23856 3984 3852 0 296
17 0 23062 3691 3565 0 300
18 1 23712 3820 3695 0 324
19 0 22146 3723 3601 0 315
20 0 22130 3739 3617 0 328
21 1 21322 3731 3611 0 329
22 0 21993 3931 3805 0 333
23 0 22225 3848 3659 0 406
24 2 24871 3912 3780 0 309
25 1 23098 3694 3565 0 326
26 0 22215 3775 3656 0 294
27 0 23866 3689 3546 0 366
28 0 22297 4023 3884 0 292
29 0 24268 3798 3672 0 309
30 1 24349 3829 3699 0 306
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Table 25. HTTP Mutator Window Update Data
Trial WinUpdateR WinFullR
1 160 0
2 115 0
3 196 0
4 103 0
5 119 0
6 106 0
7 97 0
8 119 0
9 89 0
10 105 0
11 202 0
12 196 0
13 130 0
14 125 0
15 151 0
16 103 0
17 123 0
18 148 0
19 144 0
20 165 0
21 196 0
22 193 0
23 234 0
24 107 0
25 136 0
26 170 0
27 119 0
28 177 0
29 100 0
30 106 0
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B.2.3 T-test results.
1 [ 1 ] ”Latency”
2
3 Two Sample t−t e s t
4
5 data : Control and Mutation
6 t = −57.229 , df = 58 , p−value < 2 .2 e−16
7 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
8 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
9 −0.001928181 −0.001756697
10 sample e s t imate s :
11 mean o f x mean o f y
12 3.248836 e−05 1.874927 e−03
13
14 [ 1 ] ”RTT”
15
16 Two Sample t−t e s t
17
18 data : Control and Mutation
19 t = 69 .219 , df = 58 , p−value < 2 .2 e−16
20 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
21 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
22 0.01482287 0.01600918
23 sample e s t imate s :
24 mean o f x mean o f y
25 0.019073117 0.003657091
26
27 [ 1 ] ”Duration”
28
29 Two Sample t−t e s t
30
31 data : Control and Mutation
32 t = −5.0827 , df = 58 , p−value = 4.161 e−06
33 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
34 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
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35 −5.783837 −1.806545
36 sample e s t imate s :
37 mean o f x mean o f y
38 62.19161 65.98680
39
40 [ 1 ] ”Throughput”
41
42 Two Sample t−t e s t
43
44 data : Control and Mutation
45 t = −12.483 , df = 58 , p−value < 2 .2 e−16
46 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
47 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
48 −1118.6378 −725.2289
49 sample e s t imate s :
50 mean o f x mean o f y
51 6474.200 7396.133
52
53 [ 1 ] ”Dropped Packets ”
54
55 Two Sample t−t e s t
56
57 data : Control and Mutation
58 t = −1215 , df = 58 , p−value < 2 .2 e−16
59 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
60 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
61 −5015.804 −4993.863
62 sample e s t imate s :
63 mean o f x mean o f y
64 −5006.866667 −2.033333
B.3 IMAP
This section contains the data from all QoS experiments for IMAP. For the sake of
brevity, all column headers in this section are described here. Trial indicates the index
associated with the data in a row. Latency shows the average time in milliseconds that
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it took information from the client to reach the server for the trial. RTT indicates the
amount of time in seconds from when a packet was sent by the server to the client and the
receipt of the ACK from the client. Duration shows the length of the connection in seconds.
BPSS represents the throughput of the client in bps. BPSR indicates the throughput
of the server in bps. PacketsS displays the number of packets sent by the client during
the transmission. PacketsR reports the number of packets sent by the server during the
transmission. PktsDrop indicates the sum of all dropped packets during one trial.
B.3.1 Control.
Figure 47. Histograms of IMAP QoS Control Data
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Table 26. IMAP Control QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR PktsDrop
1 0.00168 0.00083 122.027 380 380 50 50 0
2 0.00142 7.00E-04 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
3 0.00141 0.00068 122.023 380 380 50 50 0
4 0.00145 0.00074 122.026 380 380 50 50 0
5 0.00169 8.00E-04 122.025 380 380 50 50 0
6 0.00134 0.00064 122.025 380 380 50 50 0
7 0.00114 0.00053 122.025 380 380 50 50 0
8 0.0011 0.00056 122.025 380 380 50 50 0
9 0.0011 0.00055 122.026 380 380 50 50 0
10 0.00115 0.00053 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
11 0.00148 0.00077 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
12 0.0013 0.00065 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
13 0.00238 0.00119 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
14 0.00149 0.00071 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
15 0.00154 0.00075 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
16 0.00118 0.00058 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
17 0.00154 0.00075 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
18 0.00141 0.00066 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
19 0.00144 0.00071 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
20 0.00118 0.00054 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
21 0.00157 0.00075 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
22 0.00119 0.00059 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
23 0.00132 0.00068 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
24 0.00238 0.00119 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
25 0.0014 0.00071 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
26 0.00106 0.00053 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
27 0.00108 0.00055 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
28 0.0012 0.00056 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
29 0.00124 0.00063 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
30 0.00135 0.00064 122.024 380 380 50 50 0
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B.3.2 Mutator.
Figure 48. Histograms of IMAP QoS Mutator Data
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Table 27. IMAP Mutator QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR PktsDrop
1 0.00425 0.00203 122.025 380 380 50 50 0
2 0.00414 0.00213 121.99 380 380 50 50 0
3 0.00308 0.00153 122.009 380 380 50 50 0
4 0.00281 0.50282 106.986 382 414 50 46 4
5 0.00344 0.0017 122.003 380 380 50 50 0
6 0.00484 0.00234 122.019 380 380 50 50 0
7 0.00389 0.00195 122.003 380 376 50 49 1
8 0.00432 0.00207 122.02 380 380 50 50 0
9 0.00281 0.50282 106.986 382 414 50 46 4
10 0.0042 0.00218 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
11 0.00304 0.00156 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
12 0.00326 0.00164 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
13 0.00308 0.00154 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
14 0.00303 0.00152 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
15 0.00293 0.0015 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
16 0.00343 0.00172 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
17 0.00289 0.00148 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
18 0.00374 0.00193 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
19 0.0033 0.00166 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
20 0.00322 0.00166 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
21 0.00356 0.00182 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
22 0.00314 0.0016 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
23 0.00289 0.00148 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
24 0.00313 0.00161 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
25 0.02052 0.00175 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
26 0.00336 0.0017 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
27 0.00306 0.00156 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
28 0.00312 0.00161 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
29 0.0034 0.00172 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
30 0.00317 0.00162 122.022 380 380 50 50 0
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B.3.3 T-test results.
1 [ 1 ] ”Latency”
2
3 Two Sample t−t e s t
4
5 data : Control and Mutation
6 t = −4.4067 , df = 58 , p−value = 4.593 e−05
7 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
8 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
9 −0.004108429 −0.001013097
10 sample e s t imate s :
11 mean o f x mean o f y
12 0.001407335 0.003968098
13
14 [ 1 ] ”RTT”
15
16 Two Sample t−t e s t
17
18 data : Control and Mutation
19 t = −1.4843 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.1431
20 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
21 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
22 −0.09626904 0.02736483
23 sample e s t imate s :
24 mean o f x mean o f y
25 0.0006895218 0.0351416282
26
27 [ 1 ] ”Duration”
28
29 Two Sample t−t e s t
30
31 data : Control and Mutation
32 t = 1 .4468 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.1533
33 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
34 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
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35 −0.8470467 2.8620049
36 sample e s t imate s :
37 mean o f x mean o f y
38 122.0244 121.0169
39
40 [ 1 ] ”Throughput”
41
42 Two Sample t−t e s t
43
44 data : Control and Mutation
45 t = −1.3442 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.1841
46 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
47 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
48 −6.360270 2.093604
49 sample e s t imate s :
50 mean o f x mean o f y
51 380.0000 382.1333
52
53 [ 1 ] ”Dropped Packets ”
54
55 Two Sample t−t e s t
56
57 data : Control and Mutation
58 t = −1.6075 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.1134
59 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
60 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
61 −0.7970266 0.1970266
62 sample e s t imate s :
63 mean o f x mean o f y
64 0 .0 0 .3
B.4 POP
This section contains the data from all QoS experiments for POP. For the sake of
brevity, all column headers in this section are described here. Trial indicates the index
associated with the data in a row. Latency shows the average time in milliseconds that it
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took information from the client to reach the server for the trial. RTT indicates the amount
of time in seconds from when a packet was sent by the server to the client and the receipt
of the ACK from the client. Duration shows the length of the connection in seconds. BPSS
represents the throughput of the client in bps. BPSR indicates the throughput of the server
in bps. PacketsS displays the number of packets sent by the client during the transmission.
PacketsR reports the number of packets sent by the server during the transmission.
B.4.1 Control.
The result of one dropped packet in each trial for POP control experiments occurred
because some of the messages sent were larger than the standard Ethernet frame size of
1518 Bytes. Specifically, the server key exchange initialization was 1714 Bytes. From the
server perspective, this packet was not broken up into multiple packets but on the client
packet captures, it appeared as two packets. This means that no packets were dropped by
the control trials and the calculated average is misleading. The POP connection did not
omit any data as TCP has built-in safeguards to handle dropped packets.
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Figure 49. Histograms of POP QoS Control Data
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Table 28. POP Control QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR PktsDrop
1 0.0016 0.00092 120.011 296 292 33 32 1
2 0.00113 0.00062 120.012 296 292 33 32 1
3 0.00137 0.00077 120.011 296 292 33 32 1
4 0.0014 0.00082 120.011 296 292 33 32 1
5 0.00113 0.00064 120.01 296 292 33 32 1
6 0.00154 0.00094 120.009 288 284 31 30 1
7 0.00133 8.00E-04 120.011 296 292 33 32 1
8 0.0011 0.00065 120.011 296 292 33 32 1
9 0.00119 0.00076 120.01 296 292 33 32 1
10 0.00181 0.00115 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
11 0.0017 0.00112 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
12 0.00105 0.00066 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
13 0.00105 0.00062 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
14 0.00133 8.00E-04 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
15 0.00181 0.00112 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
16 0.00102 0.00061 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
17 0.00144 0.00081 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
18 0.00144 0.00084 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
19 0.00156 0.00102 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
20 0.00122 0.00063 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
21 0.00107 0.00063 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
22 0.00137 0.00078 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
23 0.00099 6.00E-04 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
24 0.00136 0.00071 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
25 0.00126 0.00059 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
26 0.0013 0.00069 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
27 0.0013 8.00E-04 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
28 0.00166 0.00081 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
29 0.00164 0.001 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
30 0.00118 7.00E-04 120.009 296 292 33 32 1
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B.4.2 Mutator.
The result of one dropped packet in each trial for POP mutator experiments occurred
because some of the messages sent were larger than the standard Ethernet frame size of
1518 Bytes. Specifically, the server key exchange initialization was 1714 Bytes. From the
server perspective, this packet was not broken up into multiple packets but on the client
packet captures, it appeared as two packets. This means that no packets were dropped by
the control trials and the calculated average is misleading. The POP connection did not
omit any data as TCP has built-in safeguards to handle dropped packets.
Figure 50. Histograms of POP QoS Mutator Data
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Table 29. POP Mutator QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR PktsDrop
1 0.02657 0.00339 120.003 300 313 34 33 1
2 0.02732 0.88682 104.976 316 357 37 33 4
3 0.02832 0.00246 119.99 296 313 33 33 0
4 0.02836 0.00267 120.007 296 313 33 33 0
5 0.02889 0.00308 119.988 296 313 33 33 0
6 0.02979 0.00289 100.011 296 347 33 28 5
7 0.02751 0.88645 104.972 316 357 37 33 4
8 0.02733 0.88628 104.976 316 357 37 33 4
9 0.02828 0.00304 120.002 300 317 34 34 0
10 0.02776 0.00254 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
11 0.0276 0.00226 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
12 0.02678 0.00195 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
13 0.02811 0.00238 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
14 0.02746 0.00214 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
15 0.02652 0.00187 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
16 0.01242 0.02072 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
17 0.02756 0.00228 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
18 0.02713 0.00181 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
19 0.02757 0.00196 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
20 0.02735 0.00212 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
21 0.02646 0.00187 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
22 0.02725 0.83208 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
23 0.02707 0.00193 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
24 0.02767 0.00227 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
25 0.02739 0.00241 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
26 0.02651 0.00213 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
27 0.02746 0.00217 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
28 0.02701 0.00175 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
29 0.02776 0.00239 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
30 0.02696 0.00231 119.991 296 313 33 33 0
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B.4.3 T-test results.
1 [ 1 ] ”Latency”
2
3 Two Sample t−t e s t
4
5 data : Control and Mutation
6 t = −184.96 , df = 57 , p−value < 2 .2 e−16
7 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
8 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
9 −0.02653919 −0.02578531
10 sample e s t imate s :
11 mean o f x mean o f y
12 0.001345462 0.027507710
13
14 [ 1 ] ”RTT”
15
16 Two Sample t−t e s t
17
18 data : Control and Mutation
19 t = −2.18 , df = 57 , p−value = 0.0334
20 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
21 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
22 −0.27027763 0.02704714
23 sample e s t imate s :
24 mean o f x mean o f y
25 0.000787852 0.122403094
26
27 [ 1 ] ”Duration”
28
29 Two Sample t−t e s t
30
31 data : Control and Mutation
32 t = 2 .1077 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03939
33 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
34 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
133
35 −0.5759626 4.9456326
36 sample e s t imate s :
37 mean o f x mean o f y
38 120.0094 117.8246
39
40 [ 1 ] ”Throughput”
41
42 Two Sample t−t e s t
43
44 data : Control and Mutation
45 t = −10.189 , df = 58 , p−value = 1.541 e−14
46 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
47 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
48 −33.97309 −19.89358
49 sample e s t imate s :
50 mean o f x mean o f y
51 291.7333 318.6667
52
53 [ 1 ] ”Dropped Packets ”
54
55 Two Sample t−t e s t
56
57 data : Control and Mutation
58 t = 1 .4841 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.1432
59 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
60 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
61 −0.3178222 1.1178222
62 sample e s t imate s :
63 mean o f x mean o f y
64 1 .0 0 .6
B.5 RTP
This section contains the data from all QoS experiments for RTP. For the sake of
brevity, all column headers in this section are described here. Trial indicates the index
associated with the data in a row. Jitter represents the average of the difference between
134
the forwarding delay of two consecutive packets in the same stream in seconds for each trial.
Duration shows the length of the connection in seconds. BPS represents the throughput
of the client in bps. PacketsS displays the number of packets sent by the client during
the transmission. PacketsR reports the number of packets sent by the server during the
transmission. Figure 51 indicates that a negative number of packets were dropped for some
trials. This is a result of a limitation in the semi-automated method used to gather RTP
data as the packet captures did not always begin with sufficient lead time before data was
sent.
B.5.1 Control.
Figure 51. Histograms of RTP QoS Control Data
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Table 30. RTP Control QoS Data
Trial MaxJitterR jitterR Duration BPS PacketsS PacketsR Dropped
1 0.264 0.227 107.014703 1566 108 108 0
2 0.264 0.227 119.025531 1564 120 120 0
3 0.264 0.227 120.026317 1564 121 121 0
4 0.264 0.227 120.026437 1564 121 121 0
5 0.264 0.227 110.024517 1565 111 111 0
6 0.264 0.227 118.025383 1564 119 119 0
7 0.264 0.227 120.02717 1564 121 121 0
8 0.264 0.227 119.027055 1564 120 120 0
9 0.264 0.227 137.246447 1400 128 128 0
10 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
11 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
12 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
13 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
14 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
15 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
16 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
17 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
18 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
19 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
20 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
21 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
22 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
23 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
24 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
25 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
26 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
27 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
28 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
29 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
30 0.264 0.227 140.682634 1377 120 132 -12
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B.5.2 Mutator.
Figure 52. Histograms of RTP QoS Mutator Data
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Table 31. RTP Mutator QoS Data
Trial MaxJitterR jitterR Duration BPS PacketsS PacketsR Dropped
1 1.053 0.355 109.012512 1566 110 110 0
2 1.053 0.355 118.02527 1583 188 122 66
3 1.053 0.355 104.019535 1566 127 105 22
4 1.053 0.355 99.998782 1709 121 109 12
5 1.053 0.355 113.016961 1565 114 114 0
6 1.053 0.355 111.997591 1565 125 113 12
7 1.053 0.355 111.997824 1676 120 120 0
8 1.053 0.355 141.674235 1230 123 112 11
9 1.053 0.355 112.018064 1460 107 107 0
10 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
11 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
12 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
13 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
14 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
15 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
16 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
17 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
18 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
19 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
20 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
21 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
22 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
23 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
24 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
25 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
26 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
27 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
28 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
29 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
30 1.053 0.355 109.111131 1554 121 109 12
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B.5.3 T-test results.
1 [ 1 ] ”Max J i t t e r ”
2 [ 1 ] ”T t e s t e r r o r . I s your data e s s e n t i a l l y constant ?”
3 [ 1 ] ”Mean J i t t e r ”
4 [ 1 ] ”T t e s t e r r o r . I s your data e s s e n t i a l l y constant ?”
5 [ 1 ] ”Duration”
6
7 Two Sample t−t e s t
8
9 data : Control and Mutation
10 t = 10 .124 , df = 58 , p−value = 1.959 e−14
11 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
12 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
13 17.48243 29.96319
14 sample e s t imate s :
15 mean o f x mean o f y
16 134.1593 110.4365
17
18 [ 1 ] ”Throughput”
19
20 Two Sample t−t e s t
21
22 data : Control and Mutation
23 t = −6.1149 , df = 58 , p−value = 8.804 e−08
24 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
25 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
26 −178.10276 −70.03057
27 sample e s t imate s :
28 mean o f x mean o f y
29 1427.733 1551.800
30
31 [ 1 ] ”Dropped Packets ”
32
33 Two Sample t−t e s t
34
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35 data : Control and Mutation
36 t = −9.1971 , df = 58 , p−value = 6.28 e−13
37 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
38 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
39 −26.95218 −14.84782
40 sample e s t imate s :
41 mean o f x mean o f y
42 −8.4 12 .5
B.6 SMTP
This section contains the data from all QoS experiments for SMTP. For the sake of
brevity, all column headers in this section are described here. Trial indicates the index
associated with the data in a row. Latency shows the average time in milliseconds that it
took information from the client to reach the server for the trial. RTT indicates the amount
of time in seconds from when a packet was sent by the server to the client and the receipt
of the ACK from the client. Duration shows the length of the connection in seconds. BPSS
represents the throughput of the client in bps. BPSR indicates the throughput of the server
in bps. PacketsS displays the number of packets sent by the client during the transmission.
PacketsR reports the number of packets sent by the server during the transmission.
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B.6.1 Control.
Figure 53. Histograms of SMTP QoS Control Data
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Table 32. SMTP Control QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR PktsDrop
1 0.06203 0.01271 120.023 227 228 45 45 0
2 0.06121 0.01324 120.024 227 228 45 45 0
3 0.06058 0.01266 120.024 227 228 45 45 0
4 0.0612 0.01254 120.023 227 228 45 45 0
5 0.06037 0.0125 120.024 227 228 45 45 0
6 0.06091 0.01234 120.025 227 228 45 45 0
7 0.06272 0.01318 120.023 227 228 45 45 0
8 0.06004 0.01185 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
9 0.06157 0.01288 120.023 227 228 45 45 0
10 0.06219 0.01229 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
11 0.06098 0.0124 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
12 0.06075 0.01309 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
13 0.0602 0.01211 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
14 0.06027 0.01216 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
15 0.06111 0.01186 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
16 0.06034 0.01192 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
17 0.06078 0.01294 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
18 0.05964 0.01233 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
19 0.06248 0.01306 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
20 0.05826 0.01206 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
21 0.06038 0.01253 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
22 0.06016 0.01244 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
23 0.06098 0.01232 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
24 0.06021 0.01249 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
25 0.06018 0.0123 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
26 0.06193 0.01243 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
27 0.06119 0.01269 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
28 0.06159 0.0133 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
29 0.06121 0.01233 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
30 0.06129 0.01198 120.022 227 228 45 45 0
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B.6.2 Mutator.
Figure 54. Histograms of SMTP QoS Mutator Data
143
Table 33. SMTP Mutator QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR PktsDrop
1 0.06534 0.01469 120.018 227 228 45 45 0
2 0.0632 0.01439 120.004 227 228 45 45 0
3 0.07002 0.90205 104.995 207 216 40 36 4
4 0.0642 0.0143 120.015 227 228 45 45 0
5 0.06485 0.01479 120.018 227 228 45 45 0
6 0.0688 0.90224 104.978 207 216 40 36 4
7 0.06439 0.01451 120.019 227 228 45 45 0
8 0.07127 0.90421 104.966 207 216 40 36 4
9 0.0696 0.90325 104.988 207 216 40 36 4
10 0.06532 0.01497 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
11 0.06182 0.01401 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
12 0.06362 0.01435 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
13 0.06363 0.01379 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
14 0.06477 0.01384 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
15 0.06357 0.01533 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
16 0.06265 0.01359 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
17 0.06482 0.01594 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
18 0.06405 0.01324 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
19 0.06327 0.01497 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
20 0.06421 0.01399 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
21 0.06188 0.01315 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
22 0.0643 0.01504 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
23 0.06286 0.01325 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
24 0.06244 0.0129 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
25 0.06389 0.01325 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
26 0.08138 0.01406 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
27 0.06136 0.01244 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
28 0.0636 0.01436 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
29 0.06423 0.01472 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
30 0.06207 0.01374 120.02 227 228 45 45 0
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B.6.3 T-test results.
1 [ 1 ] ”Latency”
2
3 Two Sample t−t e s t
4
5 data : Control and Mutation
6 t = −5.6527 , df = 58 , p−value = 5.056 e−07
7 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
8 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
9 −0.006111195 −0.002196831
10 sample e s t imate s :
11 mean o f x mean o f y
12 0.06089210 0.06504611
13
14 [ 1 ] ”RTT”
15
16 Two Sample t−t e s t
17
18 data : Control and Mutation
19 t = −2.1415 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03645
20 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
21 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
22 −0.26957080 0.02927669
23 sample e s t imate s :
24 mean o f x mean o f y
25 0.01249851 0.13264557
26
27 [ 1 ] ”Duration”
28
29 Two Sample t−t e s t
30
31 data : Control and Mutation
32 t = 2 .116 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03865
33 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
34 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
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35 −0.5194891 4.5364688
36 sample e s t imate s :
37 mean o f x mean o f y
38 120.0223 118.0138
39
40 [ 1 ] ”Throughput”
41
42 Two Sample t−t e s t
43
44 data : Control and Mutation
45 t = 2 .1122 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03898
46 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
47 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
48 −0.4174168 3.6174168
49 sample e s t imate s :
50 mean o f x mean o f y
51 228 .0 226 .4
52
53 [ 1 ] ”Dropped Packets ”
54
55 Two Sample t−t e s t
56
57 data : Control and Mutation
58 t = −2.1122 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03898
59 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
60 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
61 −1.2058056 0.1391389
62 sample e s t imate s :
63 mean o f x mean o f y
64 0.0000000 0.5333333
B.7 SSH
This section contains the data from all QoS experiments for SSH. For the sake of
brevity, all column headers in this section are described here. Trial indicates the index
associated with the data in a row. Latency shows the average time in milliseconds that it
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took information from the client to reach the server for the trial. RTT indicates the amount
of time in seconds from when a packet was sent by the server to the client and the receipt
of the ACK from the client. Duration shows the length of the connection in seconds. BPSS
represents the throughput of the client in bps. BPSR indicates the throughput of the server
in bps. PacketsS displays the number of packets sent by the client during the transmission.
PacketsR reports the number of packets sent by the server during the transmission.
B.7.1 Control.
The result of one dropped packet in each trial for SSH control experiments occurred
because some of the messages sent were larger than the standard ethernet frame size of
1518 Bytes. Specifically, the server key exchange initialization was 1714 Bytes. From the
server perspective, this packet was not broken up into multiple packets but on the client
packet captures, it appeared as two packets. This means that no packets were dropped by
the control trials and the calculated average is misleading. The SSH connection did not
omit any data as TCP has built-in safeguards to handle dropped packets.
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Figure 55. Histograms of SSH QoS Control Data
148
Table 34. SSH Control QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR PktsDrop
1 0.01874 0.00073 148.945 3125 3121 582 581 1
2 0.00186 0.00082 132.385 3377 3373 562 561 1
3 0.00184 0.00099 140.238 3116 3112 546 545 1
4 0.00192 0.00084 134.196 3296 3292 555 554 1
5 0.0019 0.00096 131.572 3369 3365 558 557 1
6 0.00194 0.00085 132.547 3337 3333 556 555 1
7 0.0017 0.00081 136.171 3256 3252 558 557 1
8 0.00174 0.00082 134.715 3283 3279 556 555 1
9 0.00188 0.00085 132.117 3348 3344 556 555 1
10 0.0017 0.00087 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
11 0.0031 0.00088 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
12 0.00883 0.00102 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
13 0.00203 0.00078 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
14 0.00203 0.00082 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
15 0.00171 0.00085 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
16 0.00165 0.0011 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
17 0.00175 0.00086 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
18 0.00174 8.00E-04 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
19 0.00198 0.00083 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
20 0.00183 0.00085 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
21 0.00804 0.00094 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
22 0.00202 0.00083 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
23 0.00175 0.00084 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
24 0.00181 0.00083 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
25 0.00177 0.00083 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
26 0.00202 0.00086 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
27 0.00169 0.00085 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
28 0.00185 0.00099 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
29 0.00182 0.00088 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
30 0.00172 0.00086 129.615 3371 3367 546 545 1
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B.7.2 Mutator.
The single negative result for dropped packets as shown in Figure 56 occurred during
trial 5. In this trial, the packet capture of the client terminated out-of-sync with the server.
This experimental error accounts for the negative result. In reality, zero packets were
dropped.
Figure 56. Histograms of SSH QoS Mutator Data
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Table 35. SSH Mutator QoS Data
Trial Latency RTT Duration BPSS BPSR PacketsS PacketsR PktsDrop
1 0.00233 0.00112 128.592 3310 3310 532 532 0
2 0.00249 0.00117 129.839 3295 3295 534 534 0
3 0.00302 0.00115 135.189 3254 3254 546 546 0
4 0.00242 0.00197 133.387 3335 3325 556 554 2
5 0.00218 0.00107 128.011 3287 3295 520 521 -1
6 0.00273 0.00115 127.689 3284 3284 519 519 0
7 0.00248 0.00108 126.591 3229 3230 498 498 0
8 0.00262 0.00117 137.37 3313 3247 560 560 0
9 0.00217 0.00106 137.371 3274 3275 566 566 0
10 0.00753 0.00097 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
11 0.00217 0.00107 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
12 0.0025 0.00119 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
13 0.00236 0.00108 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
14 0.00233 0.00107 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
15 0.00285 0.00101 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
16 0.00264 0.00096 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
17 0.00211 0.00102 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
18 0.00355 0.00142 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
19 0.0021 0.00108 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
20 0.00218 0.00102 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
21 0.00214 0.00111 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
22 0.00226 0.00115 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
23 0.00262 0.00113 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
24 0.00457 0.00101 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
25 0.00249 0.00096 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
26 0.00294 0.001 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
27 0.00234 0.00108 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
28 0.00218 0.00115 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
29 0.0023 0.00115 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
30 0.00234 0.00111 138.291 3170 3171 545 545 0
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B.7.3 T-test results.
1 [ 1 ] ”Latency”
2
3 Two Sample t−t e s t
4
5 data : Control and Mutation
6 t = −5.6527 , df = 58 , p−value = 5.056 e−07
7 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
8 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
9 −0.006111195 −0.002196831
10 sample e s t imate s :
11 mean o f x mean o f y
12 0.06089210 0.06504611
13
14 [ 1 ] ”RTT”
15
16 Two Sample t−t e s t
17
18 data : Control and Mutation
19 t = −2.1415 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03645
20 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
21 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
22 −0.26957080 0.02927669
23 sample e s t imate s :
24 mean o f x mean o f y
25 0.01249851 0.13264557
26
27 [ 1 ] ”Duration”
28
29 Two Sample t−t e s t
30
31 data : Control and Mutation
32 t = 2 .116 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03865
33 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
34 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
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35 −0.5194891 4.5364688
36 sample e s t imate s :
37 mean o f x mean o f y
38 120.0223 118.0138
39
40 [ 1 ] ”Throughput”
41
42 Two Sample t−t e s t
43
44 data : Control and Mutation
45 t = 2 .1122 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03898
46 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
47 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
48 −0.4174168 3.6174168
49 sample e s t imate s :
50 mean o f x mean o f y
51 228 .0 226 .4
52
53 [ 1 ] ”Dropped Packets ”
54
55 Two Sample t−t e s t
56
57 data : Control and Mutation
58 t = −2.1122 , df = 58 , p−value = 0.03898
59 a l t e r n a t i v e hypothes i s : t rue d i f f e r e n c e in means i s not equal to 0
60 99 percent con f idence i n t e r v a l :
61 −1.2058056 0.1391389
62 sample e s t imate s :
63 mean o f x mean o f y
64 0.0000000 0.5333333
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Appendix C. Experiment Scripts
C.1 Mutator Code
C.1.1 Mutator PlebeNet.py.
1 # Copyright (C) 2011 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporat ion .
2 #
3 # Licensed under the Apache License , Vers ion 2 .0 ( the ” L icense ”) ;
4 # you may not use t h i s f i l e except in compliance with the L icense .
5 # You may obta in a copy o f the L icense at
6 #
7 # http ://www. apache . org / l i c e n s e s /LICENSE−2.0
8 #
9 # Unless r equ i r ed by app l i c ab l e law or agreed to in wr i t ing , so f tware
10 # d i s t r i b u t e d under the L icense i s d i s t r i b u t e d on an ”AS IS” BASIS ,
11 # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, e i t h e r expre s s or
12 # impl i ed .
13 # See the L icense f o r the s p e c i f i c language governing pe rmi s s i ons and
14 # l im i t a t i o n s under the L icense .
15
16 from ryu . base import app manager
17 from ryu . c o n t r o l l e r import o fp event
18 from ryu . c o n t r o l l e r . handler import CONFIG DISPATCHER, MAIN DISPATCHER
19 from ryu . c o n t r o l l e r . handler import s e t e v c l s
20 from ryu . o fp ro to import o fp ro t o v1 3
21 from ryu . l i b . packet import packet
22 from ryu . l i b . packet import e the rne t
23 from ryu . l i b . packet import tcp
24 from ryu . l i b . packet import udp
25 from ryu . l i b . packet import ipv4
26 from ryu . l i b . packet import arp
27 from ryu . l i b . packet import icmp
28 from ryu . l i b . packet import e th e r t ype s
29 from ryu import c f g
30 from Mutator import Mutator #Import Mutator c l a s s
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31 from ActiveConnect ion import ActiveConnect ion
32 import l ogg ing
33 import schedu le
34
35 #Set up Logging
36 l ogg e r = logg ing . getLogger ( ’ SDNMutator ’ )
37 hd l r = logg ing . F i l eHandler ( ’ SDNMutator . log ’ )
38 fo rmatte r = logg ing . Formatter ( ’%( asct ime ) s %(levelname ) s %(message ) s ’ )
39 hd l r . setFormatter ( fo rmatte r )
40 l ogg e r . addHandler ( hd l r )
41 l ogg e r . s e tLeve l ( l ogg ing .DEBUG)
42
43 c l a s s Mutat ionContro l l e r ( app manager .RyuApp) :
44 OFP VERSIONS = [ o fp ro t o v1 3 .OFP VERSION]
45
46 de f i n i t ( s e l f , ∗ args , ∗∗kwargs ) :
47 super ( Mutat ionContro l ler , s e l f ) . i n i t (∗ args , ∗∗kwargs )
48
49 s e l f . mac to port = {}
50 s e l f . RIP VIP = {}
51 s e l f . VIP RIP = {}
52 s e l f . a c t i v e s = [ ]
53 s e l f .m = 0 # Track mutation number
54
55 s e l f . l o gg e r = logg ing . getLogger ( ’ SDNMutator . Logger ’ )
56 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o ( ’ Creat ing in s t ance o f Logger ’ )
57
58 # Set up argument par s ing
59 CONF = c fg .CONF
60 CONF. r e g i s t e r o p t s ( [
61 c f g . IntOpt ( ’ f requency ’ , d e f au l t =60, he lp=( ’Mutation rate , in
seconds ’ ) ) ,
62 c f g . ListOpt ( ’ networks ’ , d e f au l t=None , he lp=( ’ F i r s t three o c t e t s o f
IPv4 address ranges to mutate . Comma separated . ’ ) ) ,
63 c f g . IntOpt ( ’ timeout ’ , d e f au l t =240 , he lp=( ’ Seconds un t i l f low
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timeout ’ ) ) ] )
64 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o ( ’ Arguments r e c e i v ed : %s ’ , CONF. l i s t a l l s e c t i o n s ( ) )
65 networks = CONF. networks
66 f requency = CONF. f requency
67 s e l f . t imeout = CONF. timeout
68 p r i n t ( f requency )
69 p r i n t ( networks )
70 p r i n t (”Adding mutations to s chedu l e r . ” )
71 s e l f . mutator = Mutator ( networks )
72
73 schedu le . every ( f requency ) . seconds . do ( s e l f . t r iggerMutat ion , s e l f .
mutator , networks , False , s e l f .m)
74 schedu le . run cont inuous ly ( )
75 p r i n t (” Scheduler a c t i v e . ” )
76
77 de f t r i gge rMutat ion ( s e l f , mutator , networks , f i r s t , m in ) :
78 m in = m in + 1
79 mutations = mutator . mutate ( networks , f i r s t , m in )
80 s e l f . RIP VIP = mutations [ 0 ]
81 s e l f . VIP RIP = mutations [ 1 ]
82 s e l f . a c t i v e s = mutations [ 2 ]
83
84 # <ed i to r−f o l d desc=”Mutation p ro c e s s i ng”>
85 de f add f low ( s e l f , datapath , p r i o r i t y , match , ac t ions , b u f f e r i d=None ) :
86 o fp ro to = datapath . o fp ro to
87 par s e r = datapath . o f p r o t o pa r s e r
88 timeout = s e l f . t imeout
89
90 i n s t = [ par s e r . OFPInstruct ionActions ( o fp ro to .OFPIT APPLY ACTIONS,
a c t i on s ) ]
91 i f b u f f e r i d :
92 mod = par s e r .OFPFlowMod( datapath=datapath , i d l e t imeou t=timeout ,
hard t imeout=timeout , b u f f e r i d=bu f f e r i d ,
93 p r i o r i t y=p r i o r i t y , match=match ,
94 i n s t r u c t i o n s=i n s t )
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95 e l s e :
96 mod = par s e r .OFPFlowMod( datapath=datapath , p r i o r i t y=p r i o r i t y ,
i d l e t imeou t=timeout , hard t imeout=timeout ,
97 match=match , i n s t r u c t i o n s=i n s t )
98 datapath . send msg (mod)
99
100 de f addActive ( s e l f , s r c r i p , d s t r i p , s r c v ip , ds t v ip , sPort , dPort ,
p ro to co l ) :
101 conn = ActiveConnect ion ( s r c r i p , s r c v ip , d s t r i p , ds t v ip , ds t v ip ,
sPort , dPort , p ro to co l )
102
103 p r in t ”Adding new entry to Act ives ”
104 i f not any ( s t r ( x ) == s t r ( conn ) f o r x in s e l f . a c t i v e s ) :
105 s e l f . a c t i v e s . append ( ActiveConnect ion ( s r c r i p , s r c v ip , d s t r i p ,
ds t v ip , ds t v ip , sPort , dPort , p ro to co l ) )
106 i f p r o to co l == ”TCP” :
107 s e l f . a c t i v e s . append ( ActiveConnect ion ( d s t r i p , ds t v ip , s r c r i p
, s r c v ip , s r c v ip , dPort , sPort , p ro to co l ) )
108 e l s e :
109 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o (” Dupl icate entry in s e l f . a c t i v e s avoided ”)
110
111 de f a dd r e s s t r a n s l a t i o n ( s e l f , RIP , VIP) :
112 i f RIP not in s e l f . RIP VIP :
113 re turn Fal se
114 e l i f VIP not in s e l f . VIP RIP :
115 re turn Fal se
116 e l s e :
117 re turn True
118
119 #t r a n s l a t e RIPs & VIPs
120 de f lookupAddresses ( s e l f , s r c r i p , d s t v i p ) :
121 t r a n s l a t i o n = {}
122
123 # Check a c t i v e s t ab l e be f o r e s ea r ch ing mappings
124 conn = ActiveConnect ion . f i nd by rS r c pDs t ( s r c r i p , d s t v i p )
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125
126 i f conn i s None :
127 s e l f . mutator . p r i n tAc t i v e s ( )
128 p r i n t s t r ( conn )
129 p r i n t ”No entry found . Search RIP :VIP tab l e . ”
130
131 # Catch i f the re doesn ’ t e x i s t a t r a n s l a t i o n in RIP :VIP
132 i f not s e l f . a dd r e s s t r a n s l a t i o n ( s r c r i p , d s t v i p ) :
133 p r in t ” Trans la t i on does not e x i s t . ”
134 return
135 e l s e :
136 s r c v i p = s e l f . RIP VIP [ s r c r i p ]
137 d s t r i p = s e l f . VIP RIP [ d s t v i p ]
138 e l s e :
139 p r i n t ”Entry found in a c t i v e s . ”
140 s r c r i p = conn . rSrc
141 s r c v i p = conn . vSrc
142 d s t r i p = conn . rDst
143 d s t v i p = conn . pDst
144
145 t r a n s l a t i o n . update ({ ’ s r c r i p ’ : s r c r i p })
146 t r a n s l a t i o n . update ({ ’ s r c v ip ’ : s r c v i p })
147 t r a n s l a t i o n . update ({ ’ d s t r i p ’ : d s t r i p })
148 t r a n s l a t i o n . update ({ ’ d s t v ip ’ : d s t v i p })
149 p r in t t r a n s l a t i o n
150 return t r a n s l a t i o n
151 # </ed i to r−f o ld>
152
153 # <ed i to r−f o l d desc=”Packet t r a n s l a t i o n methods”>
154 de f arpTrans la t ion ( s e l f , arpPkt , dpid , parser , out port , o fproto , msg ,
datapath , i n po r t ) :
155 arpPkt = arpPkt [ 0 ]
156
157 map = s e l f . lookupAddresses ( arpPkt . s r c i p , arpPkt . d s t i p )
158
158
159 # Catch i f the re doesn ’ t e x i s t a t r a n s l a t i o n in RIP :VIP
160 # i f not s e l f . a dd r e s s t r a n s l a t i o n (map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] ) :
161 # return
162
163 s e l f . logPacket (”ARP” , map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] , map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] ,
map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] )
164
165 a c t i on s = [ par s e r . OFPActionSetField ( arp tpa=map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] ) , pa r s e r .
OFPActionSetField ( arp spa=map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] ) ,
166 par s e r . OFPActionOutput ( out por t ) ]
167
168 # i n s t a l l a f low to avoid the c o n t r o l l e r having to dec ide
169 i f out por t != o fp ro to .OFPP FLOOD:
170 match = par s e r .OFPMatch( i n po r t=in por t , e th type=0x806 , arp tpa=
map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , arp spa=map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] )
171 # v e r i f y i f we have a va l i d bu f f e r i d , i f yes avoid to send both
flow mod & packet out
172 i f msg . b u f f e r i d != o fp ro to .OFP NO BUFFER:
173 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 1 , match , ac t ions , msg . b u f f e r i d )
174 return
175 e l s e :
176 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 1 , match , a c t i on s )
177 s e l f . addActive (map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] , map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] , map
[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , ”ARP”)
178 s e l f . packet out (msg , o fproto , parser , datapath , in por t , a c t i on s )
179
180 de f icmpTrans lat ion ( s e l f , ipv4Pkt , icmpPkt , dpid , parser , out port ,
o fproto , msg , datapath , i n po r t ) :
181 ipv4Pkt = ipv4Pkt [ 0 ]
182 icmpPkt = icmpPkt [ 0 ]
183
184 map = s e l f . lookupAddresses ( ipv4Pkt . src , ipv4Pkt . dst )
185
186 # Catch i f the re i s no t r a n s l a t i o n
187 # i f not s e l f . a dd r e s s t r a n s l a t i o n (map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] ) :
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188 # return
189
190 s e l f . logPacket (”ICMP” , map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] , map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] ,
map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] )
191
192 a c t i on s = [ par s e r . OFPActionSetField ( i pv4 d s t=map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] ) , pa r s e r .
OFPActionSetField ( i p v 4 s r c=map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] ) ,
193 par s e r . OFPActionOutput ( out por t ) ]
194
195 # i n s t a l l a f low to avoid the c o n t r o l l e r having to dec ide
196 i f out por t != o fp ro to .OFPP FLOOD:
197 match = par s e r .OFPMatch( i n po r t=in por t , e th type=0x800 , i pv4 d s t=
map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , i p v 4 s r c=map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] ,
198 i p p ro t o =1, icmpv4 code=icmpPkt . code ,
icmpv4 type=icmpPkt . type )
199 # v e r i f y a va l i d bu f f e r i d , i f yes avoid to send both flow mod &
packet out
200 i f msg . b u f f e r i d != o fp ro to .OFP NO BUFFER:
201 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 1 , match , ac t ions , msg . b u f f e r i d )
202
203 return
204 e l s e :
205 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 1 , match , a c t i on s )
206 p r i n t ” h i t ”
207 #s e l f . addActive (map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] , map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] ,
map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , ”ICMP”)
208 s e l f . packet out (msg , o fproto , parser , datapath , in por t , a c t i on s )
209
210 de f ipv4Trans la t i on ( s e l f , ipv4Pkt in , tcpPkt in , udpPkt in , dpid , parser ,
out port , o fproto , msg , datapath , i n po r t ) :
211 ipv4Pkt = ipv4Pkt in [ 0 ]
212 map = s e l f . lookupAddresses ( ipv4Pkt . src , ipv4Pkt . dst )
213 match = par s e r .OFPMatch( i n po r t=in por t , e th type=0x800 , i pv4 d s t=map
[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , i p v 4 s r c=map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] ) # Defau l t match ru l e
214
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215 # Catch i f the re e x i s t s a t r a n s l a t i o n
216 # i f not s e l f . a dd r e s s t r a n s l a t i o n (map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] ) :
217 # return
218
219 #TCP Packet Proce s s ing
220 try :
221 tcpPkt = tcpPkt in [ 0 ]
222 p r i n t ”TCP: ” + s t r ( ipv4Pkt . s r c ) + ” :” + s t r ( tcpPkt . s r c p o r t ) + ” ,
” + s t r ( ipv4Pkt . dst ) + ” :” + s t r ( tcpPkt . d s t po r t )
223 i f tcpPkt . h a s f l a g s ( tcp .TCP SYN, tcp .TCP ACK) :
224 s e l f . addActive (map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] , map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] ,
map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] ,
225 tcpPkt . s r c po r t , tcpPkt . ds t por t , ”TCP”)
226 match = par se r .OFPMatch( i n po r t=in por t , e th type=0x800 ,
i pv4 d s t=map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , i p v 4 s r c=map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] ,
227 i p p ro t o =6, t c p s r c=tcpPkt . s r c po r t ,
t cp d s t=tcpPkt . d s t po r t )
228 e l i f tcpPkt . h a s f l a g s ( tcp .TCP FIN , tcp .TCP ACK) :
229 sender = ActiveConnect ion . f i n d by rS r c p o r t (map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] ,
tcpPkt . s r c po r t , tcp . d s t po r t )
230 r e c e i v e r = ActiveConnect ion . f i n d by rS r c p o r t (map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] ,
tcpPkt . ds t por t , tcpPkt . s r c p o r t )
231 p r in t ”\n\n\nHIT\n\n\n”
232 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o (” Received FINACK on :\n” + sender + ”\n” +
r e c e i v e r )
233 match = par se r .OFPMatch( i n po r t=in por t , e th type=0x800 ,
i pv4 d s t=map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , i p v 4 s r c=map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] ,
234 i p p ro t o =6, t c p s r c=tcpPkt . s r c po r t ,
t cp d s t=tcpPkt . d s t po r t )
235 # e l i f tcpPkt . h a s f l a g s ( tcp .TCP RST) :
236 # Do Something
237 except IndexError :
238 p r i n t ”No TCP in f o detec ted ”
239 except :
240 r a i s e
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241
242 #UDP Packet Proce s s ing
243 try :
244 udpPkt = udpPkt in [ 0 ]
245 p r i n t ”UDP: ” + s t r ( ipv4Pkt . s r c ) + ” :” + s t r ( udpPkt . s r c p o r t ) + ”
−> ” + s t r ( ipv4Pkt . dst ) + ” :” + s t r ( udpPkt . d s t po r t )
246 s e l f . addActive (map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] , map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] , map
[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , udpPkt . s r c po r t , udpPkt . ds t por t , ”UDP”)
247 match = par s e r .OFPMatch( i n po r t=in por t , e th type=0x800 , i pv4 d s t=
map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] , i p v 4 s r c=map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] ,
248 i p p ro t o =17, udp src=udpPkt . s r c po r t ,
udp dst=udpPkt . d s t po r t )
249 except IndexError :
250 p r i n t ”No UDP in f o detec ted ”
251 except :
252 r a i s e
253
254 s e l f . logPacket (” IPv4 ” , map[ ” s r c r i p ” ] , map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] , map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] ,
map[ ” d s t v i p ” ] )
255
256 # Modify IP address f i e l d s o f packet
257 a c t i on s = [ par s e r . OFPActionSetField ( i pv4 d s t=map[ ” d s t r i p ” ] ) , pa r s e r .
OFPActionSetField ( i p v 4 s r c=map[ ” s r c v i p ” ] ) ,
258 par s e r . OFPActionOutput ( out por t ) ]
259
260 # i n s t a l l a f low to avoid the c o n t r o l l e r having to dec ide
261 i f out por t != o fp ro to .OFPP FLOOD:
262 # v e r i f y a va l i d bu f f e r i d , i f yes avoid to send both flow mod &
packet out
263 i f msg . b u f f e r i d != o fp ro to .OFP NO BUFFER:
264 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 1 , match , ac t ions , msg . b u f f e r i d )
265 return
266 e l s e :
267 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 1 , match , a c t i on s )
268 s e l f . packet out (msg , o fproto , parser , datapath , in por t , a c t i on s )
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269 # </ed i to r−f o ld>
270
271 de f packet out ( s e l f , msg , o fproto , parser , datapath , in por t , a c t i on s ) :
272 data = None
273
274 i f msg . b u f f e r i d == ofpro to .OFP NO BUFFER:
275 data = msg . data
276
277 out = par s e r . OFPPacketOut ( datapath=datapath , b u f f e r i d=msg . bu f f e r i d ,
278 i n po r t=in por t , a c t i on s=act ions , data=data )
279 datapath . send msg ( out )
280
281 # <ed i to r−f o l d desc=”Event−dr iven methods”>
282 @s e t e v c l s ( o fp event . EventOFPPacketIn , MAIN DISPATCHER)
283 de f pa ck e t i n hand l e r ( s e l f , ev ) :
284 # I f you h i t t h i s you might want to i n c r e a s e the ”mi s s s end l eng th ” o f
your switch
285 i f ev .msg . msg len < ev .msg . t o t a l l e n :
286 s e l f . l o gg e r . debug (” packet truncated : only %s o f %s bytes ” , ev .msg .
msg len , ev .msg . t o t a l l e n )
287
288 ’ ’ ’ General Setup ’ ’ ’
289 msg = ev .msg
290 datapath = msg . datapath
291 o fp ro to = datapath . o fp ro to
292 par s e r = datapath . o f p r o t o pa r s e r
293 i n po r t = msg . match [ ’ i n por t ’ ]
294 dpid = datapath . id
295
296 # Setup the packet
297 pkt = packet . Packet (msg . data )
298
299 # Get the d i f f e r e n t pro toco l s , i f the e x i s t
300 eth = pkt . g e t p r o t o c o l s ( e the rne t . e the rne t ) [
301 0 ] # We know that there w i l l be an e the rne t component , so we can
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get the f i r s t element
302 icmpPkt = pkt . g e t p r o t o c o l s ( icmp . icmp )
303 ipv4Pkt = pkt . g e t p r o t o c o l s ( ipv4 . ipv4 )
304 arpPkt = pkt . g e t p r o t o c o l s ( arp . arp )
305
306 ’ ’ ’ Bas ic Switch Funct iona l i ty ’ ’ ’
307 i f eth . e ther type == ethe r t ype s .ETH TYPE LLDP:
308 # ignore l l dp packet
309 re turn
310 dst = eth . dst
311 s r c = eth . s r c
312
313 ’ ’ ’ Func t i ona l i t y f o r mac to port mappings ’ ’ ’
314 # Defau l t behavior f o r mac to port mappings
315 s e l f . mac to port . s e t d e f a u l t ( dpid , {})
316
317 # l ea rn a mac address to avoid FLOOD next time .
318 s e l f . mac to port [ dpid ] [ s r c ] = in po r t
319
320 i f dst in s e l f . mac to port [ dpid ] :
321 out por t = s e l f . mac to port [ dpid ] [ dst ]
322 e l s e :
323 out por t = o fpro to .OFPP FLOOD
324
325 ’ ’ ’ Trans la t i on Rules ’ ’ ’
326 i f arpPkt :
327 s e l f . a rpTrans la t ion ( arpPkt , dpid , parser , out port , o fproto , msg ,
datapath , i n po r t )
328 e l i f icmpPkt :
329 s e l f . i cmpTrans lat ion ( ipv4Pkt , icmpPkt , dpid , parser , out port ,
o fproto , msg , datapath , i n po r t )
330 e l i f ipv4Pkt :
331 tcpPkt = pkt . g e t p r o t o c o l s ( tcp . tcp )
332 udpPkt = pkt . g e t p r o t o c o l s (udp . udp )
333 s e l f . i pv4Trans la t i on ( ipv4Pkt , tcpPkt , udpPkt , dpid , parser ,
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out port , o fproto , msg , datapath , i n po r t )
334 e l s e :
335 a c t i on s = [ par s e r . OFPActionOutput ( out por t ) ]
336
337 # i n s t a l l a f low to avoid packe t in next time
338 i f out por t != o fp ro to .OFPP FLOOD:
339 match = par se r .OFPMatch( i n po r t=in por t , e th d s t=dst )
340 # v e r i f y i f we have a va l i d bu f f e r i d , i f yes avoid to send
both flow mod & packet out
341 i f msg . b u f f e r i d != o fp ro to .OFP NO BUFFER:
342 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 1 , match , ac t ions , msg . b u f f e r i d )
343 return
344 e l s e :
345 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 1 , match , a c t i on s )
346 s e l f . packet out (msg , o fproto , parser , datapath , in por t , a c t i on s )
347
348 @s e t e v c l s ( o fp event . EventOFPSwitchFeatures , CONFIG DISPATCHER)
349 de f sw i t c h f e a t u r e s h and l e r ( s e l f , ev ) :
350 datapath = ev .msg . datapath
351 o fp ro to = datapath . o fp ro to
352 par s e r = datapath . o f p r o t o pa r s e r
353
354 # i n s t a l l tab le−miss f low entry
355 #
356 # We sp e c i f y NO BUFFER to max len o f the output ac t i on due to
357 # OVS bug . At t h i s moment , i f we s p e c i f y a l e s s e r number , e . g . ,
358 # 128 , OVS w i l l send Packet−In with i n v a l i d b u f f e r i d and
359 # truncated packet data . In that case , we cannot output packets
360 # c o r r e c t l y . The bug has been f i x ed in OVS v2 . 1 . 0 .
361 match = par s e r .OFPMatch( )
362 a c t i on s = [ par s e r . OFPActionOutput ( o fp ro to .OFPPCONTROLLER,
363 o fp ro to .OFPCMLNOBUFFER) ]
364 s e l f . add f low ( datapath , 0 , match , a c t i on s )
365
366 @s e t e v c l s ( o fp event . EventOFPFlowStatsReply , MAIN DISPATCHER)
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367 de f f l ow s t a t s r e p l y h and l e r ( s e l f , ev ) :
368 f l ows = [ ]
369 f o r s t a t in ev .msg . body :
370 f l ows . append ( ’ t a b l e i d=%s ’
371 ’ du ra t i on s e c=%d dura t i on nsec=%d ’
372 ’ p r i o r i t y=%d ’
373 ’ i d l e t imeou t=%d hard t imeout=%d f l a g s=0x%04x ’
374 ’ cook i e=%d packet count=%d byte count=%d ’
375 ’match=%s i n s t r u c t i o n s=%s ’ %
376 ( s t a t . t ab l e i d ,
377 s t a t . dura t i on sec , s t a t . durat ion nsec ,
378 s t a t . p r i o r i t y ,
379 s t a t . i d l e t imeout , s t a t . hard timeout , s t a t . f l a g s ,
380 s t a t . cookie , s t a t . packet count , s t a t . byte count ,
381 s t a t . match , s t a t . i n s t r u c t i o n s ) )
382 p r in t ( ’ FlowStats : %s ’ , f l ows )
383 # </ed i to r−f o ld>
384
385 # <ed i to r−f o l d desc=”Logging”>
386 de f logPacket ( s e l f , p rotoco l , s r c r i p , s r c v ip , d s t r i p , d s t v i p ) :
387 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o ( p ro to co l )
388 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o ( ’ src RIP : %s , src VIP : %s ’ , s r c r i p , s r c v i p )
389 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o ( ’ dst RIP : %s , dst VIP : %s ’ , d s t r i p , d s t v i p )
390 # </ed i to r−f o ld>
391
392 de f s e n d f l ow s t a t s r e q u e s t ( s e l f , datapath , match ) :
393 ofp = datapath . o fp ro to
394 o f p pa r s e r = datapath . o f p r o t o pa r s e r
395
396 cook i e = cookie mask = 0
397 req = o fp pa r s e r . OFPFlowStatsRequest ( datapath , 0 ,
398 ofp .OFPTT ALL,
399 ofp .OFPP ANY, ofp .OFPGANY,
400 cookie , cookie mask ,
401 match )
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402 datapath . send msg ( req )
C.1.2 Mutator.py.
1 from random import rand int
2 import l ogg ing
3 import l ogg ing . c on f i g
4 from ActiveConnect ion import ActiveConnect ion
5 import ppr int
6
7 #Set up Logging
8 l ogg e r = logg ing . getLogger ( ’ In t e rva l ’ )
9 hd l r = logg ing . F i l eHandler ( ’ I n t e r v a l . log ’ )
10 fo rmatte r = logg ing . Formatter ( ’%( asct ime ) s %(levelname ) s %(message ) s ’ )
11 hd l r . setFormatter ( fo rmatte r )
12 l ogg e r . addHandler ( hd l r )
13 l ogg e r . s e tLeve l ( l ogg ing .DEBUG)
14
15 c l a s s Mutator :
16
17 de f i n i t ( s e l f , ∗ args ) :
18 s e l f . l o gg e r = logg ing . getLogger ( ’ I n t e r v a l . Logger ’ )
19 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o ( ’ Creat ing in s t ance o f Logger ’ )
20
21 # # Set up argument par s ing
22 # par s e r = argparse . ArgumentParser ( )
23 # par s e r . add argument(’−−networks ’ , nargs = ’∗ ’)
24 # args = par s e r . pa r s e a r g s ( )
25 # s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o ( ’ Arguments r e c e i v ed : %s ’ , a rgs )
26 s e l f . mac to port = {}
27 s e l f . RIP VIP = {}
28 s e l f . VIP RIP = {}
29 s e l f . a c t i v e s = [ ]
30
31 # schedu le . every (10) . seconds . do ( s e l f . mutate , networks , False , −1)
32 # schedu le . run cont inuous ly ( )
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33
34 # TODO: Parameter ize hardcoded ranges .
35 de f mutate ( s e l f , networks , f i r s t , mutation ) :
36
37 #Clear t r a n s l a t i o n t ab l e s f o r next mutation
38 s e l f . RIP VIP = {}
39 s e l f . VIP RIP = {}
40
41 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o (” Ca l cu l a t ing mutation ” + s t r ( mutation ) )
42
43 p r i n t (” Ca l cu l a t ing mutation ” + s t r ( mutation ) )
44 f o r net in networks :
45
46 exc lude = se t ( ) # Exclude members o f s e t from i n a c t i v e mutations
47 s e l f . RIP VIP [ ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 1 ” ] = ”10 . 1 3 . 1 . 1 ”
48 s e l f . VIP RIP [ ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 1 ” ] = ”10 . 1 3 . 1 . 1 ”
49 s e l f . RIP VIP [ ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 2 ” ] = ”10 . 1 3 . 1 . 2 ”
50 s e l f . VIP RIP [ ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 2 ” ] = ”10 . 1 3 . 1 . 2 ”
51 s e l f . RIP VIP [ ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 2 5 5 ” ] = ”10 . 13 . 1 . 2 55”
52 s e l f . VIP RIP [ ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 2 5 5 ” ] = ”10 . 13 . 1 . 2 55”
53
54 # Mutate Active connec t ions
55 f o r conn in s e l f . a c t i v e s :
56 VIP = s e l f . generateVIP ( net , 11 , 30)
57 r e s u l t s = ActiveConnect ion . f i nd by rDs t ( conn . rDst )
58 f o r entry in r e s u l t s :
59 # May repea t ed ly a s s i gn RIP :VIP mapping i f mu l t ip l e a c t i v e
conns .
60 entry . vDst = VIP
61 s e l f . updateRIPVIP ( entry . rDst , VIP)
62
63 exc lude . add ( conn . rSrc ) # Add to ensure a c t i v e addre s s e s aren ’
t mutated 2x .
64
65 # Mutate i n a c t i v e connect i ons
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66 f o r address in range (3 , 10) :
67 # VIP=RIP f o r f i r s t run to make t e s t i n g e a s i e r .
68 # TODO: Remove from f i n a l implementation .
69 RIP = net + s t r ( address )
70 i f ( f i r s t ) :
71 i f ( net + s t r ( address ) in exc lude ) :
72 cont inue
73 e l s e :
74 VIP = ( net + s t r ( address ) )
75 s e l f . RIP VIP [ net + s t r ( address ) ] = VIP
76 s e l f . VIP RIP [VIP ] = net + s t r ( address )
77 e l s e :
78 i f ( net + s t r ( address ) in exc lude ) :
79 # Ignore a c t i v e conns ; they ’ re c a l c u l a t ed above .
80 cont inue
81 e l s e :
82 VIP = s e l f . generateVIP ( net , 31 , 50)
83 s e l f . updateRIPVIP (RIP , VIP)
84
85 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o (”RIP :VIP mappings :\n\n\tRIP\ t \ t :\ t \tVIP\n”+ppr int .
pformat ( s e l f . RIP VIP , indent=1, width=100)+”\n”)
86 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o ( s e l f . p r i n tAc t i v e s ( ) )
87 s e l f . l o gg e r . i n f o (”Mutations c a l c u l a t ed f o r networks ”)
88 mutat ionResults = [ s e l f . RIP VIP , s e l f . VIP RIP , s e l f . a c t i v e s , s e l f .
mac to port ]
89 p r i n t (”Done”)
90 return mutat ionResults
91
92 # Check i f candidate VIP i s in use
93 de f VIP used ( s e l f , VIP) :
94 i f VIP in s e l f . RIP VIP or VIP in s e l f . VIP RIP :
95 re turn True
96 e l s e :
97 re turn Fal se
98
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99 # Generate VIP from address pool o f range poo lStar t−poolEnd
100 de f generateVIP ( s e l f , net , poo lStart , poolEnd ) :
101 VIP = net + s t r ( rand int ( poo lStar t , poolEnd ) )
102 whi l e ( s e l f . VIP used (VIP) ) :
103 VIP = net + s t r ( rand int ( poo lStart , poolEnd ) )
104 return VIP
105
106 # Update mutation mappings
107 de f updateRIPVIP ( s e l f , RIP ,VIP) :
108 try :
109 s e l f . RIP VIP [RIP ] = VIP
110 s e l f . VIP RIP [VIP ] = RIP
111 except :
112 s e l f . l o gg e r . f a t a l (”Unable to update RIP :VIP mapping ”)
113 r a i s e
114
115 # Get a c t i v e s t ab l e as s t r i n g .
116 de f p r i n tAc t i v e s ( s e l f ) :
117 a c t i v e s S t r i n g = ”\n\nAct ives Table a f t e r mutation :\ nIndex \ tReal Src \
tV i r tua l Src \ tReal Dst \ tPerce ived Dst \ tV i r tua l Dst \ tSrc Port \
tDst Port \ tPro toco l \n”
118 i = 1
119 f o r conn in s e l f . a c t i v e s :
120 a c t i v e s S t r i n g += ( s t r ( i ) + ”\ t ” + s t r ( conn ) + ”\n”)
121 i = i + 1
122 return a c t i v e s S t r i n g
C.1.3 ActiveConnection.py.
1 from c o l l e c t i o n s import d e f a u l t d i c t
2
3
4 c l a s s ActiveConnect ion :
5 # Pre−index a t t r i b u t e s f o r l a t e r lookup
6 rS r c index = d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
7 vSrc index = d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
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8 rDst index = d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
9 pDst index = d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
10 vDst index = d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
11 p ro t o co l i ndex = d e f a u l t d i c t ( l i s t )
12
13 de f i n i t ( s e l f , rSrc , vSrc , rDst , pDst , vDst , sPort , dPort , p ro to co l ) :
14 s e l f . rSrc = rSrc # Real source IP address
15 s e l f . vSrc = vSrc # Vi r tua l source IP address
16 s e l f . rDst = rDst # Real d e s t i n a t i on IP address
17 s e l f . pDst = pDst # Perce ived d e s t i n a t i on IP address o f the connect ion
b/ t rSrc & rDst
18 s e l f . vDst = vDst # Current v i r t u a l IP address f o r new connect i ons
19 s e l f . sPort = sPort # Source port
20 s e l f . dPort = dPort # Dest inat i on port
21 s e l f . p r o to co l = pro to co l # Protoco l in use ( i . e . TCP or UDP)
22 s e l f . f i n = 0 # Number o f FINs r e c e i v ed in connect ion ’ s l i f e t im e (TCP
only )
23
24 # Update i n d i c e s
25 ActiveConnect ion . rS r c index [ rSrc ] . append ( s e l f )
26 ActiveConnect ion . vSrc index [ vSrc ] . append ( s e l f )
27 ActiveConnect ion . rDst index [ rDst ] . append ( s e l f )
28 ActiveConnect ion . pDst index [ pDst ] . append ( s e l f )
29 ActiveConnect ion . vDst index [ vDst ] . append ( s e l f )
30 ActiveConnect ion . p r o t o co l i ndex [ p ro to co l ] . append ( s e l f )
31
32 de f s t r ( s e l f ) :
33 re turn ( s e l f . rSrc + ”\ t ” + s e l f . vSrc + ”\ t ” + s e l f . rDst + ”\ t ” + s e l f
. pDst + ”\ t ” + s e l f . vDst
34 + ”\ t ” + s t r ( s e l f . sPort ) + ”\ t ” + s t r ( s e l f . dPort ) + ”\ t ” +
s e l f . p r o to co l + ”\ t ” + s t r ( s e l f . f i n ) )
35
36 # Search func t i on s f o r a t t r i b u t e s
37 @classmethod
38 de f f i nd by rS r c ( c l s , rSrc ) :
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39 return ActiveConnect ion . rS r c index [ rSrc ]
40
41 @classmethod
42 de f f i nd by rS r c pDs t ( c l s , rSrc , pDst ) :
43 connect ions = ActiveConnect ion . rS r c index [ rSrc ]
44 # This loop MUST never re turn more than one item
45 f o r conn in connect i ons :
46 p r i n t ”Looking f o r ”
47 p r i n t s t r ( conn )
48 i f conn . pDst == pDst :
49 p r i n t ”Found i t ”
50 return conn
51 e l s e :
52 p r i n t (” Connection rSrc %s with pDst %s not found ” , rSrc , pDst
)
53 re turn
54 @classmethod
55 de f f i n d by rS r c p o r t ( c l s , rSrc , sPort , dPort ) :
56 connect ions = ActiveConnect ion . rS r c index [ rSrc ]
57 # This loop MUST never re turn more than one item
58 f o r conn in connect i ons :
59 i f conn . sPort == sPort and conn . dPort == dPort :
60 re turn conn
61 e l s e :
62 p r i n t (” Connection rSrc %s with sPort %d and dPort %d not
found ” , rSrc , sPort , dPort )
63 re turn
64
65 @classmethod
66 de f f i nd by vSr c ( c l s , vSrc ) :
67 re turn ActiveConnect ion . vSrc index [ vSrc ]
68
69 @classmethod
70 de f f i nd by rDs t ( c l s , rDst ) :
71 re turn ActiveConnect ion . rDst index [ rDst ]
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72
73 @classmethod
74 de f f ind by pDst ( c l s , pDst ) :
75 re turn ActiveConnect ion . pDst index [ pDst ]
76
77 @classmethod
78 de f f ind by vDst ( c l s , vDst ) :
79 re turn ActiveConnect ion . vDst index [ vDst ]
80
81 @classmethod
82 de f f i n d by p r o t o c o l ( c l s , p r o to co l ) :
83 re turn ActiveConnect ion . p r o t o co l i ndex [ p ro to co l ]
C.1.4 params.conf.
1 #Parameters f o r PlebeNet te s tbed
2
3 [DEFAULT]
4
5 f requency = 30
6 networks = 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 .
7 timeout = 240
8 #networks = 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . , 1 0 . 1 3 . 2 . , 1 0 . 1 3 . 3 7 . , 1 0 . 1 3 . 3 .
9 #networks = 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . , 1 0 . 1 3 . 2 . , 1 0 . 1 3 . 3 7 .
10 #networks = 10 . 1 3 . 3 7 .
C.2 Adversary Scripts
This section contains the scripts used by the Kali adversary to scan and exploit machines
on the network.
1 <ruby>
2
3 de f t im e d i f f ( s t a r t t ime , end time )
4 s e c o n d s d i f f = ( s t a r t t ime − end time ) . t o i . abs
5 hours = s e c o n d s d i f f /3600
6 s e c o n d s d i f f −= hours ∗ 3600
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7 minutes = s e c o n d s d i f f / 60
8 s e c o n d s d i f f −= minutes ∗ 60
9 seconds = s e c o n d s d i f f
10
11 puts ”#{hours . t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }:#{minutes . t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }:#{ seconds .
t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }”
12 end
13
14 #Star t Time
15 s t a r t t ime = Time . now
16
17 #Nmap Scan
18 r un s i n g l e (”db nmap −−min−hostgroup 96 −T4 −A −v −n 10 . 1 3 . 1 . 0 / 24” )
19
20 endTime = Time . now
21
22 puts ” Star t Time : ” + startTime . i n sp e c t
23 puts ”End Time : ” + endTime . i n sp e c t
24 puts ”Total Time : ”
25 t im e d i f f ( startTime , endTime )
1 <ruby>
2
3 de f t im e d i f f ( s t a r t t ime , end time )
4 s e c o n d s d i f f = ( s t a r t t ime − end time ) . t o i . abs
5 hours = s e c o n d s d i f f /3600
6 s e c o n d s d i f f −= hours ∗ 3600
7 minutes = s e c o n d s d i f f / 60
8 s e c o n d s d i f f −= minutes ∗ 60
9 seconds = s e c o n d s d i f f
10
11 puts ”#{hours . t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }:#{minutes . t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }:#{ seconds .
t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }”
12 end
13
14 #Star t Time
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15 s t a r t t ime = Time . now
16
17 #Nmap Scan
18 r un s i n g l e (”db nmap −−min−hostgroup 96 −T4 −n −F 10 . 1 3 . 1 . 0 / 24” )
19
20 endTime = Time . now
21
22 puts ” Star t Time : ” + startTime . i n sp e c t
23 puts ”End Time : ” + endTime . i n sp e c t
24 puts ”Total Time : ”
25 t im e d i f f ( startTime , endTime )
1 <ruby>
2
3 de f t im e d i f f ( s t a r t t ime , end time )
4 s e c o n d s d i f f = ( s t a r t t ime − end time ) . t o i . abs
5 hours = s e c o n d s d i f f /3600
6 s e c o n d s d i f f −= hours ∗ 3600
7 minutes = s e c o n d s d i f f / 60
8 s e c o n d s d i f f −= minutes ∗ 60
9 seconds = s e c o n d s d i f f
10
11 puts ”#{hours . t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }:#{minutes . t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }:#{ seconds .
t o s . r j u s t (2 , ’ 0 ’ ) }”
12 end
13
14 #Star t Timer
15
16 r un s i n g l e (” use e xp l o i t /windows/smb/ms08 067 netapi ”)
17 r un s i n g l e (” s e t PAYLOAD windows/meterprete r / b ind tcp ”)
18 r un s i n g l e (” s e t LHOST 10 . 1 3 . 2 . 5 ” )
19 r un s i n g l e (” s e t RPORT 445”)
20
21 puts ”Enter RHOST:”
22 ta r g e t = ge t s
23 attack = ” s e t RHOST ” +ta rg e t
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24 puts attack
25 r un s i n g l e ( at tack )
26
27 r un s i n g l e (” s e t SMBPIPE BROWSER”)
28 startTime = Time . now
29 r un s i n g l e (” e xp l o i t ”)
30 r un s i n g l e (” e x i t ”)
31 endTime = Time . now
32
33 puts ” Star t Time : ” + startTime . i n sp e c t
34 puts ”End Time : ” + endTime . i n sp e c t
35 puts ”Total Time : ”
36 t im e d i f f ( startTime , endTime )
C.3 Legitimate User Scripts
C.3.1 SSH.
Send ssh.sh contains the script open, maintain, and close a SSH connection to a specified
target.
1 #!/bin /bash
2 f o r i in ‘ seq 1 20 ‘ ;
3 do
4 date
5 l s
6 s l e e p 6
7 done
C.3.2 IMAP.
imap script.sh contains the script to retrieve content from the IMAP server.
1 #!/bin / sh
2
3 HOST=$1
4 (
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5 echo open ”$HOST 143”
6 s l e ep 1
7 echo ”? LOGIN starbuck@sdn . l o c a l Password !123”
8 s l e ep 1
9 echo ”? LIST INBOX ∗”
10 s l e ep 10
11 echo ”? SELECT INBOX”
12 s l e ep 10
13 echo ”? LIST INBOX ∗”
14 s l e ep 10
15 echo ”? SELECT INBOX”
16 s l e ep 10
17 echo ”? LIST INBOX ∗”
18 s l e ep 10
19 echo ”? SELECT INBOX”
20 s l e ep 10
21 echo ”? LIST INBOX ∗”
22 s l e ep 10
23 echo ”? SELECT INBOX”
24 s l e ep 10
25 echo ”? LIST INBOX ∗”
26 s l e ep 10
27 echo ”? SELECT INBOX”
28 s l e ep 10
29 echo ”? LIST INBOX ∗”
30 s l e ep 10
31 echo ”? SELECT INBOX”
32 s l e ep 10
33 echo ”? LOGOUT”
34 s l e ep 1
35 echo ” e x i t ”
36 ) | t e l n e t
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C.3.3 POP.
pop script.sh contains the script to retrieve content from the POP server.
1 #!/bin / sh
2
3 HOST=$1
4 (
5 echo open ”$HOST 110”
6 s l e ep 20
7 echo ”USER starbuck@sdn . l o c a l ”
8 s l e e p 20
9 echo ”PASS Password !123”
10 s l e ep 20
11 echo ”STAT”
12 s l e ep 20
13 echo ”LIST”
14 s l e ep 20
15 echo ”RETR 1”
16 s l e ep 20
17 echo ”QUIT”
18 ) | t e l n e t
C.3.4 SMTP.
smtp script.sh contains the script to retrieve content from the SMTP server.
1 #!/bin / sh
2
3 HOST=$1
4 (
5 echo open ”$HOST 25”
6 s l e ep 1
7 echo ”EHLO $HOST”
8 s l e ep 1
9 echo ”AUTH LOGIN”
10 s l e ep 1
178
11 echo ”YXBvbGxvQHNkbi5sb2NhbA==”
12 s l e ep 1
13 echo ”UGFzc3dvcmQhMTIz”
14 s l e ep 1
15 echo ”MAIL FROM: <apollo@sdn . l o c a l >”
16 s l e ep 5
17 echo ”RCPT TO: <starbuck@sdn . l o c a l >”
18 s l e ep 20
19 echo ”DATA”
20 s l e ep 10
21 echo ”FROM: apollo@sdn . l o c a l ”
22 s l e e p 20
23 echo ”TO: starbuck@sdn . l o c a l ”
24 s l e e p 10
25 echo ”SUBJECT: Message t i t l e ”
26 s l e e p 20
27 echo ”This i s the message .\ r \n”
28 s l e ep 10
29 echo ” .”
30 s l e e p 20
31 echo ”QUIT”
32 ) | t e l n e t
C.3.5 HTTP.
http script.sh contains the script to retrieve content from the HTTP server.
1 #!/bin /bash
2
3
4 cu r l −O $2/Data50 . txt −−l im i t−r a t e 785k
5 sha1sum Data50 . txt > Hash $1 . txt
6 rm Data50 . txt
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C.3.6 RTP.
message.txt contains the contents of a single packet that was continuously transmitted
during RTP trials.
1 This i s the capta in . We have a l i t t l e problem with our entry sequence , so we
may expe r i ence some s l i g h t turbu lence and then − explode .
C.3.7 Data Collection Scripts.
Capture Svcs.ps1 allows for semi-automated collection of network performance data
from the servers on the network.
1 #Generates . pcapng f i l e s on a loop with a pause f o r user input to begin each
loop .
2 #PARAMS
3 #Duration − l ength o f packet capture in seconds
4 #Tr i a l s − how many f i l e s to generate
5 #In t e r f a c e − I n t e r f a c e to l i s t e n on
6 #SVC Name − name o f VM to run packet captures on
7 #Protoco l − What pro to co l i s be ing a s s e s s ed
8 #Control − I s t h i s a c on t r o l or not ?
9 #Must be logged in to vCenter Server . Executed from PowerCLI .
10 param(
11 [ parameter (Mandatory=$ f a l s e ) ] [ i n t ] $Duration = 60 ,
12 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ i n t ] $Tr i a l s = 1 ,
13 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $ In t e r f a c e ,
14 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $SVC Name = ”” ,
15 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $Protoco l = ”” ,
16 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ switch ] $Control
17 )
18
19 #Password !122 f o r Overlord
20 #Password !123 f o r Others
21 $LocalUser = ” admin i s t ra to r ”
22 $LocalPWord = ConvertTo−SecureSt r ing −St r ing ”Password !123” −AsPlainText −
Force
180
23 $Loca lCredent ia l = New−Object −TypeName System .Management . Automation .
PSCredentia l −ArgumentList $LocalUser , $LocalPWord
24
25 For ( $ i = 1 ; $ i − l e $Tr i a l s ; $ i++)
26 {
27 Write−Verbose −Message ”Gett ing ready to s t a r t capture on $SVC Name” −Verbose
28
29 i f ( $Control )
30 {
31 $Sc r ip t = ” tshark . exe − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w C:\ Users \
Administrator \Captures\ $Protocol−C−$ i . pcapng”
32 }
33 e l s e
34 {
35 $Sc r ip t = ” tshark . exe − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w C:\ Users \
Administrator \Captures\ $Protocol−M−$ i . pcapng”
36 }
37
38 Write−Host ” S ta r t i ng s c r i p t f o r $SVC Name . . . ”
39 Invoke−VMScript −VM $SVC Name −GuestCredent ia l $Loca lCredent ia l −ScriptType
bat −Scr iptText $Sc r ip t
40 Write−Host ” Sc r i p t completed . ”
41
42 $remaining = $Tr i a l s − $ i
43
44 Read−Host −Prompt ” $remaining Tr i a l s remain . Press <enter> to cont inue . ”
45 }
Capture Kali.ps1 allows for semi-automated collection of network performance data from
a simulated legitimate user on the network.
1 #Generates . pcapng f i l e s on a loop with a pause f o r user input to begin each
loop .
2 #PARAMS
3 #Duration − l ength o f packet capture in seconds
4 #Tr i a l s − how many f i l e s to generate
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5 #In t e r f a c e − I n t e r f a c e to l i s t e n on
6 #SVC Name − name o f VM to run packet captures on
7 #Protoco l − What pro to co l i s be ing a s s e s s ed
8 #Control − I s t h i s a c on t r o l or not ?
9 #Must be logged in to vCenter Server . Executed from PowerCLI .
10 param(
11 [ parameter (Mandatory=$ f a l s e ) ] [ i n t ] $Duration = 150 ,
12 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ i n t ] $Tr i a l s = 1 ,
13 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $ In t e r f a c e ,
14 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $SVC Name = ”” ,
15 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $Protoco l = ”” ,
16 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ switch ] $Control
17 )
18
19 $LocalUser = ” root ”
20 $LocalPWord = ConvertTo−SecureSt r ing −St r ing ” toor ” −AsPlainText −Force
21 $Loca lCredent ia l = New−Object −TypeName System .Management . Automation .
PSCredentia l −ArgumentList $LocalUser , $LocalPWord
22
23 For ( $ i = 1 ; $ i − l e $Tr i a l s ; $ i++)
24 {
25 $ ta rge t = Read−Host −Prompt ”Enter IP o f t a r g e t machine . . . ”
26 Write−Verbose −Message ”Gett ing ready to s t a r t capture on $SVC Name” −Verbose
27
28 i f ( $Control )
29 {
30 switch ( $Protoco l )
31 {
32 ”IMAP”{ $Sc r ip t = ”sudo tshark − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w / root /
Captures / imap captures /IMAP C/$Protocol−C−$i−Kal i . pcapng & s l e ep 5 ; /
root /Captures / imap captures / imap sc r ip t . sh $ ta rge t ”}
33 ”POP”{ $Sc r ip t = ”sudo tshark − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w / root /
Captures / pop captures /POP C/$Protocol−C−$i−Kal i . pcapng & s l e ep 5 ; / root
/Captures / pop captures / pop s c r i p t . sh $ ta rge t ”}
34 ”SMTP”{ $Sc r ip t = ”sudo tshark − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w / root /
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Captures / smtp captures /SMTP C/$Protocol−C−$i−Kal i . pcapng & s l e ep 5 ; /
root /Captures / smtp captures / smtp sc r ip t . sh $ ta rge t ”}
35 ”HTTP”{ $Sc r ip t = ”sudo tshark − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w / root /
Captures / ht tp capture s /HTTP C/$Protocol−C−$i−Kal i . pcapng & s l e ep 5 ; /
root /Captures / ht tp capture s / h t t p s c r i p t . sh $ i ”}
36
37 }
38 }
39 e l s e
40 {
41 switch ( $Protoco l )
42 {
43 ”IMAP”{ $Sc r ip t = ”sudo tshark − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w / root /
Captures / imap captures /IMAP M/$Protocol−M−$i−Kal i . pcapng & s l e ep 5 ; /
root /Captures / imap captures / imap sc r ip t . sh $ ta rge t ”}
44 ”POP”{ $Sc r ip t = ”sudo tshark − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w / root /
Captures / pop captures /POPM/$Protocol−M−$i−Kal i . pcapng & s l e ep 5 ; / root
/Captures / pop captures / pop s c r i p t . sh $ ta rge t ”}
45 ”SMTP”{ $Sc r ip t = ”sudo tshark − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w / root /
Captures / smtp captures /SMTPM/$Protocol−M−$i−Kal i . pcapng & s l e ep 5 ; /
root /Captures / smtp captures / smtp sc r ip t . sh $ ta rge t ”}
46 ”HTTP”{ $Sc r ip t = ”sudo tshark − i $ I n t e r f a c e −a durat ion : $Duration −w / root /
Captures / ht tp capture s /HTTPM/$Protocol−M−$i−Kal i . pcapng & s l e ep 5 ; /
root /Captures / ht tp capture s / h t t p s c r i p t . sh $ i ”}
47
48 }
49 }
50
51 Write−Host ” S ta r t i ng s c r i p t f o r $SVC Name t r i a l $ i ”
52 Invoke−VMScript −VM $SVC Name −GuestCredent ia l $Loca lCredent ia l −ScriptType
bash −Scr iptText $Sc r ip t
53 Write−Host ” Sc r i p t completed . ”
54
55 $remaining = $Tr i a l s − $ i
56
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57 Read−Host −Prompt ” $remaining Tr i a l s remain . Press <enter> to cont inue . ”
58 }
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Appendix D. Data Processing Scripts
D.1 Stream Isolation
Filter Packet Stream.ps1 isolates the TCP or UDP stream relevant to the protocol under
test.
1 #Wil l c r e a t e a new f i l e f o l l ow i n g a supp l i ed naming scheme ( with hardcoded
name manipulat ion )
2 #tshark f i l t e r i s o l a t e d the f i r s t tcp stream in the . pcapng f i l e .
3 #Current ly only f i l t e r s i n to Control !
4
5 # Character o f f s e t s f o r use in Remove ( ) and I n s e r t ( )
6 # HTTP C Receiver #.pcapng 16 ,17
7 # IMAP C Receiver #.pcapng 16 ,17
8 # SMTP C Receiver #.pcapng 16 ,17
9 # RTP C Receiver #.pcapng 15 ,16
10 # POP C Receiver #.pcapng 15 ,16
11 # SSH C Receiver #.pcapng 15 ,16
12 # HTTP C Sender #.pcapng 14 ,15
13 # IMAP C Sender #.pcapng 14 ,15
14 # SMTP C Sender #.pcapng 14 ,15
15 # RTP C Sender #.pcapng 13 ,14
16 # POP C Sender #.pcapng 13 ,14
17 # SSH C Sender #.pcapng 13 ,14
18
19 param(
20 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ switch ] $Control
21 )
22
23 i f ( $Control ) {
24 $path = ”Control ”
25 $Type = ”C”
26 }
27 e l s e {
28 $Path = ”Mutator”
29 $Type = ”M”
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30 }
31
32 $Protoco l = ”HTTP” , ”IMAP” , ”SMTP” , ”RTP” , ”POP” , ”SSH”
33 $Fi leTypes = ”HTTP @ Receiver #OLD. pcapng ” ,” IMAP @ Receiver #OLD. pcapng ” ,”
SMTP @ Receiver #OLD. pcapng ” ,” RTP @ Receiver #OLD. pcapng ” ,” POP @ Receiver
#OLD. pcapng ” ,” SSH @ Receiver #OLD. pcapng ” ,”HTTP @ Sender #OLD. pcapng ” ,”
IMAP @ Sender #OLD. pcapng ” ,” SMTP @ Sender #OLD. pcapng ” ,”RTP @ Sender #OLD.
pcapng ” ,”POP @ Sender #OLD. pcapng ” ,” SSH @ Sender #OLD. pcapng”
34
35 $ o f f s e t 1 = 17
36 $ o f f s e t 2 = 18
37
38 For ( $ j = 0 ; $ j − l e 11 ; $ j++)
39 {
40 $p = $j % 6
41 i f ( $ j % 3 −eq 0)
42 {
43 $o f f s e t 1−−
44 $o f f s e t 2−−
45 }
46
47 For ( $ i = 1 ; $ i − l e 10 ; $ i++)
48 {
49 $Fi leTypes [ $ j ] = $Fi leTypes [ $ j ] . Remove( $ o f f s e t 1 ) . I n s e r t ( $ o f f s e t 1 , ” $ i ”)+”OLD.
pcapng”
50
51 $sb = new−ob j e c t system . t ext . s t r i n g bu i l d e r
52 $sb . append ( $Fi leTypes [ $ j ] . s p l i t ( ’ ’ ) [ 0 ] )
53 # Since we use @ to cut on , we put i t back with the proper type (C or M)
54 $sb . append (” $Type ”) | out−nu l l
55
56 # Grab the second ha l f o f the o r i g i n a l t ex t [ index 1 ]
57 $s2 = $Fi leTypes [ $ j ] . s p l i t ( ’@’ ) [ 1 ]
58 # the . ToCharArray ( ) method o f a s t r i n g breaks the s t r i n g in to i nd i v i dua l
cha ra c t e r s
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59 # there ’ s a b i t more to char vs s t r i n g ; but , that ’ s unnecessary in fo rmat ion .
60 fo r each ( $c in $s2 . ToCharArray ( ) ) {
61
62 # Add each charac t e r to the s t r i n g bu i l d e r 1 at a time , f o l l owed by a
per iod
63 $sb . append ( $c . ToString ( ) ) | out−nu l l
64 }
65
66 # f i n a l l y , s p i t the whole th ing back out as a s t r i n g ob j e c t ( th ink in
ob j e c t s )
67 $NewFile = $sb . ToString ( )
68
69 i f ( $ i −ge 10) { $ o f f s e t 1++}
70 $NewFile = $NewFile . Remove( $ o f f s e t 1 + 1)+”.pcapng”
71 Write−Host $Fi leTypes [ $ j ]
72 Write−Host $NewFile
73 i f ( $Protoco l [ $p ] −eq ”RTP”)
74 {
75 tshark −r ”C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\Control \$ ( $Protoco l [ $p ] ) \$ (
$Fi leTypes [ $ j ] ) ” −2 −R ”udp . stream eq 0” −w ”C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\
Documents\PCAPS\Control \$ ( $Protoco l [ $p ] ) \$NewFile”
76 }
77 e l s e
78 {
79 tshark −r ”C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\Control \$ ( $Protoco l [ $p ] ) \$ (
$Fi leTypes [ $ j ] ) ” −2 −R ” tcp . stream eq 0” −w ”C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\
Documents\PCAPS\Control \$ ( $Protoco l [ $p ] ) \$NewFile”
80 }
81 i f ( $ i −ge 10) { $o f f s e t 1 −−}
82 }
83 }
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D.2 Data Extraction
GatherQoSData.ps1 takes a filtered TCP or UDP stream as input and produces a .csv
with information about the transmission for later analysis.
1 #1. Apply f i l t e r to get l a t ency and RTT
2 #tshark −r . \ [ f i l e ] . pcapng −T f i e l d s −e frame . number −e ip . s r c −e ip . dst −e
tcp . t ime de l t a −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . a c k r t t −E header=y > [ f i l e ] r e s u l t s . csv
3 #2. c ap in f o s on sender and r e c e i v e r to get byte r a t e s and t o t a l packets
4 #cap in f o s [ f i l e ] . pcapng > [ f i l e ] i n f o . txt
5 #OUTPUT: QoS Data in a tab−separated csv
6 #HTTP and RTP Commented f o r a n a l y s i s l a t e r .
7
8 param(
9 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ switch ] $Control ,
10 [ parameter (Mandatory=$true ) ] [ s t r i n g ] $Protoco l
11 )
12
13 i f ( $Control ) {
14 $path = ”Control ”
15 $Type = ”C”
16 }
17 e l s e {
18 $Path = ”Mutator”
19 $Type = ”M”
20 }
21
22 $TCP = $True
23
24 switch ( $Protoco l )
25 {
26 ”FTP”{$TCP = $True}
27 ”HTTP”{$TCP = $True}
28 ”IMAP”{$TCP = $True}
29 ”POP”{$TCP = $True}
30 ”RTP”{$TCP = $False }
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31 ”SMTP”{$TCP = $True}
32 ”SSH”{$TCP = $True}
33 }
34
35 func t i on gatherTCPData ( $path , $protoco l , $type , $ i )
36 {
37 tshark −r C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Rece iver \
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Re c e i v e r $ i ‘ . pcapng −T f i e l d s −e frame . number
−e ip . s r c −e ip . dst −e tcp . t ime de l t a −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . a c k r t t −e tcp .
a n a l y s i s . r e t r an sm i s s i on −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . f a s t r e t r a n sm i s s i o n −e tcp .
a n a l y s i s . a ck l o s t s egment −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . o u t o f o r d e r −e tcp . a n a l y s i s .
s pu r i ou s r e t r an sm i s s i on −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . dup l i c a t e a ck −e tcp . a n a l y s i s .
window update −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . w indow fu l l −E header=y > C:\ Users \ smayer .
CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer Thesis\Experiments\Resu l t s \ $protoco l ‘\ $path ‘\
$protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Re c e i v e r $ i ‘ r e s u l t s . csv
38 tshark −r C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Sender\
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Sender $ i ‘ . pcapng −T f i e l d s −e frame . number −e
ip . s r c −e ip . dst −e tcp . t ime de l t a −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . a c k r t t −e tcp .
a n a l y s i s . r e t r an sm i s s i on −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . f a s t r e t r a n sm i s s i o n −e tcp .
a n a l y s i s . a ck l o s t s egment −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . o u t o f o r d e r −e tcp . a n a l y s i s .
s pu r i ou s r e t r an sm i s s i on −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . dup l i c a t e a ck −e tcp . a n a l y s i s .
window update −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . w indow fu l l −E header=y > C:\ Users \ smayer .
CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer Thesis\Experiments\Resu l t s \ $protoco l ‘\ $path ‘\
$protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Sender $ i ‘ r e s u l t s . csv
39 cap in f o s C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Rece iver \
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Re c e i v e r $ i ‘ . pcapng | Se l e c t−St r ing ” F i l e name
: ” , ”Number o f packets : ” , ” Capture durat ion : ” , ” Data b i t r a t e : ” | Add−
Content C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer Thesis\Experiments\
Resu l t s \ $protoco l ‘\ $path ‘\ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ $ i ‘ I n f o . txt
40 cap in f o s C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Sender\
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Sender $ i ‘ . pcapng | Se l e c t−St r ing ” F i l e name
: ” , ”Number o f packets : ” , ” Capture durat ion : ” , ” Data b i t r a t e : ” | Add−
Content C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer Thesis\Experiments\
Resu l t s \ $protoco l ‘\ $path ‘\ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ $ i ‘ I n f o . txt
41
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42 Write−Host $pro toco l $type $ i complete .
43 }
44
45 func t i on gatherUDPData ( $path , $protoco l , $type , $ i )
46 {
47 tshark −r C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Rece iver \
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Re c e i v e r $ i ‘ . pcapng −T f i e l d s −e frame . number
−e ip . s r c −e ip . dst −e tcp . t ime de l t a −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . a c k r t t −e tcp .
a n a l y s i s . r e t r an sm i s s i on −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . f a s t r e t r a n sm i s s i o n −e tcp .
a n a l y s i s . a ck l o s t s egment −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . o u t o f o r d e r −e tcp . a n a l y s i s .
s pu r i ou s r e t r an sm i s s i on −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . dup l i c a t e a ck −e tcp . a n a l y s i s .
window update −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . w indow fu l l −E header=y > C:\ Users \ smayer .
CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer Thesis\Experiments\Resu l t s \ $protoco l ‘\ $path ‘\
$protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Re c e i v e r $ i ‘ r e s u l t s . csv
48 tshark −r C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Sender\
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Sender $ i ‘ . pcapng −T f i e l d s −e frame . number −e
ip . s r c −e ip . dst −e tcp . t ime de l t a −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . a c k r t t −e tcp .
a n a l y s i s . r e t r an sm i s s i on −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . f a s t r e t r a n sm i s s i o n −e tcp .
a n a l y s i s . a ck l o s t s egment −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . o u t o f o r d e r −e tcp . a n a l y s i s .
s pu r i ou s r e t r an sm i s s i on −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . dup l i c a t e a ck −e tcp . a n a l y s i s .
window update −e tcp . a n a l y s i s . w indow fu l l −E header=y > C:\ Users \ smayer .
CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer Thesis\Experiments\Resu l t s \ $protoco l ‘\ $path ‘\
$protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Sender $ i ‘ r e s u l t s . csv
49 cap in f o s C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Rece iver \
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Re c e i v e r $ i ‘ . pcapng | Se l e c t−St r ing ” F i l e name
: ” , ”Number o f packets : ” , ” Capture durat ion : ” , ” Data b i t r a t e : ” | Add−
Content C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer Thesis\Experiments\
Resu l t s \ $protoco l ‘\ $path ‘\ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ $ i ‘ I n f o . txt
50 cap in f o s C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Sender\
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Sender $ i ‘ . pcapng | Se l e c t−St r ing ” F i l e name
: ” , ”Number o f packets : ” , ” Capture durat ion : ” , ” Data b i t r a t e : ” | Add−
Content C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\GitHub\Mayer Thesis\Experiments\
Resu l t s \ $protoco l ‘\ $path ‘\ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ $ i ‘ I n f o . txt
51
52 Write−Host $pro toco l $type $ i complete .
190
53 Write−Host C:\ Users \ smayer .CDN\Documents\PCAPS\$path ‘\ $protoco l ‘\ Rece iver \
F i l t e r e d \ $protoco l ‘ $type ‘ Re c e i v e r $ i ‘ . pcapng
54 }
55
56 For ( $ i t e r = 1 ; $ i t e r − l e 10 ; $ i t e r++)
57 {
58 i f ($TCP) {gatherTCPData $Path $Protoco l $Type $ i t e r }
59 e l s e {gatherUDPData $Path $Protoco l $Type $ i t e r }
60 }
D.3 Data Aggregation
ReadResults.R takes the output of GatherQoSData.ps1 and calculates averages for each
measured piece of information. Results are then stored in another .csv for statistical anal-
ysis.
1 r e qu i r e ( t i dyv e r s e )
2 r e qu i r e ( r eadx l )
3 r e qu i r e ( s t r i n g r )
4
5 c t r l d i r s <− c (”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /
Resu l t s /FTP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /
Experiments /Resu l t s /HTTP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/
Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /IMAP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/
Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /POP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /
smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /RTP/Control
” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /
SMTP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /
Experiments /Resu l t s /SSH/Control ”)
6 mutatedirs <− c (”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments
/Resu l t s /FTP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /
Experiments /Resu l t s /HTTP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/
Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /IMAP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/
Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /POP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /
smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /RTP/Mutator
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” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /
SMTP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /
Experiments /Resu l t s /SSH/Mutator ”)
7 p ro to co l <− c (”FTP” ,”HTTP” ,”IMAP” ,”POP” ,”RTP” ,”SMTP” ,”SSH”)
8 #RIPs o f sender used f o r each t r i a l . 1 : 1 mapping with p ro to co l vec to r
9 s end e r r i p <− c
( ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 8 ” , ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 8 ” , ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 8 ” , ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 8 ” , ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 8 ” , ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 8 ” , ” 1 0 . 1 3 . 1 . 8 ” )
10
11 #Generic f i l ename format
12 udp st r <− ”AAA X Jitter . csv ”
13 s e nd e r s t r <− ”AAA X Sender # r e s u l t s . csv ”
14 r e c e i v e r s t r <− ”AAA X Receiver # r e s u l t s . csv ”
15 i n f o <− ”AAA X# In f o . txt ”
16
17 #Tibble f o r in t e rmed ia t e r e s u l t s S = Sender , R = Rece iver
18 TCP Avgs <− t i b b l e ( l a t ency=0, RTT=0, durat ion=0, BPSSender=0, BPSReceiver=0,
PktsSender=0, PktsRece iver=0, PktsDrop = ( PktsSender−PktsRece iver ) ,
RetransR = 0 , RetransS = 0 , FastRetransR = 0 , FastRetransS = 0 , ACKlostR =
0 , ACKlostS = 0 , OutOfOrderR = 0 , OutOfOrderS = 0 , SRetransR = 0 ,
SRetransS = 0 , DupACKR = 0 , DupACKS = 0 , WinUpdateR = 0 , WinUpdateS = 0 ,
WinFullR = 0 , WinFullS = 0)
19
20 UDP Avgs <− t i b b l e ( Maxj i t terS=0, MaxjitterR=0, j i t t e r S =0, j i t t e rR =0, durat ion
=0, BPSSender=0, BPSReceiver=0, PktsSender=0, PktsRece iver=0, PktsDrop = (
PktsSender−PktsRece iver ) )
21
22 #Pul l data from f i l e s to c r e a t e t i b b l e s f o r TCP data
23 parseTCP <− f unc t i on (TCP Avgs , s ende r s t r , r e c e i v e r s t r , in fo , s e nd e r r i p )
24 {
25 #Import f i l e s
26 Sender <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e=s ende r s t r , header=TRUE, na . s t r i n g s = ( c
(”” , ”NA”) ) , sep=’\ t ’ , f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−16LE”) )
27 Rece iver <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e=r e c e i v e r s t r , header=TRUE, na . s t r i n g s =
( c (”” , ”NA”) ) , sep=’\ t ’ , f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−16LE”) )
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28 p r i n t ( nrow ( Rece iver ) )
29 #I s o l a t e l a t ency data
30 Sender Latency <− t i b b l e ( ip . dst = Sender$ip . dst , d e l t a = Sender$tcp .
t ime de l t a ) %>% f i l t e r ( ip . dst == s end e r r i p )
31 Sender Latency$de l ta [ Sender Latency$de l ta >3.5 ] = NA #Ignore pauses due to
t e s t s c r i p t
32 Latency mean <− round (mean( Sender Latency$de l ta , na . rm = TRUE) , 5)
33
34 #I s o l a t e RTT data
35 Sender RTT <− t i b b l e ( frame = Sender$frame . number , RTT = Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s
. a c k r t t ) %>% drop na (RTT)
36 RTT mean <− round (mean(Sender RTT$RTT) , 5)
37
38 #I s o l a t e pkts , durat ion , and bps from text f i l e s
39 i n f o <− readLines ( i n f o )
40 pkt r e c <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 6) [ 2 ] )
41 pkt send <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 6) [ 6 ] )
42 dur <− round ( as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 6) [ 3 ] ) , 3)
43 bps r <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 10) [ 4 ] )
44 bps s <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 10) [ 8 ] )
45
46 p r i n t ( s e nd e r s t r )
47 #Gather TCP I s su e Data ( Sender )
48 RT S = sum( Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s . r e t ransmi s s i on , na . rm = TRUE)
49 FR S = sum( Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s . f a s t r e t r an sm i s s i o n , na . rm = TRUE)
50 ACKl S = sum( Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s . ack lo s t segment , na . rm = TRUE)
51 OO S = sum( Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s . ou t o f o rde r , na . rm = TRUE)
52 SR S = sum( Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s . s pu r i ou s r e t r an sm i s s i on , na . rm = TRUE)
53 DA S = sum( Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s . dup l i ca t e ack , na . rm = TRUE)
54 WU S = sum( Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s . window update , na . rm = TRUE)
55 WF S = sum( Sender$tcp . a n a l y s i s . window ful l , na . rm = TRUE)
56
57 p r i n t ( r e c e i v e r s t r )
58 #Gather TCP I s su e Data ( Rece iver )
59 RT R = sum( Rece iver$tcp . a n a l y s i s . r e t ransmi s s i on , na . rm = TRUE)
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60 FR R = sum( Rece iver$tcp . a n a l y s i s . f a s t r e t r an sm i s s i o n , na . rm = TRUE)
61 ACKl R = sum( Rece iver$tcp . a n a l y s i s . ack lo s t segment , na . rm = TRUE)
62 OO R = sum( Rece iver$tcp . a n a l y s i s . ou t o f o rde r , na . rm = TRUE)
63 SR R = sum( Rece iver$tcp . a n a l y s i s . s pu r i ou s r e t r an sm i s s i on , na . rm = TRUE)
64 DA R = sum( Rece iver$tcp . a n a l y s i s . dup l i ca t e ack , na . rm = TRUE)
65 WUR = sum( Rece iver$tcp . a n a l y s i s . window update , na . rm = TRUE)
66 WFR = sum( Rece iver$tcp . a n a l y s i s . window ful l , na . rm = TRUE)
67
68 add row (TCP Avgs , l a t ency = Latency mean , RTT = RTT mean , durat ion = dur ,
BPSSender = bps s , BPSReceiver = bps r , PktsSender = pkt send ,
PktsRece iver = pkt rec , PktsDrop=(pkt send−pkt r e c ) , RetransR = RT R,
RetransS = RT S , FastRetransR = FR R, FastRetransS = FR S , ACKlostR =
ACKl R , ACKlostS = ACKl S , OutOfOrderR = OO R, OutOfOrderS = OO S,
SRetransR = SR R , SRetransS = SR S , DupACKR = DA R, DupACKS = DA S ,
WinUpdateR = WUR, WinUpdateS = WU S, WinFullR = WF R, WinFullS = WF S)
69 }
70
71 #Pul l data from f i l e s to c r e a t e t i b b l e s f o r TCP data
72 parseUDP <− f unc t i on (UDP Avgs , udp str , in fo , s e nd e r r i p )
73 {
74 #Import f i l e s ( Expects UTF−8)
75 J i t t e r Da ta <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e=udp str , header=TRUE, na . s t r i n g s = ( c
(”” , ”NA”) ) , sep = ’ , ’ , f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−8”) )
76 #I s o l a t e J i t t e r data
77 mjs <− round (mean( J i t te r Data$Send .Max . J i t t e r . . ms . ) , 5)
78 mjr <− round (mean( J i t te r Data$Rec .Max . J i t t e r . . ms . ) , 5)
79 j s <− round (mean( J i t te r Data$Send .Mean . J i t t e r . . ms . ) , 5)
80 j r <− round (mean( J i t te r Data$Rec .Mean . J i t t e r . . ms . ) , 5)
81
82 #I s o l a t e pkts , durat ion , and bps from text f i l e s
83 i n f o <− readLines ( i n f o )
84 pkt r e c <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 6) [ 2 ] )
85 pkt send <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 6) [ 6 ] )
86 dur <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 6) [ 3 ] )
87 bps r <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 10) [ 4 ] )
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88 bps s <− as . numeric (word ( in fo , s t a r t = 10) [ 8 ] )
89 p r i n t ( pk t r e c )
90
91 add row (UDP Avgs , Maxj i t terS=mjs , MaxjitterR=mjr , j i t t e r S=js , j i t t e rR=jr ,
durat ion = dur , BPSSender = bps s , BPSReceiver = bps r , PktsSender =
pkt send , PktsRece iver = pkt rec , PktsDrop=(pkt send−pkt r e c ) )
92 }
93
94 #Creates the appropr ia t e f i l enames & de s t i n a t i o n s f o r output
95 par s eProtoco l <− f unc t i on ( d i r e c to ry , protoco l , s e nd e r r i p )
96 {
97 p r i n t ( p ro to co l )
98 p r i n t ( d i r e c t o r y )
99 setwd ( d i r e c t o r y )
100
101 f o r ( i in c ( 1 : 3 0 ) )
102 {
103
104 #Update f i l enames f o r the cur rent t r i a l
105 udp st r <− sub ( ” ˆ [ [ : upper : ] ] { 3 , } ” , protoco l , udp st r )
106 s e nd e r s t r <− sub ( ” ˆ [ [ : upper : ] ] { 3 , } ” , protoco l , s e nd e r s t r )
107 r e c e i v e r s t r <− sub ( ” ˆ [ [ : upper : ] ] { 3 , } ” , protoco l , r e c e i v e r s t r )
108 i n f o <− sub ( ” ˆ [ [ : upper : ] ] { 3 , } ” , protoco l , i n f o )
109
110 i f ( g r ep l (” Control ” , d i r e c t o r y ) )
111 {
112 udp st r <− sub (” X ” , ” C ” , udp st r )
113 s e nd e r s t r <− sub (” X ” , ” C ” , s e nd e r s t r )
114 r e c e i v e r s t r <− sub (” X ” , ” C ” , r e c e i v e r s t r )
115 i n f o <− sub (” X ” , ” C ” , i n f o )
116 }
117 e l s e i f ( g r ep l (”Mutator ” , d i r e c t o r y ) )
118 {
119 udp st r <− sub (” X ” , ” M ” , udp st r )
120 s e nd e r s t r <− sub (” X ” , ” M ” , s e nd e r s t r )
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121 r e c e i v e r s t r <− sub (” X ” , ” M ” , r e c e i v e r s t r )
122 i n f o <− sub (” X ” , ” M ” , i n f o ) }
123 e l s e
124 {
125 p r i n t (” Error a s s i gn i ng output f i l e name . ” )
126 }
127
128 p r in t ( i )
129 #Update f o r each t r i a l
130 s e nd e r s t r <− sub (” (\\d |# |\\d\\d) ” , capture . output ( cat (” ” , i , ” ” , sep=””)
) , s e nd e r s t r )
131 r e c e i v e r s t r <− sub (” (\\d |# |\\d\\d) ” , capture . output ( cat (” ” , i , ” ” , sep
=””) ) , r e c e i v e r s t r )
132 i n f o <− sub (” (\\d |# |dd) ” , capture . output ( cat (” ” , i , ” ” , sep=””) ) , i n f o )
133
134 #Get ac tua l data
135 i f ( p ro to co l != ”RTP”)
136 {
137 TCP Avgs <− parseTCP(TCP Avgs , s ende r s t r , r e c e i v e r s t r , in fo ,
s e nd e r r i p )
138 }
139 e l s e
140 {
141 UDP Avgs <− parseUDP(UDP Avgs , udp str , in fo , s e nd e r r i p )
142 }
143 }
144
145 i f ( p ro to co l != ”RTP”)
146 {
147 TCP Avgs <− TCP Avgs [−1 , ]
148 p r in t (TCP Avgs)
149 #Output r e s u l t s to proper d i r e c t o r y
150 i f ( g r ep l (” Control ” , d i r e c t o r y ) )
151 {
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152 wr i t e . csv (TCP Avgs , f i l e = capture . output ( cat ( protoco l , ” C Avgs . csv ” ,
sep=””) ) )
153 }
154 e l s e i f ( g r ep l (”Mutator ” , d i r e c t o r y ) )
155 {
156 wr i t e . csv (TCP Avgs , f i l e = capture . output ( cat ( protoco l , ” M Avgs . csv ” ,
sep=””) ) )
157 }
158 e l s e
159 {
160 p r i n t (” Error par s ing d i r e c t o r y name . ” )
161 }
162 }
163 e l s e
164 {
165 UDP Avgs <− UDP Avgs [−1 , ]
166 p r in t (UDP Avgs)
167 #Output r e s u l t s to proper d i r e c t o r y
168 i f ( g r ep l (” Control ” , d i r e c t o r y ) )
169 {
170 wr i t e . csv (UDP Avgs , f i l e = capture . output ( cat ( protoco l , ” C Avgs . csv ” ,
sep=””) ) )
171 }
172 e l s e i f ( g r ep l (”Mutator ” , d i r e c t o r y ) )
173 {
174 wr i t e . csv (UDP Avgs , f i l e = capture . output ( cat ( protoco l , ” M Avgs . csv ” ,
sep=””) ) )
175 }
176 e l s e
177 {
178 p r i n t (” Error par s ing d i r e c t o r y name . ” )
179 }
180 }
181 }
182
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183 f o r ( j in c ( 2 : 2 ) )
184 {
185 par s eProtoco l ( d i r e c t o r y = c t r l d i r s [ j ] , p r o to co l = pro to co l [ j ] , s e nd e r r i p =
s end e r r i p [ j ] )
186 par s eProtoco l ( d i r e c t o r y = mutatedirs [ j ] , p r o to co l = pro to co l [ j ] , s e nd e r r i p =
s end e r r i p [ j ] )
187 }
D.4 Validation Analysis
MakeGraphs.R takes Aust’s original data and the validation data from experiments and
produces graphs of the data for comparison.
1 r e qu i r e ( t i dyv e r s e )
2 r e qu i r e ( r eadx l )
3 #r equ i r e ( gr idExtra )
4 r e qu i r e ( ggp lot2 )
5 r e qu i r e ( cowplot )
6 r e qu i r e ( ex t r a f on t )
7
8 setwd (”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments ”)
9
10 Avgs <− a s t i b b l e ( r e ad ex c e l (” Resu l t s . x l sx ” , shee t = ”AustAvgs ”) )
11
12 MutationTime = c (”30S” ,”1M” ,”5M” ,”15M”)
13
14 #outputd i r <− ”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Latex/ Figures
”
15
16 #S l i d e s d i r e c t o r y
17 outputd i r <− ”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis / S l i d e s /”
18
19 IS <− ggp lot ( data=Avgs , aes ( x=Time , y=IntenseScan , group=Mutate ) ) +
20 th eme c l a s s i c ( ) +
21 labs (y=”Seconds ” , c o l=”Treatment\nCondition ”) +
22 geom l ine ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 2) +
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23 geom point ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 3) +
24 s c a l e x d i s c r e t e ( l im i t s=MutationTime ) +
25 theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =16) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =16) ,
26 ax i s . t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) )
27
28 ggsave (” IScan . png ” , IS , path = outputdir , he ight = 5 .75 , width = 5 . 4 , un i t s =
” in ”)
29
30 IH <− ggp lot ( data=Avgs , aes ( x=Time , y=IntenseHosts , group=Mutate ) ) +
31 th eme c l a s s i c ( ) +
32 labs (y=”Hosts ” , c o l=”Treatment\nCondition ”) +
33 geom l ine ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 2) +
34 geom point ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 3) +
35 s c a l e x d i s c r e t e ( l im i t s=MutationTime ) +
36 theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =16) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =16) ,
37 ax i s . t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) )
38
39 ggsave (” IHosts . png ” , IH , path = outputdir , he ight = 5 .75 , width = 5 . 4 , un i t s =
” in ”)
40
41 IPT <− ggp lot ( data=Avgs , aes ( x=Time , y=‘PenTime−I ‘ , group=Mutate ) ) +
42 th eme c l a s s i c ( ) +
43 labs (y=”Seconds ” , c o l=”Treatment\nCondition ”) +
44 geom l ine ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 2) +
45 geom point ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 3) +
46 s c a l e x d i s c r e t e ( l im i t s=MutationTime ) +
47 theme ( text = e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =16) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =16) ,
48 ax i s . t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) )
49
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50 ggsave (”IPT . png ” , IPT , path = outputdir , he ight = 5 .75 , width = 5 . 4 , un i t s = ”
in ”)
51
52 QS <− ggp lot ( data=Avgs , aes ( x=Time , y=QuickScan , group=Mutate ) ) +
53 th eme c l a s s i c ( ) +
54 labs (y=”Seconds ” , c o l=”Treatment\nCondition ”) +
55 geom l ine ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 2) +
56 geom point ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 3) +
57 s c a l e x d i s c r e t e ( l im i t s=MutationTime ) +
58 theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =16) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =16) ,
59 ax i s . t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) )
60
61 ggsave (”QScan . png ” , QS, path = outputdir , he ight = 5 .75 , width = 5 . 4 , un i t s =
” in ”)
62
63
64 QH <− ggp lot ( data=Avgs , aes ( x=Time , y=QuickHosts , group=Mutate ) ) +
65 th eme c l a s s i c ( ) +
66 labs (y=”Hosts ” , c o l=”Treatment\nCondition ”) +
67 geom l ine ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 2) +
68 geom point ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 3) +
69 s c a l e x d i s c r e t e ( l im i t s=MutationTime ) +
70 theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =16) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =16) ,
71 ax i s . t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) )
72
73 ggsave (”QHosts . png ” , QH, path = outputdir , he ight = 5 .75 , width = 5 . 4 , un i t s =
” in ”)
74
75
76 QPT <− ggp lot ( data=Avgs , aes ( x=Time , y=‘PenTime−Q‘ , group=Mutate ) ) +
77 th eme c l a s s i c ( ) +
200
78 l ab s (y=”Seconds ” , c o l=”Treatment\nCondition ”) +
79 geom l ine ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 2) +
80 geom point ( aes ( c o l o r=f a c t o r (Mutate ) ) , s i z e = 3) +
81 s c a l e x d i s c r e t e ( l im i t s=MutationTime ) +
82 theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =16) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =16) ,
83 ax i s . t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =18) )
84
85 ggsave (”QPT. png” , QPT, path = outputdir , he ight = 5 .75 , width = 5 . 4 , un i t s = ”
in ”)
D.5 Validation T-tests
ValidationTTests.R takes control and mutation data and conducts t-tests at the 99%
confidence level to look for a difference in the two reported means.
1 r e qu i r e ( t i dyv e r s e )
2 r e qu i r e ( dplyr )
3 r e qu i r e ( r eadx l )
4 r e qu i r e ( s t r i n g r )
5
6 #Read Rep l i c a t i on Data
7 setwd (”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /”)
8
9 MayerControl <− a s t i b b l e ( r e ad ex c e l (” Resu l t s . x l sx ” , shee t = ”Control − 30
Hosts ”) )
10 Tr ia l30S <− a s t i b b l e ( r e ad ex c e l (” Resu l t s . x l sx ” , shee t = ”30 sec − 30 Hosts ”) )
11 Trial1M <− a s t i b b l e ( r e ad ex c e l (” Resu l t s . x l sx ” , shee t = ”60 sec − 30 Hosts ”) )
12 Trial5M <− a s t i b b l e ( r e ad ex c e l (” Resu l t s . x l sx ” , shee t = ”5 min − 30 Hosts ”) )
13 Trial15M <− a s t i b b l e ( r e ad ex c e l (” Resu l t s . x l sx ” , shee t = ”15 min − 30 Hosts ”) )
14
15 #setwd (”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /
Va l idat i on ”)
16
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17 #MayerControl <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e =”MayerControl . csv ” , header=TRUE, sep
= ’ , ’ , na . s t r i n g s = ”−”, f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−8”) )
18 #Tria l30S <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e =”Mayer30S . csv ” , header=TRUE, sep = ’ , ’ , na .
s t r i n g s = ”−”, f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−8”) )
19 #Trial1M <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e =”Mayer30S . csv ” , header=TRUE, sep = ’ , ’ , na .
s t r i n g s = ”−”, f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−8”) )
20 #Trial5M <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e =”Mayer30S . csv ” , header=TRUE, sep = ’ , ’ , na .
s t r i n g s = ”−”, f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−8”) )
21 #Trial15M <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e =”Mayer30S . csv ” , header=TRUE, sep = ’ , ’ , na .
s t r i n g s = ”−”, f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−8”) )
22
23 treatments <− c (” Control ” ,”30S” , ”1M” , ”5M” , ”15M”)
24
25 #Change to output d i r e c t o r y
26 setwd (”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /
Va l idat i on ”)
27
28 t . t e s t . robust <− f unc t i on ( Control , Mutation , hyp , con f id ence ) {
29 obj<−t ry ( t . t e s t ( Control , Mutation , var . equal = hyp , conf . l e v e l = con f idence )
, s i l e n t=TRUE)
30 i f ( i s ( obj , ” try−e r r o r ”) ) re turn ( warnings ( ) ) e l s e re turn ( obj )
31 }
32
33 tTest s <− f unc t i on ( ControlData , MutationData , Tr i a l )
34 {
35 p r i n t ( paste (” Conducting t−t e s t s f o r ” , Tr ia l , sep = ” ”) )
36 #Do t−t e s t s 99% con f idence l e v e l s f o r a l l met r i c s
37 s ink ( paste (”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /
Resu l t s /Va l idat i on /” , Tr ia l , ” 99 T−Tests . txt ” , sep = ””) , append =
FALSE)
38
39 p r i n t (” Scan − I ”)
40 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$ ‘ In t ense Scan ‘ , MutationData$ ‘ In t ense Scan ‘ ,
hyp = TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
41 p r i n t (” Scan − Q”)
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42 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$ ‘ Quick Scan ‘ , MutationData$ ‘ Quick Scan ‘ , hyp
= TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
43 p r i n t (” Hosts − I ”)
44 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$ ‘ In t ense Hosts ‘ , MutationData$ ‘ In t ense Hosts
‘ , hyp = TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
45 p r i n t (” Hosts − Q”)
46 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$ ‘ Quick Hosts ‘ , MutationData$ ‘ Quick Hosts ‘ ,
hyp = TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
47 p r i n t (”Pen Time − I ”)
48 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$ ‘ Pen Time − I ‘ , MutationData$ ‘ Pen Time − I ‘ ,
hyp = TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
49 p r i n t (”Pen Time − Q”)
50 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$ ‘ Pen Time − Q‘ , MutationData$ ‘ Pen Time − Q‘ ,
hyp = TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
51 s ink ( )
52 }
53
54 tTest s (MayerControl , Tria l30S , ”30S”)
55 tTest s (MayerControl , Trial1M , ”1M”)
56 tTest s (MayerControl , Trial5M , ”5M”)
57 tTest s (MayerControl , Trial15M , ”15M”)
D.6 QoS Analysis
StatsTests.R takes the input from ReadResults.R and then charts the differences between
control and mutation data. It also conducts t-tests and is capable of producing histograms.
1 r e qu i r e ( t i dyv e r s e )
2 r e qu i r e ( r eadx l )
3 r e qu i r e ( s t r i n g r )
4 r e qu i r e ( ggp lot2 )
5 r e qu i r e ( psych )
6 r e qu i r e ( reshape2 )
7 r e qu i r e ( cowplot )
8 r e qu i r e ( matr ixStats )
9 r e qu i r e ( ex t r a f on t )
203
10
11 #Process avgs . csv f i l e s f o r a l l the p r o t o c o l s under t e s t and conduct t−t e s t s
as we l l as make box & whisker p l o t s .
12 #Has c ap ab i l i t y to make histograms ( cu r r en t l y commented out c a l l to func t i on
histograms ( ) )
13
14 c t r l d i r s <− c (”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /
Resu l t s /FTP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /
Experiments /Resu l t s /HTTP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/
Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /IMAP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/
Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /POP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /
smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /RTP/Control
” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /
SMTP/Control ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /
Experiments /Resu l t s /SSH/Control ”)
15 mutatedirs <− c (”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments
/Resu l t s /FTP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /
Experiments /Resu l t s /HTTP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/
Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /IMAP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/
Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /POP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /
smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /RTP/Mutator
” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /Resu l t s /
SMTP/Mutator ” ,”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /
Experiments /Resu l t s /SSH/Mutator ”)
16 p ro to co l <− c (”FTP” ,”HTTP” ,”IMAP” ,”POP” ,”RTP” ,”SMTP” ,”SSH”)
17 #RIPs o f sender used f o r each t r i a l . 1 : 1 mapping with p ro to co l vec to r
18
19 #Generic f i l ename format
20 avg s s t r <− ”AAA X Avgs . csv ”
21
22 updateFilename <− f unc t i on ( avg s s t r , d i r e c to ry , p ro to co l )
23 {
24 #Update f i l enames f o r the cur rent p ro to co l
25 avg s s t r <− sub ( ” ˆ [ [ : upper : ] ] { 3 , } ” , protoco l , a v g s s t r )
26
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27 i f ( g r ep l (” Control ” , d i r e c t o r y ) )
28 {
29 return ( avg s s t r <− sub (” X ” , ” C ” , a v g s s t r ) )
30 }
31 e l s e i f ( g r ep l (”Mutator ” , d i r e c t o r y ) )
32 {
33 return ( avg s s t r <− sub (” X ” , ” M ” , a vg s s t r ) )
34 }
35 e l s e
36 {
37 p r in t (” Error a s s i gn i ng output f i l e name . ” )
38 re turn (” Error in updateFilename ”)
39 }
40 }
41
42
43 t . t e s t . robust <− f unc t i on ( Control , Mutation , hyp , con f id ence ) {
44 obj<−t ry ( t . t e s t ( Control , Mutation , var . equal = hyp , conf . l e v e l = con f idence )
, s i l e n t=TRUE)
45 i f ( i s ( obj , ” try−e r r o r ”) ) re turn (”T t e s t e r r o r . I s your data e s s e n t i a l l y
constant ?”) e l s e re turn ( obj )
46 }
47
48
49 boxplot s <− f unc t i on (ExptData , p ro to co l )
50 {
51 p r i n t ( paste (” Creat ing boxp lot s f o r ” , protoco l , sep = ” ”) )
52 #Set output d i r e c t o r y
53 outputd i r <− ”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Latex/
Figures ”
54 #S l i d e s Dir
55 outputd i r <− ”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis / S l i d e s /”
56
57 #Generate box & whisker p l o t s f o r data
58 i f ( p ro to co l != ”RTP”)
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59 {
60 boxylatency <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$latency ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) +labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”
Latency ( sec ) ”) + theme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) +
theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s .
t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
61 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” l a t en cy . png ” , sep = ””) , boxylatency , path =
outputdir , he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
62
63 boxyRTT <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$RTT) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”RTT (
sec ) ”) + theme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) + theme (
text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s .
t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
64 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” RTT. png” , sep = ””) , boxyRTT, path = outputdir ,
he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
65 }
66 e l s e
67 {
68 boxyMJ S <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$MaxjitterS ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”
Maximum J i t t e r ( s ec ) ”) + theme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”
none ”) + theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t
. x = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) ,
ax i s . t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
69 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” Max J i t t e r S . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyMJ S , path =
outputdir , he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
70
71 boxyJ S <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$j i t terS ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”Mean
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J i t t e r ( s ec ) ”) + th eme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) +
theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s .
t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
72 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” J i t t e r S . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyJ S , path =
outputdir , he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
73
74 boxyMJ R <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$MaxjitterR ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”
Maximum J i t t e r ( s ec ) ”) + theme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”
none ”) + theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t
. x = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) ,
ax i s . t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
75 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” Max Jitter R . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyMJ R , path =
outputdir , he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
76
77 boxyJ R <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$j itterR ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”Mean
J i t t e r ( s ec ) ”) + th eme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) +
theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s .
t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
78 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” J i t t e r R . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyJ R , path =
outputdir , he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
79 }
80
81 boxyduration <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$duration ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”
Duration ( sec ) ”) + th eme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) +
theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e .
x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y = e l ement text ( f a c e
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=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
82 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” dura t i on . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyduration , path =
outputdir , he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
83
84 boxyBPS S <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$BPSSender ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”Sender
Throughput ( bps ) ”) + theme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) +
theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e .
x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y = e l ement text ( f a c e
=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
85 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” BPS S . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyBPS S , path = outputdir ,
he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
86
87 boxyBPS R <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$BPSReceiver ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”
Rece iver Throughput ( bps ) ”) + theme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n =
”none ”) + theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t .
x = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s .
t i t l e . x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
88 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” BPS R . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyBPS R , path = outputdir ,
he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
89
90 boxyPktS <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$PktsSender ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”Packets
Sent ”) + th eme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) + theme ( text
=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text (
s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e . x =
e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y = e l ement text ( f a c e=”
bold ” , s i z e =20) )
91 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” PktsS . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyPktS , path = outputdir ,
he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
92
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93 boxyPktR <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$PktsReceiver ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”
Packets Received ”)+ th eme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) +
theme ( text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e .
x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y = e l ement text ( f a c e
=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
94 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” PktsR . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyPktR , path = outputdir ,
he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
95
96 boxyDrop <− ggp lot (ExptData , aes ( ExptData$control , ExptData$PktsDrop ) ) +
geom boxplot ( ) + geom point ( ) + labs (x = ”Experiment Type” , y = ”Dropped
Packets ”) + th eme c l a s s i c ( ) + theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n = ”none ”) + theme (
text=e l ement text ( fami ly = ”Century Gothic ”) , ax i s . t ex t . x =
e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t ex t . y = e l ement text ( s i z e =18) , ax i s . t i t l e .
x = e l ement text ( f a c e=”bold ” , s i z e =20) , ax i s . t i t l e . y = e l ement text ( f a c e
=”bold ” , s i z e =20) )
97 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” Drop . png ” , sep = ””) , boxyDrop , path = outputdir ,
he ight = 5 . 5 , width = 4 . 7 , un i t s = ” in ”)
98
99 p r i n t ( paste (”Graphs c rea ted in : ” , outputdir , sep = ””) )
100 }
101
102 tTest s <− f unc t i on ( ControlData , MutationData , p ro to co l )
103 {
104
105
106 p r in t ( paste (” Conducting t−t e s t s f o r ” , protoco l , sep = ” ”) )
107 #Do t−t e s t s 99% con f idence l e v e l s f o r a l l met r i c s
108 #s ink ( paste (”C: / Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Experiments /
Resu l t s /” , protoco l , ”/” , protoco l , ” 99 T−Tests . txt ” , sep = ””) , append
= FALSE)
109
110 i f ( p ro to co l != ”RTP”)
111 {
209
112 p r in t (” Latency ”)
113 p r in t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$latency , MutationData$latency , hyp = TRUE,
con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
114 p r in t (”RTT”)
115 p r in t ( t . t e s t . robust (ControlData$RTT , MutationData$RTT , hyp = TRUE,
con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
116 }
117 e l s e
118 {
119 #pr in t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$MaxjitterS , MutationData$MaxjitterS , hyp
= TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
120 #pr in t ( t . t e s t . robust ( Contro lData$ j i t t e rS , Mutat ionData$j i t terS , hyp = TRUE
, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
121 p r in t (”Max J i t t e r ”)
122 p r in t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$MaxjitterR , MutationData$MaxjitterR , hyp =
TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
123 p r in t (”Mean J i t t e r ”)
124 p r in t ( t . t e s t . robust ( Contro lData$j i t terR , MutationData$j itterR , hyp = TRUE,
con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
125 }
126 p r i n t (” Duration ”)
127 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$duration , MutationData$duration , hyp = TRUE,
con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
128 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$BPSSender , MutationData$BPSSender , hyp =
TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
129 p r i n t (”Throughput ”)
130 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$BPSReceiver , MutationData$BPSReceiver , hyp =
TRUE, con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
131 p r i n t (”Dropped Packets ”)
132 p r i n t ( t . t e s t . robust ( ControlData$PktsDrop , MutationData$PktsDrop , hyp = TRUE,
con f idence = 0 . 99 ) )
133 s ink ( )
134 }
135
136 histograms <− f unc t i on ( ControlData , MutationData , p ro to co l )
210
137 {
138 p r in t ( paste (” Creat ing histograms f o r ” , protoco l , sep = ” ”) )
139 #Set output d i r e c t o r y
140 outputd i r <− ”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Latex/
Figures ”
141
142 i f ( p ro to co l != ”RTP”)
143 {
144 cLatency <− ggp lot ( ControlData , aes ( l a t ency ) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10)
+ theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”
Latency ( sec ) ”) + ylab (” Frequency ”)
145 cRTT <− ggp lot ( ControlData , aes (RTT) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10) + theme (
ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”RTT ( sec ) ”) +
ylab (” Frequency ”)
146
147 mLatency <− ggp lot (MutationData , aes ( l a t ency ) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10)
+ theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”
Latency ( sec ) ”) + ylab (” Frequency ”)
148 mRTT <− ggp lot (MutationData , aes (RTT) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10) + theme
( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”RTT ( sec ) ”)
+ ylab (” Frequency ”)
149 }
150 e l s e
151 {
152 c J i t t e r <− ggp lot ( ControlData , aes ( j i t t e rR ) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10) +
theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (” J i t t e r
( s ec ) ”) + ylab (” Frequency ”)
153 mJitter <− ggp lot (MutationData , aes ( j i t t e rR ) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10)
+ theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”
J i t t e r ( s ec ) ”) + ylab (” Frequency ”)
154 }
155
156 cBPSR <− ggp lot ( ControlData , aes ( BPSReceiver ) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10) +
theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”
Throughput ( bps ) ”) + ylab (” Frequency ”)
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157 cDrop <− ggp lot ( ControlData , aes ( PktsDrop ) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10) +
theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”Dropped
Packets ”) + ylab (” Frequency ”)
158
159 mBPSR <− ggp lot (MutationData , aes ( BPSReceiver ) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10)
+ theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”
Throughput ( bps ) ”) + ylab (” Frequency ”)
160 mDrop <− ggp lot (MutationData , aes ( PktsDrop ) ) + geom histogram ( b ins = 10) +
theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le=70, v ju s t =0.5) ) + xlab (”Dropped
Packets ”) + ylab (” Frequency ”)
161
162 i f ( p ro to co l != (”RTP”) )
163 {
164 i f ( p ro to co l == ”HTTP”)
165 {
166 #Spec i a l case s i n c e HTTP drop graph isn ’ t d e s c r i p t i v e
167 cGrid <− p l o t g r i d ( cLatency , cRTT, cBPSR, l a b e l s = c (”” , ”” , ””) )
168 mGrid <− p l o t g r i d (mLatency , mRTT, mBPSR, l a b e l s = c (”” , ”” , ””) )
169 }
170 e l s e
171 {
172 cGrid <− p l o t g r i d ( cLatency , cRTT, cBPSR, cDrop , l a b e l s = c (”” , ”” , ”” ,
””) )
173 mGrid <− p l o t g r i d (mLatency , mRTT, mBPSR, mDrop , l a b e l s = c (”” , ”” , ”” ,
””) )
174 }
175 }
176 e l s e
177 {
178 cGrid <− p l o t g r i d ( c J i t t e r , cBPSR, cDrop , l a b e l s = c (”” , ”” , ”” , ””) )
179 mGrid <− p l o t g r i d ( mJitter , mBPSR, mDrop , l a b e l s = c (”” , ”” , ”” , ””) )
180 }
181 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” C Hist . png ” , sep = ””) , cGrid , path = outputd i r )
182 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” M Hist . png ” , sep = ””) , mGrid , path = outputd i r )
183 }
212
184
185 pieCharts <− f unc t i on ( ControlData , MutationData , p ro to co l )
186 {
187 p r in t ( paste (” Creat ing p i e char t s f o r ” , protoco l , sep = ” ”) )
188 #Set output d i r e c t o r y
189 outputd i r <− ”C:/ Users /smayer .CDN/Documents/GitHub/Mayer Thesis /Latex/
Figures ”
190
191 QoSNames = c (” Retransmiss ion ” , ”Fast Retransmiss ion ” , ”Lost ACK” , ”Out o f
Order ” , ” Spur ious Retransmiss ion ” , ”Dupl i cate ACK” , ”Window Update ” , ”
Window Ful l ” , ”Data ”)
192
193 #Control
194
195 QoSDataC = c (
196 mean( ControlData$RetransS ) ,
197 mean( ControlData$FastRetransR ) ,
198 mean(ControlData$ACKlostR ) ,
199 mean(ControlData$OutOfOrderR ) ,
200 mean( ControlData$SRetransR ) ,
201 mean(ControlData$DupACKR) ,
202 mean(ControlData$WinUpdateR ) ,
203 mean( ControlData$WinFullR )
204 )
205
206 datapkts <− mean( ControlData$PktsReceiver )−sum(QoSDataC)
207
208 QoSDataC = c (QoSDataC , datapkts )
209
210 QoSdfC <− data . frame ( QoS Metric = QoSNames , c on t r o l = round (QoSDataC , 0) )
211
212 p r in t (QoSdfC)
213 p r in t (sum( QoSdfC$control ) )
214
213
215 QoSbp <− ggp lot (QoSdfC , aes ( x=”Average Packet D i s t r i bu t i on ” , y=contro l , f i l l
=QoS Metric ) ) +
216 geom bar ( width = 1 , s t a t = ” i d e n t i t y ”) +
217 th eme c l a s s i c ( )
218 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” C Pie . png ” , sep = ””) , QoSbp , path = outputd i r )
219
220
221 #Mutate
222
223 QoSDataM = c (
224 mean(MutationData$RetransS ) ,
225 mean(MutationData$FastRetransR ) ,
226 mean(MutationData$ACKlostR ) ,
227 mean(MutationData$OutOfOrderR ) ,
228 mean(MutationData$SRetransR ) ,
229 mean(MutationData$DupACKR) ,
230 mean(MutationData$WinUpdateR ) ,
231 mean(MutationData$WinFullR )
232 )
233
234 datapkts <− mean(MutationData$PktsReceiver )−sum(QoSDataM)
235
236 QoSDataM = c (QoSDataM, datapkts )
237
238 QoSdfM <− data . frame ( QoS Metric = QoSNames , mutator = QoSDataM)
239
240 p r in t (QoSdfM)
241 p r in t (sum(QoSdfM$mutator ) )
242
243 QoSbp <− ggp lot (QoSdfM , aes ( x=”Average Packet D i s t r i bu t i on ” , y=contro l , f i l l
=QoS Metric ) ) +
244 geom bar ( width = 1 , s t a t = ” i d e n t i t y ”) +
245 th eme c l a s s i c ( )
246 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” M Pie . png ” , sep = ””) , QoSbp , path = outputd i r )
247
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248 QoSData <− QoSdfC
249 QoSData$mutator <− round (QoSdfM$mutator , 0)
250 p r in t (QoSData )
251
252 QoSData .m <− melt (QoSData , id . vars = ”QoS Metric ”)
253 p r in t (QoSData .m)
254
255 QoSChart <− ggp lot ( data=QoSData .m, aes ( x=QoS Metric , y=value ) )+
256 geom bar ( aes ( f i l l =va r i ab l e ) , p o s i t i o n = pos i t i on dodge ( ) , s t a t = ” i d e n t i t y
”) +
257 geom text ( aes ( l a b e l = value , group = va r i ab l e ) ,
258 s i z e = 3 , ang le = 0 , p o s i t i o n = pos i t i on dodge ( width=0.9) ) +
259 theme ( ax i s . t ex t . x = e l ement text ( ang le = 90 , h ju s t = 1) ) +
260 c o o r d f l i p ( ) +
261 theme ( legend . p o s i t i o n=”bottom”)
262
263 ggsave ( paste ( protoco l , ” Drop . png ” , sep = ””) , QoSChart , path = outputd i r )
264 }
265
266
267 proc e s sPro to co l <− f unc t i on ( c t l d i r , mutate dir , f i l ename , p ro to co l )
268 {
269 p r in t ( p ro to co l )
270
271 #Import & prepare Data ( expect s . csv s to r ed in UTF−8)
272 #F i l e i s d i f f e r e n t from f i l ename so that i t can su rv iv e being regexe ’ d
273 p r in t ( c t l d i r )
274 f i l e <− updateFilename ( f i l ename , c t l d i r , p r o to co l )
275 ControlData <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e=paste ( c t l d i r , ”/” , f i l e , sep = ””) ,
header=TRUE, sep = ’ , ’ , f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−8”) )
276 p r in t ( mutate d i r )
277 f i l e <− updateFilename ( f i l ename , mutate dir , p r o to co l )
278 MutationData <− a s t i b b l e ( read . csv ( f i l e=paste ( mutate dir , ”/” , f i l e , sep =
””) , header=TRUE, sep = ’ , ’ , f i l eEncod ing = ”UTF−8”) )
279 p r in t (”Data read from f i l e s . ” )
215
280
281 #Print & de s c r i b e data
282 p r in t ( ControlData )
283 p r in t (MutationData )
284
285 Contro lStat s <− de s c r i b e ( ControlData )
286 MutationStats <− de s c r i b e (MutationData )
287
288 ControlData <− add column ( ControlData , c on t r o l = TRUE)
289 MutationData <− add column (MutationData , c on t r o l = FALSE)
290 ExptData <− rbind ( ControlData , MutationData )
291 bool <− f a c t o r ( ExptData$control==1, l a b e l s = c (”Mutator ” ,” Control ”) )
292 p r in t ( bool )
293 ExptData$control <− bool
294 p r in t (ExptData )
295
296 myPlots <− boxplots (ExptData , p ro to co l )
297 #tTest s ( ControlData , MutationData , p ro to co l )
298 #histograms ( ControlData , MutationData , p ro to co l )
299 #pieCharts ( ControlData , MutationData , p ro to co l )
300 }
301
302 f o r ( j in c ( 2 : 7 ) )
303 {
304 proc e s sPro to co l ( c t l d i r = c t r l d i r s [ j ] , mutate d i r = mutatedirs [ j ] , f i l ename
= avgs s t r , p r o to co l = pro to co l [ j ] )
305 }
216
Appendix E. Network Wiring Diagram
This appendix includes the physical connections between the SDN switch and two servers
used to conduct experiments. The rack diagram used an IBM switch due to a lack of
available Pica rack diagrams. On the real Pica switch, the numbering for ports is flipped
(i.e., top row ports are even and bottom row ports are odd). For this thesis, the dotted red
line on Port 2 of Aberdeen 1 indicates an inactive interface. The HP switch on port 1 of
Aberdeen 1 did not play a role in this thesis.
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